

RELIGION IN LIFE

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Religion in Life

FRANCIS J. McCONNELL

THERE are two terms in my title hard to define. One is religion and the other is life. In such a title we usually know what we mean by life, namely, fullness and fineness of human experience. For our purpose too it may be fairly satisfactory to think of religion as the efforts, and the results of the efforts, of human beings to make adjustments to the invisible powers which they think of as being under or over or back of the things that are seen. The religious feeling may show itself in a dread of the invisible powers, or in a consciousness of dependence upon them, or in a striving for communion with them.

There was a time when religion was manifestly the outcome of and the demand of the total human experience, and that demand is true of some types of religion to-day. If we think of ancestor-worship in China as a religious expression we must recognize that such worship touches all phases of the daily life of the Chinese. The dead hands of the ancestors are quite as potent factors in the daily existence of the Chinese as are the living hands of their neighbors. The family life is ruled by the duties due the ancestor to such an extent that some social students insist that the over-population of China is due to the necessity of every man's having sons to perform duties after the fathers have joined the ancestors. In India, Hinduism, the religion of two hundred and seventy-five millions of people, through its minute regulations even of the foods its followers eat, touches the lives of its followers many times every day. In the less developed religions, like belief in demons and witches, the control of daily life is even more detailed and exacting.

The first step away from this direct interest of men in religious observances came with the delegation of religious activities to a separate class of priests. In Genesis there is an interesting and revealing story of an Israelite's persuading a wandering traveler, who proved to be expert in the performance of religious ceremonies, to remain permanently in the Israelite's house and in return for shelter and food to take charge of the religious rites of the household. This primitive division of labor was quite likely to have notable consequences. Inevitably the fact that the head of the house had himself ceased to conduct the religious rites would make him not necessarily less interested in those rites but certainly less familiar with their performance and more dependent upon the specialized knowledge of the expert. After a time one priest could do the work of several

families, and in the populous centers the priests be drawn together by common interests.

By the time the priestly organization plays any part in connection with the ruling powers of society it is open to the charge that on the one hand it stands apart from the real currents of life, and that on the other it becomes an agency blocking the normal and natural program of society as a living organism. This charge has been made against the agents of organized religion ever since there have been such agents. Religious conservatism has a number of roots—one of them being the adult man's unwillingness to give up the conceptions which he was taught as a child, and another the priest's utilization of this feeling to maintain the *status quo*—the conservation at times playing into the hands of the social classes who have most to gain by maintaining things as they are and most to lose by any change. It is not necessary to call priests insincere to account for this blocking of living social forces. In the old days of magic in religion probably most priests genuinely believed in the magic. Take the belief in extreme sacramentarianism to-day—the belief that in the wafer and wine of the communion service an actual physical miracle is wrought and that the divine is actually physically present in the elements in a fashion other than in unblessed wafers and wine. There are, no doubt, priests who sincerely do believe just that, and there are, no doubt, phases of this belief which stand in the way of, and can be used against, the advancing stream of the living program of society. Indeed the tendency of organized religion is like that of any organization—the resistance of change, and change is of the very essence of life.

While all the above is true we must nevertheless note some differences which are becoming increasingly clear. As individuals the believers who have composed the religious organizations have, in the nature of the case, been immersed in life. The need of earning daily bread has made that necessary. It is to the organizational activities as organizational that I have been referring. Now the more modern developments of democracy have brought about a new opportunity for religious bodies. Principal A. D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol, has of late shown that at present any democracy which includes a nation in its sweep is too big to find its way along alone—too big also to be effectively swayed by the eloquence or imagination of a single leader. We must look instead to the activities of like-minded groups such as trade-unions, civic associations, and churches to give enough body to progressive ideas to cause society to advance. There are signs that the realization of this corporate responsibility is bringing reli-

gious organizations definitely into the stream of present-day social life. We can confidently look forward to a period when the realization of this corporate responsibility will bring the church into the stream of community life with an effectiveness never yet known. As long as the priests of a church are guardians of what are regarded as the secrets of eternal life they can hold an organization firm against the forces of change, and as long as they are custodians also of any form of vested interests they can to a degree withstand change. When, however, the church itself knows in its membership the tides of advancing life officialism cannot do much to keep the church from taking its place in the forward-moving currents of the world's life. For illustration, the complaint of the friends of the liquor traffic to-day is that the church has thrown itself too completely into actual living problems. This general tendency will become more and not less. The plain man judges religion by life-tests and the thought of the plain man to-day shapes the interpretation of ecclesiastical standards of religious character. The churches that insist on inner experience declare that the possession of a religious experience is revealed by the type of life it produces. The churches that insist on acceptance of creed avow that vital belief determines conduct. The ritualistic organizations will have it that the observance of ritual shows itself in better character. All agree that churches must stand or fall by their effects stated in human terms.

A second movement which has tended to take religion out of the closest touch with living experience has proceeded in the more intellectual realm. There was a time when religion definitely ruled all thinking. Every stir in nature was the direct act of God or of a god. Men arguing for the existence of God sought to find proof of a design in every detail of creation—or, on the other hand, in miracles which were taken as showing the intentions of the divine. Of later years the scientific method has met with general enough acceptance to convince most men who take thinking seriously that everything acts according to law, miracle itself being according to a higher law or a law not yet thoroughly understood. A division has been made between science and religion—or, rather, between science and theology—giving to science the sphere of explanation or the tracing of antecedents and consequents—the pointing out of the inevitability with which some consequents follow some antecedents, and the conditions under which events in the natural world can be produced or foretold. Science, strictly speaking, does not deal with the nature of back-lying causes at all. Religion has to do with the interpretation of the character of such causes.

This division seems plausible enough and fair enough, but some of its actual effects have not been fortunate. To begin with, too few scientists have kept to their own side of the line. If pressed for a statement as to the function of science, they indeed say that science concerns itself merely with antecedents and consequents in a scheme of law. When not thus pressed they are likely to speak with authority on philosophy and religion. Scientists are usually poor philosophers, but that makes no difference with multitudes of men. The multitudes think the scientist is as authoritative in discerning the character of the Cause under all things as he is in announcing the formula according to which the Cause works in the realm of phenomena. Moreover, the statement that science knows nothing about the back-lying cause is misleading. The ordinary reader thinks that if the scientist cannot attain to this knowledge nobody can. But the allotment of so much territory to science—the whole world of sense phenomena—seems to many serious-minded people to leave very little for religion, which forthwith becomes obscure and remote. The division between science and religion—leaving to science the description of the working of phenomenal laws and to religion the reflection upon the fundamental Cause—is sound enough. Practically it has resulted in an apparent turning over to science of almost the entire sphere of living fact and in relegating religion to a place of slight vital significance. As the skeptic once said, after the reign of physical law is once established we bow God out of the universe with thanks for his provisional services.

It is from the use of the scientist's method itself that there is brought about a moving back to the recognition of the part religion plays in life. The scientist is always talking about taking account of facts as they are. Looking thus at facts as they are there have been revealed in the past quarter-century vast bodies of fact in the form of psychological phenomena. Of course, the psychologist is prone to insist that these facts have only psychological significance and do not point to objective reality. It is rather dangerous, however, for the psychologists to talk in this fashion, for they claim objective reality for psychological systems, failing to see that it is as possible to say that the seizure of psychological principles is just as psychological in its process as is the seizure of religious principle. Waiving this scruple, however, modern science recognizes that, psychologically at least, religious phenomena are among the most obtrusive facts of life.

Moreover, the differences between scientists themselves as to the deeper significance of their theories are more and more seen to depend upon the underlying assumptions which the scientists make. Scientists

are for the most part divided into two camps—those with the will-to-believe and those with the will-not-to-believe. The former temper puts the largest, most helpful construction on the facts that the facts will bear and is more productive than the will-not-to-believe, invaluable as this latter is for the systematic confirmation of scientific discoveries.

Now whether a thinker wills to believe or wills not to believe depends upon assumptions that he makes concerning values in the universe—especially as to the extent to which what we call the human values count. More and more the atmosphere of our time judges facts, even scientific facts, by their human interest. Once in a while a scientist ponderously affirms that one fact weighs as much as another with him—that facts are all on the same plane, with a sort of democracy among them, all being equals. If scientists actually regarded facts thus we should find ourselves at the end of scientific discovery, for such discovery depends upon the discernment of leading facts, of ranks and orders among facts. Facts do not constitute a democracy among themselves. There are ruling facts which lord it over their fellows. What the scientist probably means is that he takes account of all the facts, but such taking account does not imply giving each fact the same weight. All facts must be faced, but some must be totally ignored after they are faced as being devoid of all meaning for the particular purpose in hand. It requires but a little knowledge of the actual methods of scientists to discover the extent to which subjective interests enter even into their discovery of facts. These subjective interests are often those that make the widest and deepest human appeal. They are begotten in the scientist oftentimes by the social expectations of the times in which he lives.

At the present time there is more emphasis on the right of religion to a place in the interpretation of scientific fact than for perhaps a generation. When the scientist tells us that all he can predict is a slowing down of the forces of the earth and the consequent decay of all life the religious thinker replies that this does not settle the worth of the religious ideals. The disappearance of the race from the earth because of the wearing out of physical forces may not mean any more than the disappearance of individuals from the earth due to the death of the physical organism. From the beginning mankind has refused to take the death of individuals as necessarily the last word as to the significance of those individuals. In any event the greater meaning for life which science is showing to-day lies not merely in the larger control over physical forces which science is achieving but in the larger place which science is willingly

conceding to religion in the interpretation of physical facts. Of more significance is the refusal of religious thinkers to be dominated by the scientists' interpretations whether those interpretations are friendly or not. We are not willing to let scientists have the last word in these fields. The scientist may keep the believer in religion off particular premises for a while, but the pressure of the demands of life is too heavy, especially after it becomes clear that the scientist himself has no right to the premises.

Again, more schools of psychology would to-day relegate religion from the realm of life considered as reality by making religion an illusion, or a projection on the world by wishful thinking. One foremost leader will have it that religion is the last great illusion to be destroyed. Religion appears to be a retreat from reality, the nourisher and consoler of sick and hurt souls not strong enough to face life and the truth. It is a defense mechanism built up against the stern facts of daily existence. The only way to get men to face life as it is is to destroy this illusion.

Well, religion is not the only fact in experience that supplies a retreat for men. What does a poet do when confronted with the ugliness of the actual world, but retreat so far into an ideal realm of beauty that he ceases to see the ugly? What does the social reformer do when confronted with the myriad injustices of the present social order but move toward some Utopia which will always be of the stuff of which dreams are made? What does the scientist do in the presence of the chaos and confusion of the fact world but fasten his gaze upon an imaginary world where everything falls into order? Even the mathematicians have told us of their pure delight in contemplating the precision with which the most intricate equations hold together in perfect statement. Why should artistic and scientific tranquillity of spirit be so commendable and religious tranquillity be so reprehensible? Anything that brings into life calmness leads to the release of new energies.

Here is where the Freudian falls short in his interpretation of religious experience. If believers did really withdraw from the world in vast numbers, if a majority of them thus withdrew, or a respectable minority, more might be said for religion as a retreat. The outstanding fact is that the believers are certainly not living in a realm apart but are among the hard workers of the world. Their testimony is that their religious reflections enable them to come back to work, after moments of utter exhaustion and despair, and go on with their tasks. The testimony is substantially similar to that of artists and scientists. Believers are in the world by the

millions. If as many people were using religion merely as a retreat from the world, as the Freudian theory would demand, religion would immensely slow down the work of the world. As it is the charge that believers in religion are dreamers and not workers falls of its own inadequacy. We have only to look around us to see the limitations of the Freudian statement.

The psychologist is peculiarly prone to look upon a single individual as giving him the clue to a particular truth and then to forget how much his problem may be affected by the sheer multitudinousness of the individuals. He tells us that in understanding one individual he understands all. The "all," however, is appallingly numerous. We have on our hands not just a few individuals who might seem like "sports" in the play and crossplay of natural forces, but masses of persons whose number entitles them to be considered a cosmic problem. There individuals come into existence, in the Freudian theory, as the outcome of strictly natural causes. Now an agent, to our commonsense minds, is supposed to report at least something concerning itself by what it does. On the Freudian theory the reports of these natural causes convey nothing significant about the causes themselves except that they are producing illusions by the tens of millions. What the ultimate facts in the universe are the Freudian, with somewhat complacent humility, tells us that he does not know. He is willing to believe, however, that the more the ultimate realities do the less we know about them, except that they are producing illusions. I should think it would require about as strong intellectual swallowing power to believe that the cosmic forces are perpetually unable to tell the truth about themselves as to believe that they at least occasionally make sound self-revelations.

Somewhat akin to the Freudians, though not closely so, are the instrumentalists of to-day who teach that religious beliefs are so many instruments, or spiritual foods, or atmospheres to be valued for the effects they produce in the life and consciousness of individuals and in social conduct and institutions. The instrumentalist does not by any means look on the believer as a dreamer. He regards beliefs as forces in the world of activity, but he thinks their living significance is exhausted in their instrumental use. God is an instrumental idea, to be valued solely for the use made of it. If the idea of God becomes in use a living force that is as far as we need go. You at least cannot get God any farther into life than this.

This sounds plausible enough until we begin to ask what the life thus instrumentally nourished consists in. One phase of that life is the search for objective reality. God is an instrumental conception to help us

on to the glow of satisfaction we feel as we search for God the ultimate reality. The ultimate result of such search is to find more and better instruments, which in turn help us on to further instruments. Instruments are the ultimate realities to aid lives which are admittedly ends-in-themselves. If I can believe in a neighbor who is both instrumental to my larger life and at the same time an end-in-himself there would not seem to be any valid reason for closing the channels to belief in a God not only instrumental but likewise an end-in-himself.

The brandishing of instruments with no other aim than to get the thrill of brandishing and to get more and better instruments may seem at first to fit in well with the demands of actual life. In life we do use some instruments just for the joy of using them. We eat some foods just for the satisfaction of the palate. We breathe some airs for the intoxicating delight of the breathing itself. The human spirit, however, is much too serious to take all this as the whole of life. Even if we admit the sportsman's ideal of activity itself as an end-in-itself to be the final goal of human endeavor, we have a long way to travel before we reach that goal. Meantime there is a vast deal of individual and social effort to be undertaken and achieved—effort not suggestive of the sportsman ideal. If all our beliefs and practices are instrumental we wonder why the beliefs are always pointing to something beyond the instrumental. If we deal with instruments all the time we wonder if the realization of the truth that we can never get beyond instruments would not in the end chill our enthusiasms for the instruments. Some of to-day's educators insist that education is training in method, irrespective of what the method is to be used for. The intellectual blade is to be sharpened without reference to what it is to cut. The swing away from this method, already noticeable, is due to its lacking the feel and atmosphere of actual life.

A philosophy which to-day has much to say about its keeping close to the centers and issues of life calls itself humanism. That teaching insists that so far as our religious effort is concerned we should put man at the supreme place and keep him there. We are almost without the necessity of being told that some things are good for man. We recognize the dignity of the loftier human ideals. Let us take these on their own account, without raising any questions as to man's origin or his destiny, or his relation to the universe. If the universe is friendly, let us take the friendliness as clear gain; if it is hostile or indifferent, let us plant our feet on the firm basis of unyielding despair.

This philosophy has had two outcomes. In the hands of some who

have made man the measure of all things the tendency has been downhill away from the high idealism of the early formulators of the doctrine. The theory is fine enough for youth, when ideals lift the youth of their own power. If we take into account the logical precursor of humanism—pragmatism—the philosophy has now been in existence long enough for those who embraced it at its first appearance in their youth to have gone far into middle age or beyond. With many of these—though admittedly not all—humanism has become a set of loosely held practical principles with utilitarian standards as the tests of value. Others have run to extreme individualism, leaving to every man to select his scheme of values as best suits his thought or his taste, for this extreme individualism reduces what we once conceived of as rock-bottom ideas even of right and wrong to affairs of personal taste. Curiously enough this individualism was for a time aided from a quarter where we should least have expected—from mathematical physics and astronomy as set forth in Einstein's relativity—or rather from a misunderstanding of that theory. Einstein was for a time supposed to mean that even space-time events are so relative to the observer that every observer makes even his own space and time without any objective standard. A little careful study of Einstein reveals that he does not mean this. If his first readers of the humanistic type had been careful to master the significance of the "interval" in Einstein they would have been kept from the mistake of concluding that the great mathematician was trying to break the universe up into a spatial-temporal anarchy without any elements in objective reality common to all observers.

It is only fair to say that other humanists were not impressed with the virtues of extreme individualism and made their chief religious effort the attempt to make better the life of mankind in the man. On this side the social progress of the past quarter-century has benefited greatly from the philosophy which has emphasized and possibly over-emphasized the human values. In this type of humanism, moreover, are to be seen signs of a desire for something larger as an object of humanistic effort than any number of men taken merely as individuals.

The difficulty with humanism as more narrowly conceived is that in actual life humanism is not enough for human beings. I spoke a moment ago of Einstein. Einstein seems to be searching for one all-inclusive formula which will include space-time events as expressions of gravitational and electro-magnetic forces. He has said that he does not care to contemplate in a religious spirit any construction of nature which is merely the expression of man's will to have it so. This is strange coming from

the inventor or discoverer of relativity. In any case, however, this is an utterance of a mood which craves for religion something more than the strictly humanistic values. Others, like J. A. Hobson, are speaking in the same strain. They will have it that the human alone does not give a large enough object for human effort and meditation. Hobson insists that nature must be brought into the range of man's religious contemplation.

There are a good many human beings in the world, yet it is doubtful if any considerable proportion of them ever can be brought to accept humanism as a religious creed. Humanism as a creed will always be the religious system of small minorities. It may in itself be logically consistent enough, as beliefs go, but it is too small. There is not enough of it. Taking men as they are the world over and throughout all history, we find that as soon as they begin to brood over religious problems their minds reach out beyond the human. They ponder upon the forces of nature and upon the causes or Cause of those forces. It is possible to say that this out-reaching and far-reaching tendency is to be curbed and limited with the progress of religious thought, as we control the race-wide impulse to think in terms of magic in religion, but the proneness to range outward and upward, if not of the essence of religion, is certainly deep-seated in human nature. The mind may sweep far beyond the human and then declare that it has found that it must limit itself to the human, but will always be restless inside its self-imposed confines. This may be nothing but futility on the part of the mind, but it is thoroughly human—and thoroughly characteristic of the vital thinking of the living mind.

It remains to say a word about current emphasis on mysticism and its relation to life. The years preceding the World War saw widespread emphasis throughout Christendom on the practical and social phases of the Christian religion. With the close of the War, and with the ratification of the Peace Treaty there came upon a European Christianity, victors and vanquished alike, a feeling of the emptiness of all effort to redeem the institutions of this present world—and a yearning for retreat from the actual world. We were to meet God in mystic vision and let the world go by. This tendency was marked especially among the Protestant churches of Germany, with some traces of the movement in the churches of England.

Mysticism is common to virtually all religions. The psychological form of the experience is substantially the same everywhere. All depends on the motive of the search for the experience and its content. Christian mysticism partakes of the quality distinctive of Christianity—the exalta-

tion of moral values stated in human terms. One may see a genuine type of mysticism in the rapt "lostness," so to speak, of the Hindu holy man sitting by the Indian roadside. Such a seeker is indeed in quest of forgetfulness of the world and of all that is therein—for the world is evil and the successive stages of existence in which men play a part are horrors to be avoided by the mystic search. The mysticism of Christianity, on the other hand, comes out of moral striving and leads on to further striving. It comes out of life and leads back to life. The Hebrew prophets were mystics of the type afterward seen in Christianity. Their visions came out of passion for a better life for their people. There is little in the accounts of the experiences to suggest that a prophet was ever seeking a vision on his own personal account. The prophets were seldom concerned about their own individual salvation. They were searching for power and sanction in a moral struggle. Their vision bore upon a moral conflict.

Jesus declared that it is out of doing the divine will that men come to a knowledge of the truth. Manifestly, according to the teaching of Jesus, that divine will is to be done in the daily round of human tasks. Out of such doing arises an awareness of the divine similar to the awareness of truth or beauty which comes out of long practical devotion to truth and beauty, an awareness which is the mark of all mystic vision. In the teaching and example of Jesus religion and life are indissolubly bound together.

Religion in the Light of Contemporary Science

KIRTLEY F. MATHER

THE spirit of bitter antagonism, which a few decades ago was characteristic of the conflict between science and religion, is rapidly being replaced by an attitude of friendly and orderly co-operation. The advance of scientific method from the physical field, through biological territory, into the realm of psychology, is to-day forcing the average intelligent layman to distinguish between theological husks and religious kernel, in contemporary as well as in traditional religion. Thus modern science is actually encouraging the growth of a truer and more religious spirit in the attitude of thoughtful men toward the problems of the present and the future. At the same time scientists are becoming increasingly aware of the fact that the scientific method is only one of several possible ways of approaching reality and treating it. In the search for the truth that increases wisdom there is real need for a wider spread and a deeper hold of mental habits based upon a correct understanding of the actual limitations of science.

Apparently the more articulate of the current leaders in various fields of scientific research are well aware of this need. A survey of recent contributions from their pens reveals a sympathetic appreciation of the problems which arise in that broad segment of human thought where science and religion make contact with each other. When religion is looked upon as life rather than ritual, as an attitude toward the universe rather than a system of precepts, it is inevitable that the intelligent citizens of all enlightened lands should consider with the greatest interest the ideas developing in the minds of contemporary pioneers of scientific progress.

Especially significant is the new knowledge concerning the nature of human life and the administration of the universe. This knowledge makes possible the evolution of a religion based on reverence for the universe as it is now supposed to be, rather than on traditions which have come down from the pre-scientific age. Organized knowledge is of course much less than the whole of wisdom, but it is an absolutely essential part of wisdom.

Two of the world's most eminent biologists have recently presented the fruit of their mature scholarship and long experience in two magnificent volumes,¹ entitled *Life: Outlines of General Biology*. As the title sug-

¹ *Life: Outlines of General Biology*, by J. Arthur Thomson and Patrick Geddes. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931; 1515 pages (two volumes), illustrated, \$15.

gests, this work is a comprehensive survey of biological knowledge—a whole university course or, better, three or four such courses—presented as only such masters of literary expression and lucid exposition could present it. But it is much more than a textbook of biology, even though the professors should all agree that there is room in textbooks for illustrative anecdotes, kindly humor, sly digs, and satiric byplay. It is, in fact, the personal philosophy of two shrewd and vigorous men whose personal philosophy should be of more than passing interest to those who are trying to comprehend the revolution in “world-view” which modern science is achieving in this day. A thoughtful reading of these closely printed pages is indeed a liberal education in itself.

“Life,” as Thomson and Geddes view it, is something more than a mechanical concourse of atoms; it is both a biological and a psychological activity. Its manifestations include art and science and human institutions as well as organisms, simple and complex. The “neo-vitalism” of these hale septuagenarians involves nothing of metaphysical transcendentalism. Instead it leads them to place the emphasis upon social evolution which will be progressive in years to come only if men develop to the full the “superman” which is within each individual. Accordingly they call for “a yet fuller arousal of the ardor and devotion of youth, uniting anew its emotional, intellectual, and imaginative powers,” turning these “toward deeper and higher social achievements, with generous rivalry in the arts of true peace, at once reconstructive and evolutionary.”

Professor J. S. Haldane, in his latest book,² joins in the wholesome revolt against shallow and barren mechanism. There are, he says, three different realms, namely, physics, biology, and psychology, and the axioms of one are not applicable to the others. It is a mistake to try to force life and mind into Galileo’s and Newton’s conceptions of matter. Truth, right, and beauty are not merely manifestations of interests of individuals, but they unite us socially and religiously. There is evidence for the existence of God in our striving after truth, beauty, goodness. “It is neither consistent with religion nor with our actual experience to regard ourselves as nothing more than a series of obscure happenings on an obscure planet in a gigantic physical universe. Our universe is not outside of God, and the universe is the progressive manifestation of God. This is the basis of religion; and however often religion may be obscured by mistaken scientific metaphysics or buried in equally mistaken theology, it will return in

² *The Philosophical Basis of Biology*, by J. S. Haldane. Doubleday, Doran and Company, New York, 1931; 155 pages, \$2.

ever clearer form to guide and inspire humanity as it has done to such a great extent in the past, in spite of the baseless superstitions which have often been associated with it."

From these general surveys one turns logically to more specialized books dealing with the nature of man. Human mentality is a tangle, strangely compounded of factors which we are ever trying to resolve into categories of emotion, intellect, and volition. The interplay of passion, intelligence, and will which issues in personality provides one of the most insistent problems to those who agree that the greatest study for mankind is man. The science of psychology has in recent years thrown only indirect light upon this problem. Many attempts have been made to measure intelligence, but few to fathom it. The will is apt to be disposed of by treating it as something else. While biologists have been turning their backs on the older mechanistic views of life, the psychologist has been giving the impression that man is a victim of circumstance, a mere puppet on the stage.

Two books have recently come from the press which represent the very natural and altogether healthy protest which is to-day arising against the tendency to belittle the will as an element in human nature.³ Doctor Aveling is president of the British Psychological Society; for many years he has been engaged in research concerning the "higher thought processes" and is well known in Great Britain as an author and editor. Professor Wyatt has been mainly occupied in the direct study of education rather than of psychology, but, as he states, "to educate, one must know not only how to impart knowledge, but how to train intelligence, how to regulate passion and therefore how to develop and strengthen will."

Both authors arrive at approximately the same conclusion and ably defend a similar thesis. "The living being is capable of freedom in virtue of intelligence on the one hand and of volition on the other. Intelligence limits what he can do, what he will do depends upon volition. His freedom is thus limited by the degree of his intelligence. Intelligence is thus a limiting condition of will itself" (Wyatt). "In the strictest meaning of the term, a person is an individual incomunicably existing in himself, who is not merely will, or energy elicited by goals and determined by motives, but an intelligent will contemplating means to ends and making its own motives" (Aveling).

³ *Personality and Will*, by Francis A. P. Aveling. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1931; 242 pages, \$2. *The Psychology of Intelligence and Will*, by Horace G. Wyatt. Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1931; 273 pages, \$4.

Neither book is easy reading—the very nature of the subject and the profundity of its treatment preclude that—but each will prove intensely interesting to the reader who is willing to spend the mental energy required for the assimilation of its contents. Probably Doctor Aveling's volume will prove the better for the average layman, while the trained psychologist will be the more anxious to read Professor Wyatt's book with its criticisms of the several current theories of intelligence—criticisms with which he will probably not be altogether in sympathy.

Obviously, the problems of human nature and freedom of the will cannot be considered altogether apart from the question of the nature of the administration of the universe as a whole. Here again the mechanistic interpretations, so strongly intrenched along the scientific frontier a decade or more ago, have been largely abandoned or greatly modified. The "unbreakable chain of cause and effect" has apparently been broken, whether for better or for worse, by the introduction of the Heisenberg principle of indeterminism and uncertainty. Although this principle applies only to the inconceivably small units of matter and of energy, it has frequently been cited as providing a basis for a belief in the freedom of the human will. This would seem to be in error, for the principle of causality certainly applies in all the practical affairs of everyday life. In any event it now appears that judgments concerning causality and indeterminism must be suspended until more facts are known. At least this is the inference one draws from Planck's latest contribution to the subject.⁴

Professor Planck is the originator of the quantum theory, which for many years has threatened to overthrow the whole foundation of classical physics. Recently, however, it has been incorporated into the older body to make a more complete entity. This book is a presentation of his attitude toward the origin and significance of physical laws in the light of which he interprets the results of relativity and of the quantum theory.

"Research in general has a twofold aim—the effective domination of the world of sense and the complete understanding of the real world; and both of these aims are in principle unattainable." Nevertheless, the progress which is being made toward these goals spurs us on to further efforts. Professor Planck considers the relativity theory to be the crowning achievement of classical physics, and the quantum theory as something apart, which can be correlated with classical physics with difficulty. A causal connection between physical events is to him the only adequate type of

⁴ *The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics*, by Max Planck. W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1931; 114 pages, \$2.

physical law—statistics being simply a confession of ignorance or neglect of fundamental causes. Thus he cannot take as final the indeterminism that results from the quantum theory.

Most of the younger theoretical physicists will doubtless contend that quantum mechanics, like relativity, has now made itself an integral part of classical mechanics, extending its application to very small objects. Many of these physicists will also take the attitude that advances are to be made in atomic physics by dropping the concept of causality in this sphere. Planck's point of view, however, is worthy of serious consideration not only by physicists but by all those who are concerned with the meaning of modern science.

An extremely valuable symposium of modern scientific opinion concerning religion has just been published with the suggestive title, *Has Science Discovered God?*⁶ Nine of its essays were written especially for this volume by such men as Heber D. Curtis, Edwin G. Conklin, William McDougall, J. Arthur Thomson, Harlan T. Stetson, and Sir Oliver Lodge. The remaining seven sections are reprinted, or condensed by the editor, from previous publications. Thus the gist of Sir James Jeans's *The Mysterious Universe*, of Albert Einstein's article in the *Forum* of last year (also reprinted in *Living Philosophies*), of Arthur S. Eddington's *Science and the Unseen World*, of John Langdon-Davies' *Man and His Universe*, and of Robert A. Millikan's *Science and the New Civilization* are made available in a compact form. Special mention ought also to be made of Mr. Cotton's admirable "Introduction" and "Conclusion," which summarize succinctly and accurately the present status of the modern view concerning the impact of science upon religion.

These essays indicate that the scientists of America, or at least those contributing to the volume, are in substantial agreement with the position maintained by the authors of the books reviewed in the first half of this article. Never before in the history of human thinking has mankind "been so near sight and touch of Eternal Realities: They seem all but breaking on us in aspects of grandeur and beneficence." "Scientific theory is giving us a plausible idea of a universal mind, something religion has not given us. Research in the last few years has conferred on religion a dignity, a richness, an expanse it never had before. For those religionists who have ears to hear and minds to comprehend, these new discoveries will touch their faith with an unexampled sublimity. Together, science with its knowl-

⁶ *Has Science Discovered God?* edited by Edward H. Cotton. T. Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1931; 366 pages, \$3.50.

edge, philosophy with its interpretation, and religion with its faith, may prove that, after all, eternal purpose is eternal goodness."

To many readers, the essay on "Psychical Research, Science and Religion," J. Malcolm Bird, may prove the most enlightening section of this symposium. As those who know Mr. Bird would expect, it is a reasoned exposition of the recent trend and contemporary achievements of psychical research. It is his belief that many of the phenomena with which that phase of research must deal are explainable on the basis of "a non-spiritistic species of supernormal psychical cognition," but that "the remaining fraction of the phenomena is reserved for the spirits, in actual truth."

Two paragraphs may well be quoted to indicate the great importance and scientific temper of Mr. Bird's conclusions: "Experimental science cries out for a new cosmic philosophy, complaining that the old one is bankrupt. Relativity offers to meet the demand. It is more than mere coincidence that psychical research steps in here, presenting a wide phenomenology, a complete hypothesis covering this so far as broad philosophical outlines are concerned, and the strong suggestion that if science will but examine the matter, both the phenomena and the philosophy covering them will be found precisely in line with the new ideas toward which science is verging. The more closely we scrutinize this correspondence the more must we become convinced that it is a significant one; that the phenomena of psychical research, when rationalized as a matter of nonmediumistic cognition by the operator, are truly phenomena of the new universe that science is discovering; that when this universe has been more fully drawn in, we shall have at least a beginning of the mechanistic explanation for our supernormal cognitions which has been so conspicuously lacking in what I have said to this point."

"I think it rather probable that ultimately we shall decide that some of the phenomena of psychical research are best covered by a spiritistic hypothesis, which must then subsist side-by-side with the psychological one to which I have given most of my space. If so, then we shall have to have a philosophy of biological life which gives the human animal something to survive with, a universe which gives us a place to survive into, and a covering of cosmic philosophy that recognizes all this as an aspect of reality. If the necessity arises it will be met, and in that event we shall be able in obvious truth to say that science and religion have come together."

In striking contrast to all the foregoing is the attitude displayed by Bertrand Russell in the latest book from his iconoclastic pen.⁸ To Russell

⁸ *The Scientific Outlook*, by Bertrand Russell. W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1931; 269 pages, \$3.

the external world (if it actually exists at all) "consists of events, short, small, and haphazard. Order, unity and continuity are human inventions." No wonder he proceeds with zest to the demolition of the metaphysics and theologies of such men as Eddington and Jeans. Unfortunately, in so doing he is occasionally guilty of the well-known trick of constructing a man of straw, which purports to represent the mental image of his adversary, and which is easily torn into fragments and tossed to the wolves.

More than once, also, he has obviously exaggerated grossly his statements concerning matters which are incapable of measurement or which rest solely upon opinion; for example: "the general public has derived the impression that physics confirms practically the whole of the Book of Genesis."

The reason for Russell's pessimistic outlook is not hard to find. If one is determined to regard the universe solely as a system of mechanically functioning entities, he must inevitably be left, naked and bewildered, without any ethical guidance for human aspirations. When science is regarded as the sum total of truth, without appreciation of the other phases of experience or the other approaches to an understanding of reality, not only does an intellectual cloud drift over science to obscure its value, but also there is no opportunity left for the development of an ethical control of "the increased power of manipulation derived from scientific technique."

No more healthy antidote to Russell's gloomy condemnation of the scientific trend could be found than that provided by his younger fellow countryman, Julian Huxley, in a stimulating volume entitled *What Dare I Think?*¹ This book presents most ably the challenge of modern science to human action and belief; it is in essence a plea for scientific humanism. The mantle of the grandfather, Professor T. H. Huxley, has unmistakably fallen upon this grandson.

To Julian Huxley, man is, from the external viewpoint of physical science, a bit of machinery. But from another aspect, "he is a spiritual being, whose emotional and intellectual activities, since they occur in the realm of consciousness and are nonspatial and nonmaterial, are in a different order of existence." If science has any basis whatsoever for reaching a verdict, it is evident that man is the first organism produced in the known history of the universe which has the prerogative of exercising conscious control over its own evolutionary destiny. The belief is unwarranted that "every invention is inevitably good, and that progress is automatic." "Change must come; it can, on balance, be good; it is our business to try to

¹ *What Dare I Think?* by Julian Huxley. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931; 278 pages, \$2.50.

guide it and ensure that it shall be not merely change but progress." But "the knowledge provided by science is emotionally and morally neutral. And so is the power of control which inevitably arises out of that knowledge."

Therefore, mankind must use something more than scientific knowledge as he turns his face toward the future. Not that there are "two regions of reality, one of which is accessible to scientific method and the other inaccessible. Rather there is a single reality, but scientific and other ways of approaching it and treating it." "Religion, in the light of psychological and anthropological science, is seen not as a divine revelation, but as a function of human nature." Apparently, in this present crisis in human affairs, religion is an extremely important function which may conserve stability at the same time that it welcomes change.

The most obvious theological effect of the scientific outlook is "that it renders either futile or illogical all straightforward personifications of divinity, all conceptions of God which regard him as a separate being, controlling the universe which he has created, all views which stress God's transcendence instead of his immanence." More than that, as Huxley points out, the logical Absolute has no significance for human affairs, simply because it is absolute and perfect, whereas human life, in its spiritual even more than in its physical aspect, is always and inevitably a development.

All of which leads to the general conclusion that religion, as viewed by modern scientists, should have as its main creed: to have life and have it more abundantly. The concept of development of personality must occupy the center of the religious scheme. A religion of life must not be afraid of the greatest and most precious property of life—the property of development and progressive change.

Group Movements in Religion

A Personal Account of the Cambridge Group

W. HAROLD BEALES

GROUP methods are very prominent just now in the religious life of England. The Oxford Group, which is associated with the work of Doctors Buchman and Shoemaker, and is known in America as "A First Century Christian Fellowship," has brought new life to many of our churches, of various denominations. An offshoot from it, owing much to the Rev. J. N. Reid, is influencing Presbyterianism. In Methodism, though not confined to it, the Cambridge Group Movement has been making rapid strides during the last two years. It is the purpose of this paper to describe this last movement in as close detail as space permits.

With its origins we need not especially concern ourselves. The story has been written in a small volume entitled *A Group Speaks*. Suffice it to say that it began with a number of students in the University of Cambridge who had been asked to interest their fellow students, up and down the country, in the creative opportunity which the coming of Methodist Union presented to them. They accepted the task eagerly, for it is a great thing to share in the building of a new church, and these are great days in which to do it. Soon, however, they found themselves face to face with fundamental questions. Why appeal to anyone to become enthusiastic about Methodism? What was its gospel? What was *the* Gospel? For many weeks they lingered over that last inquiry, sometimes quarreling furiously. At last came agreement as to what Christianity really meant and offered, and with agreement dismay. For if, to use old-fashioned language, "a full, rich evangelical experience was God's purpose for every man," they were in serious case, since they did not possess it. Before they could do anything for other people, God must do much for them. The book above-mentioned tells of how they gave themselves to disciplined prayer, of how they broke through to a new and transforming awareness of God, of how they discovered to their wonder and joy that they could share their experience with others, and of how almost without plan or preparation they found themselves thrust into a movement. Of its spread and influence many stories could be told. Here I shall avoid both incident and propaganda, and shall confine myself to a description of the type of Christian thought and activity which is emerging from these beginnings.

I must begin by emphasizing certain prolegomena. Professor Fearon Halliday, in a volume entitled *Psychology and Religious Experience*, has criticized what he calls "Conference" religion. He says:

It is not to deny the helpfulness of a good conference to say that there is abroad to-day much of what we may call "conference-religion," by which we mean the religion of the person whose faith has no real assurance, and who goes into the company of others in a similar state, for the sake of what is called "corporate" religion and "corporate prayer." Fellowship in prayer may be a great thing, but how much greater it would be if all those who shared in it were certain of God when they were alone and brought that certainty with them into the fellowship. It is scarcely possible not to have the feeling that to-day many people find in a conference the assurance that they ought to find in God—an assurance which is often of a passing nature because it rests on a mass mood, and is not the outcome of a real personal relationship. This is not a matter for scorn, but for investigation. The people who go to conferences are honest. They need God and want to find him. They believe in him in idea, but they cannot with any feeling of assurance say "My Father." The words represent to them a conventional rather than a personal realization.

This warning is much needed in England, and may not be irrelevant to conditions in America. Our Group has tried to avoid the danger which it envisages.

All effective group religion presupposes personal religion. How vital this recognition is in the case of our own movement will be seen when I try to indicate its deeper ideals. The cultivation of this individual Christianity is a common concern to all the group movements of which I have any knowledge. The emphasis on "The Morning Watch" in the Oxford Group is well known. We had placed great stress on it before we had ever heard of Buchmanism at all.

I must not attempt in these few pages to describe how we came to a common conviction of the inevitableness and the basic necessity of faith. More than one great scientist and philosopher helped us there. Granted faith, prayer became not only possible but highly, even centrally important. Time must be allowed for it, and we must teach each other how to pray. Prayerlessness is one of the supreme problems of the modern church. If Whitehead's famous dictum, "Religion is what a man does with his solitariness," be adopted as a touchstone for most people's Christianity, the result must surely be startling. Let us consider for a moment the poverty of much of our public worship. So many of our folk sing hymns by their tunes, and judge services by their sermons. They get little out of our services, though Professor Anderson Scott has lately reminded us¹ that

¹ *The Church, Its Worship and Sacraments.*

they are very similar to those which Jesus habitually attended. The reason seems to be that ours are not fed and rendered significant by any rich inner life on the part of the average worshiper. From many outwardly pious lives private prayer has completely ceased.² In many others it is exercised in ways incredibly meager and narrow. All the time, as our hymn book says, it is "the Christian's vital breath."

We try, then, to teach our members to pray. All the usual means are employed. Books and pamphlets on both theory and method are in regular circulation in most groups. We believe that of the very essence of true prayer is honesty. And, in full recognition of this, we suggest that there is a place at which even an agnostic can begin. The reward of true prayer is the discovery of God as a living, commanding fact in our lives. Most people do not find him because they are not actively seeking him. Reality is one thing; our feeling for reality is another thing. And, psychologically speaking, our feeling for reality is very largely conditioned by our ability or inability to pay attention, to concentrate. If many church members are paying little or no attention to God, why should they be surprised if he does not seem real to them?

Yet, in parenthesis, I do not want to place unbalanced emphasis on our own activity. God is in this business far, far more impressively than we are. The old theologians were right—we can do nothing apart from him. Let us beware of that insidious humanism which is eating its way into the very vitals of our Christian thinking. Was it not Augustine who said, "We could not seek Him, had he not already found us," or a greater who taught that, "We love Him because he first loved us"? We could not practice the presence of God did he not practice the presence of us. He is Light—swift, eager, marvelously patient, always seeking us. He ordains that we should seek him, only out of the tremendous honor in which he holds us. We are the crown of his creation thus far. If we may say it reverently, everything has been staked upon us, upon us in freedom. He will not force us even to save us. Here is the secret of his terribly humble and humbling unobtrusiveness. But just how deeply he feels about it, and how far he is prepared to go, we read in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ. And "love never faileth." We need not be feverish in our search after him. The finding will rest with him even more than with us.

These very thoughts suggest one obvious way in which we have to

² For this statement I have ample evidence from my own pastoral work, which has been especially exercised among young people.

help one another. I have mentioned the narrowness of conventional prayer. Incidentally, it is in connection with petitionary prayer, in its various forms, that most of the problems emerge which are so paralyzing for many Christians. Valuable thought has been exercised on these problems, and helpful books abound. The final and satisfying answer to them, however, for any given individual, is to be found in the continuous practice of prayer itself. This is not to despise intellectual effort. A man who runs away from his difficulties under any pretext is a coward. But what faith makes possible is a devotional approach to truth side by side with the intellectual. The one supplements and quickens the other. A wider and more embracing prayer is the crying need of many Christian lives. That it helps us meet these pressing intellectual difficulties is only one of its recommendations. It is a road to communion with God. It is the invitation to him to fellowship; in it and through it he can come and sup with us, and we with him. So we school each other in the meaning and value of adoration, thanksgiving, confession, intercession, self-offering—all the reaches of the devotional life as far as we have explored them. We give reasons for urging regularity; and we suggest experiments—as, for instance, in the use of silence.

While we have no stereotyped rules of procedure in our Group at all, the vast majority of us agree on linking up our prayer life with the life of every day. For this reason, we, with our friends of the Oxford Group, definitely recommend the "morning watch." A very practical point emerges here. One of the dangers of the Christian life is vagueness, as an illustration will show. In both England and America we preserve that quaint old custom of making good resolutions at the New Year. We show as pathetic a trust in it as did Doctor Johnson, who, after years of failure, still regularly repeated his intention to get up earlier in the morning. We also fail, as our comic papers annually remind us—and why? The fact is, of course, that I am never likely to do much about anything which I can postpone until next autumn. Suppose, on the other hand, that I have given "myself in this day" to God, "I am for it," as the soldiers used to say in the War. Something has got to be done before lunch. Life itself becomes an experiment. It is no longer simply my own; nor is my profession, my daily task, my sole concern. Numbers of our young people have found a completely new and even dangerous life by the active recognition of this principle. They have also become infinitely more effective from the Christian point of view. The day's work is thus linked on with the morning's prayer. The two interfuse, the one interpenetrating the

other. Every act tends to become a religious act; new disciplines reveal themselves and new urges. At night when one goes to rest one may be too tired to use much time and energy for prayer. But, with Brother Lawrence,

When he had finished, he examined himself how he had discharged his duty; if he found *well*, he returned thanks to God; if otherwise, he asked pardon; and without being discouraged, he set his mind right again, and continued his exercise of the *presence of God*, as if he had never deviated from it. "Thus," said he, "by rising after my falls, and by frequently renewed acts of faith and love, I am come to a state, wherein it would be as difficult for me not to think of God, as it was at first to accustom myself to it."

More and more God is able to share in such a life. That is our witness. "Ye are my friends if ye do the things which I command you." "Fellow workers with God," sharing however humbly his creative activity, we find him, as we dare to claim, by our side. There is a fine story about the present king of England that, on one occasion when he was a sailor, his vessel was anxious to do a certain speed record. Everybody was determined to do his bit; and the furnace had many unaccustomed stokers. One of the regular "hands," hard at work, noticed that his neighbor was throwing in his coal erratically. Obviously he was a novice at his job. Taking a glance at him, he was astonished to see the future king handling his shovel with the rest. To which one may add a saying somewhere in William James that God is no gentleman; he is always to be found in the work-a-day side of our life. The particular color of our experience of him may vary with our temperament. But "God is, and is a rewarder of them that seek after him."

We now come to a discussion of the Group itself. A group is primarily a company of friends. The members of it seek to deepen their intimacy with one another in every usual way. As they have opportunity, they take meals together, go walks together, play games together. Once a week, only more frequently under special pressure of work, the group meets as a whole. The gathering generally takes place in a private house, which is more comfortable, in England, at any rate, than any ordinary church room. Christian names replace surnames, and meetings are of the most informal and unstudied description. A typical example will be described later; but, as mentioned above, nothing is fixed or stereotyped. A first necessity is for frankness and honesty. To secure this, since the English are by nature a shy and reserved race, we keep our individual groups small. A very sound psychology underlay Jesus' choice of *twelve* disciples. The number was neither too small nor too big. We ordinarily work with a

group of from twelve to sixteen or seventeen folk. Afterwards, as fresh comrades come forward, we either form them into a new group, or the original one divides. Again, we keep our membership as nearly homogeneous as possible in the matter of age. This is particularly important where people in the early twenties are concerned, for so many middle-aged people become pontifical! There is something devastating about such a remark as, "When you are as old as I am . . ."; and what can one do with a lady who suddenly bursts out, "Oh, you mustn't say that! It's wicked"? There can be no heresy, and there is no place for shock in a group which aspires to help its members. Otherwise individuals will tend to be silent just when they need most urgently to share their thought with the rest.

We practice a certain principle of "leaderlessness" in our groups. This has not always been as carefully explained or understood as it ought to have been; and, in consequence, a group here and there has temporarily suffered. We have a slogan, "Call no man your master save Christ"; but our idea is emphatically not a merely negative one. I shall be quoting, just now, from Ephesians, "And he gave some apostles, and some prophets, . . ." The true leader is God-given. The Group owes almost everything to a few such, and gladly acknowledges it. In what sense then "leaderlessness"? There is, and must be for a considerable time to come, a place for an ex-officio leadership in the church. Yet it must never be forgotten that no ex-officio position *confers* upon anybody spiritual leadership. The ordination vows which a minister takes must be constantly renewed; because only as he is a man of God can he speak with authority to his people. It is good to remember how often the two forms of leadership are combined in the life and work of one person. But we do hear from time to time of men who have "outlived their usefulness"; while the Master himself rebuked certain religious teachers as "blind leaders of the blind." The trouble in the ordinary church, as it is organized to-day, is that there is no inevitable challenge to such ineffective leadership. It is at least theoretically possible that a man or woman may be in such a condition as to be incapable of giving his or her flock what they need, and may even continue in that state for years without discovering it. How often have most of us who work among young people come across youngsters who are clinging loyally to their church, all the time with a pathetic sense of disappointment and frustration! Surely there must be more in Christianity than they have been able to discover! And, meanwhile, there seems to be no one on hand to speak the releasing word. Have

we always been able to speak it ourselves? Has not the occasion for penitence come to us, whether recognized or not? Others are leaving the church altogether. . . . Now, in any genuine group, the continuance of such a situation is impossible. There is a leadership which is gladly and instantly acknowledged. It is that of the comrade to whom God has given a word to say. The group will crystallize round him, and may continue to make him its center for a long time, even permanently, though I hope that this would not need to happen. All the time, however, the leader will recognize that he only finds completeness in comradeship with the rest. If they need him, he also needs them. He can only continue to help just so long as he is willing to be helped; he will be learning all the time that he is teaching. He will *gladly welcome* a refusal to follow him whenever his inspiration fails. The group will regard it as a solemn obligation to "lighten the darkness" even of the one most honored in its midst, if darkness there seems to be. Everyone is in the group on the basis of both giving and receiving. All will be humble; none will be servile. As a matter of fact, it has happened again and again in a group that one has heard the frank and open refusal to follow some false lead, even a cheery hint to some member that he had better "shut up." This has never caused offense, because such resentment would be seen to be a rather fatal kind of sin, and moreover silly. It may have caused temporary pain. It has more than once definitely led to the spiritual rebirth of the one who has been silenced or left without response.

One other working principle must be stressed at this stage, namely, that of Group loyalty. For reasons which will appear later, a group always strives after unanimity in all its discussions, and particularly in all its decisions. We have learned from the Society of Friends the limitations of a majority vote. Quakers never rest satisfied in their business sessions until the clerk can bring forward a minute recording "the sense of the meeting." They would regard it as a disaster that one party should defeat another. Through conversation, and it may be even more through silence, they make their supreme aim the reaching of a common mind. In just the same way our groups have to learn to be willing to wait patiently, if necessary, on the odd individual. They can only move securely when they can all move together. But, once they have reached agreement on some issue, Group loyalty comes into immediate play. Suppose, to take an instance, a group were separating for a vacation, and all the members agreed that they would "meet" for prayer at seven every morning, one poor man might find it hard to wake up at so early an hour. He would then resort to artificial stimulus,

for he would never dream of being "absent." Group intimacy becomes a very real and impressive thing, as *A Group Speaks* bears witness; and we have thought on occasion that we could attribute the condition of some ailing group to such a personal failure as this.

We are now in a position to appreciate the simple details of a typical group meeting. The leader of it, with very light duties to perform, will be the one whose turn it happens to be. Shy people would, of course, be excused, as nothing in Group can possibly be compulsory. Actually, after a group has been at work for a few weeks, there are no shy folk left in it. Hampering self-consciousness steadily disappears in an atmosphere which is entirely natural and free and healthy. The meeting will probably commence with silence, which yearly takes a more important place in the worship of all the churches in England. It may be broken by a short reading by the leader, and by several prayers, some read, some extempore. It will usually be ended by a repetition on the part of all present of the Lord's Prayer. The evening's discussion will follow. In this part of our activity and method we completely part company with our friends in the Oxford Group. They suppress all discussion as dangerous to their central purpose. It is just as essential to ours, as the last section of this paper will show. Our discussion may be concerned with a wide variety of subjects. But two considerations will invariably govern the choice of it. They are connected with the two main purposes for which every group exists. The first of these is—to become a group. This does not happen automatically, and sometimes it is the result only of a long process. No group has "arrived" until it has reached that common mind of which we have just been speaking. It only finally reaches this when all its members have focused on a common Center. For us that means—"when all its members have found God in Christ, and been found of him." Perhaps the group does for practical purposes reach unity at a stage in its career slightly earlier than this. When some members have come to know that transforming experience, and the rest are at one in desiring and seeking for it, the bond that binds all together becomes a very powerful one. We have known such groups, on a basis of inflexible honesty, wonderfully successful in evangelism. This brings us to the second great purpose of every group; and it must be remembered that the word "every" here means exactly what it says. No group in all our movement is happy, or feels itself a genuine group, until it can combine the second activity with the first. Every one of our groups, then, is expected to be a working group, and quite directly along lines of evangelism. Moreover, when our groups go out they go as *groups*; the very groups

which have grown together carry through their ministry in an unbroken fellowship. If by chance some particular members cannot accompany the rest in any enterprise they will be with them in thought and prayer. We do not pick special teams, or put all our faith and hope in gifted leaders. Strong and weak we co-operate with one another. Nor do we feel that this is "risky"; for it is a Group saying, of every piece of work, that "it is God's job." And out of actual experience we can say that this use of the group in its completeness has been one of our most effective methods of service. These two predominant purposes govern all our group discussion. It would not be possible to classify the conversations which take place. A few illustrations must suffice. It frequently happens that, in a newly formed group, members feel that the first necessity is to share as fully as they can with one another their religious positions. They thus come to a clear idea of the actual situation from which they are going to commence their pilgrimage together. Talks along these lines will frequently be followed by others on how they may move forward to a richer common experience. Before long they may find themselves studying the use and technique of private devotions. Again, when a group is actually facing what we call "outworkings," some common evangelical purpose, there is obviously need for much careful work in preparation. A weekend retreat, in which a group goes to meet a band of young people associated with some university or church, will require very careful handling, especially when it is to be conducted on conversational lines. Not only will the spiritual program have to be planned, the message have to be worked out in detail, the group will have to be ready to deal with any problems which may emerge. A group knows nothing of the protection which a pulpit is supposed to give. Its members are neither theologians nor philosophers; they may nevertheless have to handle topics which might puzzle either class, for it is always easier to ask questions than to answer them. It will readily be seen that a group may have to spend months in preparing itself for work of this kind; and plenty of honest effort is being put into the study of the Bible, the attempt to understand and restate in such language as can grip modern youth some of the great doctrines of our faith, or the application of Christianity to the larger issues of our day. In passing, it is worth mentioning that this outward-turning purpose which is characteristic of our whole movement saves us very largely from two of the dangers which threaten all experiments like ours—over-introspection and morbidity on the one hand, academic aridity and mere argumentativeness on the other. It would be too much to claim that these evils never occur, but they are held in check in most

groups, and can be defeated in all. Incidentally, if a group is badly held up, our usual method of helping it is to send another group to meet with it. To return to our meeting, it will normally close much as it opened, save that the period spent in silence and prayer will be shorter.

A special paragraph might well be written on "outworkings." The whole subject is one of great importance for us. Groups must keep active in order to keep healthy. Various kinds of work are undertaken, and new kinds are continually being invented. I will only pause to mention one which is as old as Christianity itself, and which no movement of any kind can ever afford to neglect, namely, personal evangelism. This can be done tactfully as well as tactlessly. In it the life can be as eloquent as the lip, in fact more so. It is just here that a genuinely experimenting life can be so valuable. It is a fairly frequent thing for one of our members to be asked—"What has happened to you?" Opportunities for witness thus tend to occur spontaneously. A member schooled in group ideas learns to be increasingly sensitive to their approach, or on occasion to create them.

The time has now arrived to attempt to express what are the fundamental ideals of the Cambridge Group Movement. In so far as, among other similar movements, it has its own word to speak and its own work to do, its differentia lies in what follows. It has gained its inspiration from the Epistle to the Ephesians; and its master thought is that of the Body of Christ. It believes that, despite the claims of Catholic apologists, there is something here which the church has never yet seriously attempted to work out. There is room for and need for endless experiment, the humblest Christian having something to contribute.

Assuming the Pauline authorship of Ephesians, though not unmindful of the difficulty of so doing, and working with that general line of interpretation of the Epistle which is associated with the names of Dr. Armitage Robinson in England, and Dr. E. F. Scott in America, let us consider one passage only, in the fourth chapter. The apostle sketches what he conceives to be a truly healthy church. He had known unhealthy ones; and the First Epistle to the Corinthians is a constant reminder that he was under no greater temptation to be a sentimentalist than we are. This authentic church is a hive of mutual ministry, a conspiracy in which every member of it participates. All kinds of people with the most various gifts go to make it up. "And he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers. . . ." All are similarly employed—"for the work of ministering." That is to say, every single member of this unique company is absorbingly engaged in giving all possible

moral and spiritual help to every other member. As the church spreads and grows, all new entrants into it are submitted to the same gracious process, until they in turn can take their active share in it. And, as all do so, something develops in the life of the church itself. We might call it the Group Mind. Saint Paul puts it in his own way—“. . . unto the building of the body of Christ.” The goal to be attained is that unity, unity so profound that our sense of separateness from one another is transcended.

“*Till we all come . . . to a perfect man*”: that is, all of us together (for this is implied by the Greek) to God’s New Man, grown at length to full manhood. Not “to perfect men”: for the apostle uses the plural of the lower-stage only: “that we be no longer children” is his own contrast. We are to grow out of our individualism into the corporate oneness of the full-grown man.⁸

“In the New Man,” continues Dean Robinson, “grown to perfect manhood, Saint Paul finds the consummation of human life.” He adds later,⁹

The law of growth for the individual is this: that he should learn more and more to live as a part of a great whole; that he should consciously realize the life of membership, and contribute his appropriate share towards the completeness of the corporate unity; and that thus his expanding faculties should find their full play in the large and ever enlarging life of the One Man. It is to this that Saint Paul points when he says, “that we be no longer children, but grow up into Him every whit.”

In one of the most remarkable poems of the *In Memoriam* Tennyson suggests that the attainment of a definite self-consciousness may be the primary purpose of the individual’s earthly life:

This use may lie in blood and breath,
Which else were fruitless of their due,
Had man to learn himself anew
Beyond the second birth of Death.

We gather from Saint Paul that there is a further lesson which we are called to learn—the consciousness of a larger life in which in a sense we lose ourselves, to find ourselves again, no longer isolated, but related and co-ordinated in the body of Christ. That the poet, too, knew something of the mystery of this surrender of the individual life may be seen from his Prologue:

Thou seemest human and divine,
The highest, holiest manhood, thou:
Our wills are ours, we know not how;
Our wills are ours, to make them thine.

The apostle goes on to write of the Head of the Body; and what he teaches is absolutely vital, both from the personal and from the group

⁸ J. Armitage Robinson, D.D., *St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians*, p. 100.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

point of view. I will only direct attention to it, and pass on to note the impressive way in which Ephesians links on with the fourth Gospel. In the seventeenth chapter of the latter, and especially in the concluding passage, from verse twenty onward, we find that the only term set to the intimacy of this group relationship is to be found in the unity in diversity of the life of the Godhead itself. What a heresy would this be considered did it not occur in the New Testament!

Now there may be readers of this article who recognize in Saint Paul's conception of church development and human progress a remarkable anticipation of some of the most recent and advanced sociological thinking. It is a big temptation to dwell upon that; but we must hurry on. Let us, however, recall one more passage, bearing on our theme, this time from Galatians (3. 27-28):

For as many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ. There can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male and female: for ye all are one man in Christ Jesus.

If this be paraphrased into our modern speech, it suggests a Christianity which is absolutely relevant to contemporary conditions. Here are indicated the most intractable problems with which we are confronted in this twentieth-century world, those of sex, class, color, nationality, and race. If our religion can solve *them*, it does indeed hold the keys of the future in its hands. But who believes that it can—do even Christians themselves? And at that point I recall an old proverb, learned in school days, "When action is wanted, all talk is vain and useless." Our trouble is, as I have suggested above, that we are face to face with a *kind* of Christianity which we have never seriously attempted to work out. I repeat that there is room and need for endless experiment, in every possible direction; and for that scientific spirit which recognizes that while many an experiment may fail, even these failures have their necessary place in the scheme of things. On the balance, research succeeds and moves forward. What is more, nothing that can happen can render these experiments useless or unimportant. Suppose that the gloomiest prognostications of our dreariest prophets are fulfilled, and we enter again into a period of barbarism, when much that man has gained is either threatened or lost, there must still be a far-away turning point that awaits our human race; and mankind can be saved by a remnant in the future, as more than once it has been in the past. This building of the Body of Christ is likely, in fact, to be a protracted business. And since so little has been done hitherto, we must be content to begin in the very humblest fashion. In church, in college, in business, in indus-

trial and political life, at home, our experiments must go steadily forward—inevitably without advertisement. As we say sometimes, "There are no reputations to be made in the Group." But the work must be drastic and faithful; there will be call for endless patience and endurance.

This, then, is the particular contribution which our Group hopes to make to the active thought and purpose of the church, and through it to the larger life of the world. We are only at ABC, and we present members may never reach DEF; but we are already a happy comradeship, for we feel that we have hitched our wagon to a star. Said John Bright once, to a number of young men who came to him asking for a motto, "Give yourselves to the greatest cause that you know whose battle is yet in front of it." Our cause is such an one; and all lesser idealisms and reforms and revolutions are included in it. To quote Tennyson once more,

Man as yet is being made, and ere the crowning Age of ages,
Shall not æon after æon pass and touch him into shape?
All about him shadow still, but, while races flower and fade,
Prophet-eyes may catch a glory slowly gaining on the shade,
Till the peoples all are one, and all their voices blend in choric
Halleluiah to the Maker, "It is finished. Man is made."⁶

It would be idle to pretend that this spiritual program does not involve profound consequences for the persons concerned with it. When Doctor Robinson speaks of our growing out of our individualism, he is suggesting one of the most far-reaching transformations that a human soul can know. Searching sacrifices are involved and disciplines, "even to the dividing of soul and spirit." We are reminded that Jesus never easily or lightly invited his hearers into his nearer fellowship. A touch of steel enters into all his teaching at this point.

"There came a scribe, and said unto him, Master I will follow thee whithersoever thou goest. And Jesus saith unto him, the foxes have holes, and the birds of the heaven have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head" (Matt. 8. 19-20).

Let us again work with an illustration. On the death of the King of England, the Prime Minister and his colleagues immediately resign. They then receive their seals of office at the hands of the new king, becoming thereby *his* ministers. This custom carries us back to medieval days when, on the accession of a new king, all the landowners of the country had to do homage to him. Legally all their estates belonged to the crown; they only reverted to them when, by the king's grace, they were handed back to

⁶ Quot. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

them. This might, and did sometimes involve a "fine." For us in the Body of Christ—our loyalty to one another is ultimately bound up with our loyalty to the Head. And what we have literally to do is to place ourselves unreservedly into God's hands—this not simply in some vague, expansive, all-and-nothing offering of our whole lives to him, but in the actual details of every day and action. This surrender of ourselves, or committal as I prefer to call it—because he is in it helping us through every phase of it—ultimately means that we yield our life's sovereignty into another keeping than our own; and to make such a committal of ourselves even into the hands of God is intensely difficult and even painful. Have we not a parable in the wobbling of the nations during these post-war years? The League of Nations in the last resort means nothing and can accomplish nothing unless in some real measure it invades the sovereignty of each participating nation. No nation dares, or at present really wants to, make that concession to League efficiency. It *looks* so like walking out into a blizzard . . . naked. So we have the extraordinary spectacle of the world's leading nations all desiring peace, while none dares to disarm. We still hope that life's greatest gifts will be ours without payment, though they never will be, and indeed never can be. Now, it may well be that our ferocious criticism of our political leaders, for their pathetic futility in this situation, is really the result of a projection. For it is exactly on such a *personal* issue that we tend to fail ourselves. If we could only fit Christianity into our lives, instead of having to fit our lives into it! If we could only retain the very last word! And Christ's challenges come echoing back; and again we see that picture of the One who surveys our fields, whether of activity or ambition, and says, so quietly and finally, "Yes, you can have that back, just as it is; and that, with a difference, . . . No, I must keep this." Yet here is the way to all life's greatest rewards and victories. For every yielded treasure—an hundredfold! "What I kept, I lost; what I spent, I had; what I gave, I have." It should be heavily underlined that we are not imagining a process which impoverishes, but rather one which enhances human personality. Is there anything so enriching as love? Surely no other stimulus operates so powerfully toward the fullest development of the self. "For their sakes I sanctify myself." The more I am, the more I can contribute. And, further, we gain our lives by losing them, for His sake and the gospel's.

The thing is beyond our strength altogether; we had better recognize it. But the glory of the Cross of Christ is that it saves us from ourselves; and no man is truly redeemed until he becomes redemptive.

The New Testament in 1931

CLARENCE TUCKER CRAIG

NO survey of the literature appearing over as short a period as approximately six months can indicate fully the present status of biblical investigation. However, many of the present trends and emphases find excellent illustration, and not a few books have appeared which are of permanent value. No attempt will be made in these pages to present a complete bibliography. A selection is made of the books which seem more important to one reviewer.

It would be well to begin with a general survey of *The English Bible as Literature*, by Charles A. Dinsmore (Houghton Mifflin). It is dotted with quotation and allusion to other great literature of the world and comes from the pen of one who is himself a writer of no mean ability. He believes we should pass beyond the ages of infallibility and of criticism to the age of appreciation. He rejects an analytical approach to his subject, for this library should be viewed as a whole. After a consideration of the genius and discipline of the Hebrew people, Dinsmore considers in turn the literary qualities of the successive books of the Bible. This leads him inevitably to a certain process of analysis, but of the historical contents rather than of the literary types. Not that these are entirely overlooked, for there are excellent chapters on the prophets and the Wisdom Literature (whose writers are called the humanists of Israel). There is at least room for difference of opinion as to whether the final synthesis would not be clearer with more space given to literary analysis and less to historical summary of contents.

It will be a surprise to many to read Dinsmore's judgment that the American Standard version is of a higher literary quality than most of the original text. He likewise argues for its superiority as literature of power over the modern translations which endeavor to make the Bible a book of the people. It should be noted that *The American Translation of the Old and New Testament*, by Edgar J. Goodspeed and J. M. Powis Smith, is now published in one volume (University of Chicago Press). Naturally the New Testament books claim less space in Dinsmore's treatment. They are great literature only because they "grew out of a great love and center around humanity's divinest figure." The book has the high tone of inspirational quality which we expect from its author.

The World of the New Testament is made the subject of a series of

fluent and fascinating chapters by T. R. Glover (Macmillan). He states his object as "to see the world in which the new society of Christ found itself." It gives him opportunity to ramble widely over the classical world and philosophize from his intimate knowledge of antiquity. There are discursive chapters on the Greeks, Alexander, the Romans, and the Jews. Entertaining and informing as the book is, there are many who will doubt that the world of the New Testament really was the world of these classical authors and the political currents which are discussed. The volume will not replace standard texts on the field, but adds a delightful survey of the world which Christianity ultimately had to penetrate.

Our period has seen the appearance of an unusual book on the language of the New Testament. *Overstatement in the New Testament*, by Claude C. Douglas (Henry Holt), is not written for linguistic students of the *koiné* Greek, but is primarily for interpreters. The thesis is well stated in the title; grave injustice will be done to the Bible if we do not recognize the large use of hyperbole and exaggeration. Truth is carried farther on the "wings of extravagant forms of speech," but Occidentals must not stumble upon the rock of literalism. An amazing number of overstatements are listed, far exceeding any Greek writings in this respect. Professor Douglas has done good service in bringing to the foreground questions of literary form and an analysis of the intention of the authors.

As a child of the Psalms and the prophets, Jesus could not be expected to express himself with bald literalism. It is with the parables that the greatest help is rendered to the interpreter. Douglas brings out well that in representing a small phase of truth a parable may misrepresent others unless we give heed to the place of paradox and contrast. But when Jesus' word on divorce is dismissed with the statement "It is the part of wisdom to call this hyperbolic and avoid the difficulties" we fear that the author's thesis has carried him too far. "Ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel, till the Son of man be come" is certainly more than hyperbole for the need of haste. It should be noted that A. T. Robertson has brought out two more volumes of his *Word Pictures in the New Testament* (R. R. Smith). They assist materially in interpreting the finer shades of meaning in the original.

That Jesus is the center of our interest in the Bible was at no time made clearer than in the books of the past few months. A very large number of them are concerned with him. Three stand out as of permanent significance in our understanding of him: *The Teachings of Jesus*, by Harvie Branscomb (Cokesbury); *The Historic Jesus*, by James Mackinnon

(Longmans); and *Jesus and the Gospel of Love*, by Canon Charles E. Raven (Henry Holt). The first is by one of the most promising young New Testament scholars in America, the second is by a veteran church historian, and the third by a theological leader deeply interested in modern currents of life. The first is a college textbook, the second an imposing monument to scholarly reading, while the third is really a contribution to theology, centering about the person of Jesus. Canon Raven believes, "For us Jesus is normative. To explain him is to interpret Christianity."

To take them in order, Branscomb has given us the best statement of the teachings of Jesus in moderate compass which we now possess. He writes with a simplicity and clarity of style that makes it easy to read. He knows thoroughly the present status of the study of Jesus, but does not bewilder the student with continual references to conflicting opinions. He states his own well-grounded convictions with persuasive forcefulness. The writer received about fifty reviews of Branscomb's book from students in a seminary class this past summer and with monotonous regularity came the judgment, "This book ought to be on the shelf of every minister."

It begins with an excellent statement evaluating the sources of information for our knowledge of the teachings of Jesus. After considering the place of teaching in his ministry, the author goes on to treat systematically the ground that has been covered so often. Yet he does this with a freshness of statement that challenges the interest of the reader. The final chapter contains an admirable discussion of the originality and authority of Jesus. The well selected references to supplementary reading will furnish the basis for an excellent reading course on Jesus.

The theological aspects of Mackinnon's book are more modern, strange to say, than the historical. He has read almost everything of significance, and pays lip service to the point of view of form-criticism. However, when the author comes to his reconstruction of the life of Jesus, he shows that he rejects their method of approach in the very task of attempting a successive account of events. While he has progressed beyond the Markan lives of a generation ago, he still takes seriously the idea of a Perean and Samaritan ministry based on Luke, and does not believe that the ministry of the Seventy is simply a doublet. Nevertheless, the copious references to contemporary literature as well as the author's fine interpretative power make it a very important book.

In Mackinnon's treatment of miracles, the virgin birth, and the resurrection, we find a splendid modern outlook. The author does not hide his opinions behind a smoke screen of verbiage, but believes profoundly that

there is more religious power in a modern position than in any apologetic for traditionalism. Many scholars will question his claim that the Pharisees as well as Jesus believed in a "spiritual" resurrection, but that should not prejudice the consideration of the rest of his argument.

One of the greatest values of this attempt to tell the story of the ministry consecutively lies in the consideration of the historical value of the fourth Gospel. Mackinnon believes that it was written by a disciple of a Judean witness, and "is an interpretation of the historical Jesus, not an historic account of Jesus. No historian, who knows by experience the exacting demands of scientific historic method, would dream of taking it at its face value." Though the raising of Lazarus is told in a wonderfully dramatic way, it begets the suspicion that "as an historian, the author does not know the difference between history and allegory." But Mackinnon is bound by no Johannine taboo. Where he finds genuine historical material he attempts to weave it into the story.

No greater contrast could be imagined than with the book by Canon Raven. His Jesus is essentially a Johannine Christ. Jesus was not primarily an ethical teacher, nor an apocalyptic, nor a Rabbi, nor did Christianity arise from syncretism. The essence of his truth is Light, Life, and Love. Canon Raven knows perfectly well that such a revolutionary thesis can only be established on the basis of a different evaluation of the sources than is customary. Mark is dated in 59, Luke in 61-3, Matthew in 65-9, while the fourth Gospel is of even greater historical value, for authorship "at Ephesus or Antioch by John the apostle in his old age" fits the facts better than any other theory. He thinks that it may have been written first in Aramaic, and only published in Greek after the apostle's death.

Before proceeding to characterize this important volume further, it should be noted that its strength lies in the field of theology, not of biblical interpretation. The author writes in a fascinating style that is often disarming by the easy confidence in which he disposes of contrary positions with such phrases as "it is impossible to deny." Rarely, if ever, has the story of Christological speculation been told in as fascinating a manner. If it is one-sided, it is at least very readable, and looks at ancient controversies from a modern point of view. When Canon Raven comes to state his own Christological position he is at his best and no serious student can fail to profit from his wise expression of the essence of Christian faith. He would oppose any absolute separation of natural and supernatural or of God and the world that would make of Jesus an intruder from another sphere if any divinity be ascribed to him. In exposing the essential

Apollinarianism of certain recent defenders of the creeds he has performed a distinct service. It is only to be hoped that he does not hold that his New Testament conclusions are essential to his excellent Christological statement.

Since Canon Raven finds Johannine mysticism so congenial to his temperament, it was inevitable that he should cherish an aversion against apocalyptic. He makes the frequent assumption (owing to the former Schweitzer vogue) that apocalyptic is equivalent to the particular reconstruction of that great missionary scholar. "Take the language of apocalyptic literally and it becomes vulgar and grotesque, false alike to Jesus and to any high spiritual sensitiveness." Therefore, he practically dismisses the whole in favor of Johannine eschatology. Mackinnon is also afraid that any emphasis upon the apocalyptic element (which he readily grants, however) will be at the expense of the ethical and spiritual. But as an accurate historian he does not fail to recognize in places the connection between eschatology and ethics in the teaching of Jesus. Branscomb, of course, assumes the axioms of modern critical study of the New Testament.

There is marked contrast between the positions on the Gospels entertained by Canon Raven and those in the commentary by Friedrich Hauck on the Gospel of Mark in the new *Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testamente* (Werner Scholl, Leipzig). This series is being written by a group which belongs to the so-called "positive" school with traditional, orthodox sympathies. "Erlangen" is a by-word in Germany, not for what we would call fundamentalism, but for definitely conservative conclusions. The Greek text and a German translation are made the basis for well-arranged commentary notes and brief discussions of the main problems. The form-criticism approach to Mark is adopted whole-heartedly. "The Gospels consist on the one hand of separate fragments, little sections, coming from historical recollection, to which many declarations concerning place, time and persons participating are added. . . . On the other hand, these individual fragments are fitted into a whole frame-work or made serviceable to a whole idea which the evangelist desires to exhibit through his book. To the historical tradition comes evaluation and opinion. That is always to be kept in mind in the historical judgment of the narrative. The Gospels present history from a super-historical, religious viewpoint." It hardly needs to be added that Hauck finds no occasion to modernize the kingdom expectation of Jesus.

We may compare with Raven's conclusions likewise the positions in the German liberal *Introduction to the New Testament*. The famous book by Adolph Jülicher, which has been standard for a generation, appears in a

completely new revision in which the aged, blind author has been assisted by Erich Fascher, one of the coming names in the New Testament field on the Continent. (*Einleitung in das Neuen Testament*, Mohr, Tübingen.) He dates Mark shortly after 70, Matthew 80-100, and Luke 80-110. Since comparatively few American readers will have access to the volume, some of the more important changes from the earlier edition may be briefly noted. 2 Thessalonians is now denied to Paul; 2 Corinthians 10-13 is part of a letter written after chapters 1-9; the decision on Ephesians is still left in the balance. 1 Peter is now looked upon as a baptismal address by a Roman presbyter, which was then sent with added words of exhortation and comfort to communities in Asia Minor. Arnold Meyer has succeeded in convincing the authors that James is the adaptation of an originally Jewish testament of Jacob, which was made into a Christian Epistle by extensive interpolations something after the fashion of our documents of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. The fourth Gospel, they believe, was written in Syria between 100-25, but the authors can find no really satisfactory solution of the Johannine problem.

Two important books in English are dedicated to this most puzzling of all New Testament problems. Mary Ely Lyman gives a splendid popular statement of the liberal position in *The Fourth Gospel and the Life of To-day* (Macmillan). She attempts to answer the question concerning the effect upon our present evaluation if we accept the general point of view that "the secret of any true understanding of the Gospel lies in the recognition that, as a literary work, it is a unique blend of history with religious experience, an unusual fusion of fact with poetry." She dates the book at Ephesus about 110. "If an experience of Jesus is what the author wishes to tell, rather than a consecutive, ordered, factually accurate story of his life, then the question of whether he himself beheld the events is not of primary importance." The story of Jesus is presented in such a way as to commend itself to those who were familiar with philosophical thought. Mrs. Lyman's book is a presentation of a particular conclusion rather than a discussion of the many issues raised by this chameleon-like Gospel. It fills a real need as a sympathetic introduction to a modern understanding of the book.

A scholarly discussion of the present status of Johannine study was not available in English until the appearance of Wilbert F. Howard's *The Fourth Gospel in Recent Criticism and Interpretation* (Epworth). Bernard's huge volumes quite ignored most modern work, and the plan of the Moffatt commentary series did not enable Macgregor to give any full

survey of the modern situation. In this prolegomena to Johannine studies, the well-known editor of Moulton's Grammar has put English readers in his debt in a uniquely valuable way. Part One surveys the work during the twentieth century on the fourth Gospel in Germany, France, England, and America. The greatest omissions, so far as we can see, are in American books. Part Two is then devoted to a consideration in turn of the main problems raised by this criticism—sources, possible displacements, the relation to the synoptics, and the history-of-religions background. In the last section he indicates the main lines of his own interpretation of the Gospel.

Howard believes that the beloved disciple is to be identified with the Son of Zebedee, but is not the author. The speeches in the fourth Gospel are to be looked upon as Targums on words of Jesus rather than as literal reproductions. On the whole, however, a distinctly more conservative position is adopted than that of Mrs. Lyman. Valuable as are the personal expressions of Howard himself, his greatest contribution lies in making accessible the great literature in foreign languages and in offering a consideration of problems not yet realized in many quarters in this country.

The monograph on *The Kingdom of God in the New Testament*, by E. F. Scott (Macmillan), is important. The author has unusual facility for stating simply the main conclusions of historical study. The succession of brief volumes from his pen has been very helpful. Though some other scholars may feel that in this book Scott has been over-eager to make his results palatable to the general reader, the book may thereby be all the more helpful to those who have been brought up on the Ritschlian social gospel. "We speak of 'building up the kingdom' by earnest Christian work; we think of it as the far-off goal to be attained through growing knowledge, better legislation, strengthening of human brotherhood. . . . The kingdom to which he looked forward was God's kingdom; men are powerless to bring it into being. They can wait for it, they can make the world ready to receive it, there must be no limit to their labor and fidelity with which they perform this work of preparation. Yet the kingdom is of God and must be given directly by God."

Professor Scott writes not as a Barthian theologian, but as a New Testament scholar of distinguished reputation. The Jewish hopes are made the background for a discussion of the many-sided aspects of the kingdom expectation of Jesus. He is careful to make clear that apocalyptic and spiritual are not antithetical, but could go hand in hand for a first-

century Jew. The kingdom "was to come suddenly and supernaturally, yet for God's servants it was an inward possession. God was to bring it in by his own immediate act; to this belief Jesus always remained faithful. Yet he allowed for other modes of divine action than those of visible miracle. The kingdom was in its essence moral and spiritual, and God would establish it by renewing the hearts of men."

Fresh interpretations of Jesus are ever welcome for they bear testimony to the undying influence of the Nazarene. One that is genuinely unique comes from the pen of Dr. Ricardo Rojas, lately Rector of the University of Buenos Aires, and one of the most conspicuous historians and men of letters in Latin America at the present time. *The Invisible Christ* (Abingdon) contains a series of three dialogues between the Guest and a Bishop. It portrays the wrestling of a sincere, mystical mind in a Roman Catholic atmosphere with the mystery of Christ. The intimate knowledge of religious iconography makes the first dialogue on the image of Christ particularly fascinating. The author would ascend to the invisible Christ by reducing the different testimonies of his life to a single symbol in the word of the Great Teacher. It is not a book to be read with the expectation of an increase of knowledge about the Bible, but as a witness to valid mystical experience. The possibilities of such a faith transcending rigid dogma are well expressed in two lines of the dialogue:

Bishop—"When faith is combated by reason, doubt is born."

Guest—"From doubt fertilized by reason, a new faith may be born."

Thomas Walker has done a valuable service in collecting together in one short volume *Jewish Views of Jesus* (Macmillan). He first summarizes the late Jewish traditions about Jesus, those that were read in the Middle Ages. Paul Goodman and Friedländer are the illustrations drawn of attitudes of modern Jewish orthodoxy, and the writings of Claude Montefiori and I. Abrahams for liberal Judaism. The anonymous *As Others Saw Him* and the great work by Klausner are the formal lives summarized. Some of the material in the last chapter is demanded less by the theme than by the desire of the author to express his beliefs on themes touching the life of Christ, such as the virgin birth, and the Son of man problem. But we cannot be reminded often enough that "Christianity was born within the Jewish synagogue and greater justice must be done to the synagogue of Jesus' time. . . . Anything which will make the synagogue-life better known, may help on to a better understanding of some aspects of the life and teaching of Jesus." To the list of Jewish views of Jesus must now

be added that by Ernest R. Trattner, who has written *As a Jew Sees Jesus* (Scribner's).

It is the merit of the social origins' school that they have emphasized that the books of the New Testament can be understood only in connection with the social movement that produced them. A significant contribution to this type of study is *The Martyrs* (University of Chicago Press), by Donald W. Riddle. The author does not merely study again the political relationships of early Christianity. He would see in many of the early Christian writings insight into the social control exercised by the community in order to keep its membership faithful. 1 Peter and Hebrews clearly illustrate the thesis. Revelation is for this reason more individualistic than the Jewish apocalypses. Jesus appears as a martyr rather than a teacher. More daring is the application to the Gospel of Mark. Riddle believes that it was called forth by the Neronian persecution. Hellenistic Judaism had used martyrology as its type of control literature while Palestinian Judaism used the apocalypse. Mark combines the two in giving such prominence both to the Way of the Cross and the signs of the end. If this exaggerates one interest in the first century out of proportion, it should nevertheless emphasize the intimate connection between the Gospels and the other contemporaneous Christian literature.

Of works upon Paul, there is only one to command our notice. *The Mysticism of Paul*, by Albert Schweitzer (Henry Holt), was not yet published when these pages were concluded. Hence this notice can take no consideration of the quality of the translation, being based upon the original German edition. The volume provides the positive reconstruction for which the way was paved by the survey of Pauline study in *Paul and His Interpreters*, which appeared in 1912. While Schweitzer has taken notice of much of the work upon Paul since that date, particularly the contributions of Reitzenstein, one gains the impression that no real modification of position has been made.

This volume is much more than a work on Paul. It is Schweitzer's reconstruction of the development of Christianity from John the Baptist to Ignatius. The chapter on the fourth Gospel is among the least adequate; insufficient recognition is given to the Hebraic character of that work. Howard makes that clear in the lengthy discussion he gives to Schweitzer. For Raven, the whole book is an "instance of perverse ingenuity necessitated by a false starting-point." A majority of scholars would more likely believe that truth lies in some middle position between them.

The great Italian scholar, Salvatorelli, has asked the question if mysticism and eschatology do not most completely describe early Christianity. It is the position at least of Schweitzer, although the two come from opposite approaches. Schweitzer commends the emphasis upon sacramental realism in Paul by the history-of-religions school, to which Salvatorelli belongs (his monograph bore the title *From Locke to Reitzenstein*). Paul was certainly not a modern Protestant preaching an individual assurance of redemption based on salvation by faith. But Schweitzer can see no hellenistic influence upon Paul. His mysticism was an apocalyptic mysticism. If Iranian ideas were embodied in his thought they were mediated through Judaism. To a Jew, a God mysticism was out of the question. For the Paul of Mars Hill, the author of Acts must assume all responsibility. It was participation in the mystical body of Christ that formed the essence of Paul's mystical experience, which could be expressed briefly either as being "in Christ," or "Christ in me."

It would be impossible here to develop in detail the elaborate logical scheme which Schweitzer finds indicated in the six Pauline letters which he accepts as genuine. If it is too logical to be entirely convincing, it certainly cannot be dismissed without consideration. Particularly is this true in his treatment of the peculiar phases of Pauline mysticism. In suffering, men die with Christ and share in the messianic woes; in the gift of the Spirit men rise with him to a new ethical life.

The book is written in Schweitzer's gripping, forceful style. For such a closely reasoned book, it will be found surprisingly easy to read, and extremely rewarding in its stimulating insights. Despite the fact that his Paul cannot be naturalized in the twentieth century, Schweitzer closes with a remarkable chapter on the permanent significance of Paul. The apostle grounds for all time that faith has nothing to fear from the most rigorous thinking, and that love, not authority, can be the only chain upon freedom. In fact, traditionalism must always be faced by thinking if living religion is to develop. Again, we learn from Paul that Christ-mysticism is the heart of Christianity. "Looking out upon the floods of eternity, Paul's mysticism stands upon the firm ground of the historical appearance of Jesus Christ." Finally, Paul was the last to hold together faith in the coming kingdom of God and redemption through Christ. The development of this thought leads Schweitzer to a consideration of the ethical problem. The early Christians could not follow either Jesus or Paul in ethic because they did not share their eschatological position. Hence, they adopted their ethic from popular philosophy, interspersed with words of Jesus. Eastern the-

ology developed the idea of the divinizing of the flesh; Western thought elaborated the justification doctrine. But no ethic flows from either. Today, an unauthentic Jesus, founding a kingdom of God according to a certain ethic, and an unauthentic Paul of justification by faith stand opposed. In the measure in which we impart truth concerning Jesus it will be in terms of Paul's teaching of redeeming fellowship with Christ. Jesus' ethic of readiness for the supernatural kingdom of God became in Paul the ethic of a redeemed life in the kingdom of God that is experienced in fellowship with Jesus. No summary, however, can do justice to Schweitzer's inspiring pages.

We cannot bring to a close this survey of the current study of the Bible with more fitting words, "there remaineth yet very much land to be possessed."

Religion and the Social Order

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I SHALL never forget an incident which occurred in the experience of one of my colleagues during our years at theological seminary. There were, at that time, no dormitories for the embryonic rabbis, so he had secured board and lodging at the home of a genial typical boarding-house landlady who was a very devout church member. I cannot recall the denomination which was the recipient of her passionate loyalty, but that is beside the point. One evening, in the course of the usual arguments on all subjects that invariably cross the boarding-house table, a discussion arose concerning the lynching of a Negro in a certain Southern city. There were quite a number of vehement protestations against the inhumanity and immorality of such conduct. Suddenly, the genial and sanctimonious empress of the domicile, in the midst of filling a plate with a second portion of stew, uttered these words, "I don't blame them for stringing up that nigger. If I had my way, I'd hang every one of them." My friend, remembering her religious loyalties, turned to her and, by way of gentle rebuke, said, "But, my dear Mrs. So-and-so, doesn't your religion teach you 'Thou shalt not murder'?" The accustomed genial look in her eyes turned to one of frenzied rage, and pointing a trembling finger at my friend, she shouted, "See here now, you keep religion out of this!"

As the Duchess in "Alice in Wonderland" would say, "And the moral of this is . . ." There are millions of faithful and sincere communicants of all religious denominations to-day who cannot comprehend the fact that the kingdom of God in heaven has a great deal to do with the sort of kingdom of God which we human beings construct here on earth. Many of them, in all honesty and sincerity, look upon the church and religion solely as an escape mechanism, something to take them away from the humdrum monotony or the terrible struggles of earthly existence. I have no quarrel with those who seek the holy quiet of the sanctuary as a means of mystical communion with the Divine. I am not one of those who, with the very estimable Dr. Charles Ellwood, feel that we should turn religion over, bag and baggage, to the sociologists. I believe very devoutly in the mystical aspects of religious life, in that inner sense of godliness, and in the beauty of holiness in its supernatural æsthetic aspects. Yet I cannot feel that this inner communion reaches its greatest religious

significance merely in the transcendental experience. Religion must not be an anodyne but a stimulant. The inspiration of the supernatural revelation must be definitely a springboard to launch us, with a new sense of the fitness of things, into the turbulent stream of the problems of the economic and social and political world. Mysticism which halts with the mere experience is only a selfish debauch. The revelation of divine realities of beauty must be translated into concrete terms of social action. The sense it gives us of a mystically pure Oneness must lead us to strive to extirpate all disharmony, especially that born of economic and political oppression. The quality of godliness must touch every human relationship and not only our smug inner selves. The "beauty of holiness" and "supernatural aesthetics" attain their full significance only when they carry us into the fight against the vicious ugliness of man-made slums, against the drabness of exploited childhood, and the ruination of the sweetness and charm of girlhood amid a system of nerve-wracking hours of labor and pitifully little pay.

In following such a course we are merely acting in harmony with the fundamental traditions of religious life as expounded by the greatest of our leaders and teachers. The combination of the supernatural and the ethical is the very mark of the genius of the teachings of the Prophets of Israel and of Jesus of Nazareth. The modern interest of religion in social problems is not a new thing. It is merely going back to the essential truths of those traditions which we endeavor to carry on.

Social justice, not in a vague and generalized sense, but as an application of religious ethics to concrete economic and political problems, is the most outstanding distinguishing mark of the Bible. The five books of Moses abound in the practical connection of a supernatural God-revelation with the immediate affairs of human relationships. Issuing directly from the concept of godliness is the ethico-social responsibility of the man who, digging a pit, may allow it to remain unguarded and thus cause a menace to the life and limb of those who might fall therein. In the sacred literature of the Hebrews it becomes a religious mandate to place a guard rail around any elevated platform in order to protect the lives of those who may use it. Again and again I hear very devout folks say that religion and the pulpit must preach ethical generalizations and let society draw the concrete conclusions. Religion, they assert, must tell people to love their neighbors as themselves, but the details of the manifestation of that love in the social order are the concern of other than religious forces. "Religion has nothing to do," they maintain, "with industrial safety laws, unem-

ployment, old age security, and such specific economic problems." This, however, is not the biblical tradition, as we have seen. Moreover, in these same five books of Moses the belief in the inalienable rights of property which so many hold as a fetish to-day are questioned and, in fact, negated by the Law of the Jubilee Year. And Amos, in the market place, did not merely say, "Let justice flow forth as waters," but he turned to the food adulterators and the profiteers and recited specifically what in their own lives and business activities constituted injustice and godlessness. Isaiah followed the same course with regard to the monopolists who "join house to house and field to field." Jeremiah attacked that sanctimoniousness which, in the name of religion, made an idol of shallow patriotism; and, again and again, in the social teachings of Jesus the supremacy of human rights over those of property are definitely and specifically set forth.

Let us remember that modern socialized religion, from its very genesis, follows the same line of development that characterized former days. The religion of the Prophets of Israel was born directly out of the social, economic, and political evils of the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries preceding the Christian era. Pauline Christianity issued out of the social decay of Greece and Rome. So, too, our modern socialized religion was born and develops out of the moral conflict arising in the economic world as a result of the Industrial Revolution and the Machine Age. History also repeats itself in the matter of spiritual leadership. It is not the priests of Israel whom we remember and who stand pre-eminent. It is an Amos or an Isaiah. It is not the timid repeaters of empty cant and shallow generalities who are the real religious prophets of to-day. It is a Harry Ward in America, a Gandhi in India, or a Kagawa in Japan.

Organized religion is itself to blame for much of its lack of influence in modern life. It has allowed the most reactionary among the people who pay its bills and build its ornate cathedrals to dictate its policies. Let me give one or two examples. Not so many years ago, in the course of a symposium on the social and economic conditions of the New England textile industry, one of the mill owners, who claimed to be a church "pillar," arose and said, "A community needs industry first. The church must never push its humanitarian ideals beyond the ability of an industry to stand it." This was at a meeting held under religious auspices, yet we were told by the representative of the current economic system, speaking to his religious leaders, that if it is a question of profits against a decent subsistence for the workers, we must be silent and allow the exploitation of

the lives of men and women and children to continue for the sake of these profits. And these are the men who are so often sincerely "religious" and furnish the means whereby many a church functions! An acquaintance of mine in a certain Protestant denomination, who felt that he could not stand idly by, preaching a gospel of love in abstract generalities while so much of specific hate existed in the economic order, practically cried to me "They tell me to 'cut it out' and preach the gospel whenever I dare touch any real problems of life." A young Reform Jewish colleague of mine in a fair-sized Eastern city was threatened with the loss of his job merely for signing a manifesto calling for arbitration of a local industrial dispute, and was warned by the congregational board henceforth to "keep his mouth shut on economic problems." Even some men in the pulpit become so convinced of the sacredness of things as they are that they assist in making religion simply an invoker of blessings on the status quo. One young rabbi in the Jewish pulpit of a Pacific Coast town had been most active in his denunciation of the injustice being done Mooney and Billings. What happened I know not, but suddenly he "saw the light," and asked me not to use his name any more in connection with the Mooney and Billings affair. He had "discovered certain facts which indicated that these men deserved their punishment." There is the well-known case of a certain metropolitan "house of God" which is reputed to have an annual income of one and a half million dollars. Some years ago it was discovered that a great deal of this annual income came from real estate in the slum sections where people lived under the most horrible housing conditions and where the menace of fire, contrary not only to morals but also to law, was added to unsanitary circumstances as dangers to life. I understand that, at least for the greater part, the present million and half annual income comes from less unsavory sources, yet with such an enormous stake in the economic status quo, it was not surprising to hear the present incumbent of this pulpit declare recently: "Churches should not be used as centers of propaganda for social problems." Is it any wonder, in the light of this, that communists proclaim religion to be an opiate, and that they destroy the churches whenever they come into power?

In fact, despite the great social messages of its founders, it is a tragic record that the organized church, throughout the ages, has repeatedly missed its great moral opportunity by being coerced by the forces of reaction. The real founders of religion were great, fearless social idealists. The mark of their genius was evidenced in the declaration of the principle that man cannot make his worship acceptable to God except as he strives

for righteousness, justice, and love in the social order. Nevertheless, the institutions built upon the teachings and in the names of these great prophetic souls have often become fossilized and have again and again impeded social progress. Would you have concrete instances? Look at the reactionary attitude of most of the churches even to-day toward the advancement of science! Witness the cruel inhumanity of the Inquisition! Behold the manner in which the Orthodox Church invoked blessings on the iniquitous reign of the Russian Tsars! Read the sad story of how religious leaders in the early days of the Industrial Revolution tried to make the workers oblivious to economic exploitation by the promise of "pie in the sky"! Consider, too, the unenviable record of the churches with regard to war! Banners of hostile nations have been blessed by priests of the same denominations in the name of one universal God. Why, the atrocity has even gone to the limit where the churches of one Christian nation, only a comparatively few years ago, blessed a war against China which had as its chief aim the forcing of the curse of the opium traffic on the Chinese!

Here in America, there are the occasional "voices crying in the wilderness." There are, moreover, the rather courageous and emphatic declarations of national religious bodies like the Federal Council of Churches, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the Central Conference of American Rabbis; but when it comes to the bulk of the individual churches in our cities, towns and villages, few indeed are those which embody the prophetic spirit in defiance of the law of the sacredness of things as they are. In an unemployment crisis most of the individual churches content themselves merely with collecting charity instead of challenging the social order that condemns millions to starve in the midst of plenty. A prominent advertising man receives the plaudits of the clergy for writing a book in which Jesus of Nazareth is boomed as a sort of a sublimation of the go-getting American business man. Sermons are given from innumerable pulpits, showing the practical "dollar-and-cents" value of the use of the Bible in the accumulation of profits; and, by general agreement, Moses or Jesus becomes the first Rotarian. Churches, before the depression, amassed enormous building funds and erected marvelous cathedrals with elaborate trappings and rituals, while often, almost in the very shadows of these gorgeous temples, human beings lived in habitations hardly fit for swine. As one writer put it, possibly in a somewhat extreme form, but certainly with a great germ of truth—"The money changers are still in the Temple, but the lash of Jesus is bound around the bankroll."

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Pulpits mouth empty phrases concerning the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of all mankind, yet every Ku Klux Klan lodge has its full quota of "men of God." We hedge terribly in facing racial issues. I know personally of an instance which happened in a certain large city where, at a dinner to be given to Oswald Garrison Villard, a number of prominent Negroes were invited. The hotels refused to entertain colored guests. The churches of the city were appealed to, and not one that was asked, not even the reputedly liberal Friends, would house the dinner, and it had to be taken to the private home of a truly religious person.

The churches have not escaped unscathed because of this moral cowardice. All of us complain of the desertion of religion by our youth. Not religion, but the churches have been deserted. This dereliction, to my mind, is not primarily the result of theological doubt and misgiving. Most of our liberal denominations have found a basic philosophy which permits a godly faith to exist without irrational contradictions alongside the tenets of modern science. The trouble lies elsewhere. Youth is chronically and incurably idealistic. Its charm and beauty lie in the fact that it is dissatisfied with the world that the elders have built, a world of the bloodshed of war and the poverty due to economic exploitation. Youth longs to build a finer and nobler civilization. It looks in vain to the churches to lead in this movement. With that keen sensitiveness which characterizes youth, it evaluates all our vague generalized protestations of justice and love as mere idle cant. It beholds in most of the churches a useless social investment. Moreover, we have not only lost our youth, but we have also estranged the more intelligent and alert of the working class who look to us in vain amid the oppression which many of their numbers endure in mill and mine. Religion, which, from the spirit of its founders, was the traditional friend of the under-dog even in the face of all manner of threat and persecution, has lost its heroic rôle amid smugness and complacency. Yet the greatest bit of irony is that those whose interests lie in the stability of the status quo and are protected by the benisons of religion, harbor very little regard for the institutionalized church which blesses their wars and their economic depredations. They realize that they are the church's masters and not its servants. Institutionalized religion thus loses its force not only with youth but with labor and capital as well. So it is that the world, bereft of its faith, turns from the ineffectual church to a cult of materialistic science, to a religion of stark unmoral nationalism, to crass practical materialism, or to class struggle communism. These desertions are all the more distressing because none

of these substitutes can take the place of an ethical philosophy which co-ordinates the whole cosmos in a system of justice on the basis of a faith in a God who is the quintessence of all values, all righteousness and all love.

Distressing, it is indeed, and disgraceful that, despite the great ethico-social traditions of the churches, modern social ideals and movements to curb the wanton aggressiveness of vested wealth and efforts to improve the lot of the underprivileged have had their inspiration outside the ranks of religion and often among those who are definitely anti-religious. This is not only a reproach; it is regrettable, I feel, on the basis of general ethical stability. I feel that the rôle of social reform belongs primarily to the churches. I feel that a fundamental ethical philosophy of life must flow out of a revelation of godliness. It is that revelation which is the only thing that can give stability to social justice. Humanistic dicta have too elusive a foundation. Mankind of itself and the institutions of mankind need something more stable than the changing standards of changing civilizations. The world needs a basic social philosophy which recognizes and respects the validity of cosmic principles. It craves not for materialistic panaceas, but for divine reality. As someone has well said, "The unrest of to-day is not simply the rumbling of empty stomachs, but the stirring of the soul of man."

We cannot acquire this prestige and position by pious generalities and theological definitions. We are definitely under the suspicion that, for the greater part, the church of America is a class church; that pulpits lull the people with phrases of other-worldliness or with sweet sentiments of hollow beauty, while thousands starve at the very church doors. Have we permanently deserted the concept of an all-pervading holiness which does not stop at the altar, but which strides into the market place and champions in concrete terms the cause of social justice? Can we be satisfied with beautiful churches, melodious organs, with songs and prayers, and yet fail to challenge the social order where all the fundamentals of brotherhood are violated for pay that provides for less than subsistence, not to mention a living wage? Can we thank God for the health and safety of our own children and yet do nothing actively to root out the vicious evils of child labor which denies a healthy childhood to hundreds of thousands? Dare we sit smugly satisfied at the thought of God's loving care over our own daughters, while hundreds of thousands of other young women toil unceasingly for miserable wages at nerve-wracking machines and find their only hope of a little bit of the joy of life on the streets or in the cheap

dance-halls? A great scientist said recently, "We need a religion which will give men a sense of sin regarding social values." The whole matter could not be put more aptly. We must emphasize social salvation as a prerequisite to the salvation of the individual. We must have, not a static system of generalized ethics, but a dynamic ethical religion which faces up to the challenging problems of a machine age, and not only preaches and passes resolutions, but acts.

Unemployment—men seeking in vain the inalienable right of every one of God's creatures to labor to support himself and his dear ones; old age—here in a modern society where low wages, periodic unemployment, and the vicissitudes of health destroy the power of adequate saving and many old couples face the end of their years in enforced separations amid the ignominious environment of the poorhouse; international peace—the challenge to men and nations to root the passion of war out of their hearts, and to obey in sincerity God's command, "Thou shalt not murder"; a living wage—the requirement that a man be given enough for his labor to support his family in decency; birth control—the application of the intelligence of man's God-given mind to his God-given powers of procreation; these are only some of the vital issues which are the concern of those who would guide society ethically. Religion, to be potent to-day, must have an ethical answer to these questions. Has religion the courage to make itself vital, to brave criticism and threat; the self-sacrifice to house itself, if necessary, in less magnificent churches, to clothe itself in simpler habiliments; but, above all, the heroism to recreate for this day and age the spirit of its founders? Upon the answer to this challenge rests the outcome of a very real problem: Will organized religion, as we know it to-day, survive the batterings of an age of materialistic science and godless machines?

The Idea of God in Recent Literature

HARRIS FRANKLIN RALL

IT is an interesting task to scan recent books which treat of the idea of God. One reason is the renewed interest in this greatest of all questions. Another reason is the diversity in the views that are expressed. Once upon a time the men who were interested in religion and wrote about God shared pretty much the same general point of view. They accepted a common theological tradition, and they held to a common underlying philosophy. To-day, outside the Roman Catholic Church and fundamentalist circles, this is radically changed. The Christian tradition is apparent, but an authoritative Christian doctrine, whether found in the creeds or assumed to be taken from the Bible, is denied.

Even so conservative a writer as Dr. Charles Gore, the ablest representative of the Anglican tradition of to-day, asserts his independence, in method at least. His work is not unworthy of a first mention in this article. In his *Reconstruction of Belief* he included three volumes previously published, covering the whole range of doctrine. It is an admirable statement of the traditional position, temperate in expression, catholic in spirit. He says: "I have, ever since I was an undergraduate, been certain that I must be in the true sense a free thinker, and that either not to think freely about a disturbing subject, or to accept ecclesiastical authority in place of the best judgment of my own reason, would be for me an impossible treason against the light." Doctor Gore calls himself frankly "a Catholic by mental constitution," more frank here in confessing this personal predilection than many a liberal who thrusts forth his prepossessions and considers himself strictly scientific. Doctor Gore in the same context speaks significant and illuminating words: "The only difficult dogma of the church is the dogma that God is Love. But deeper than any difficulty has been the feeling that at the roots of my being I am confronted with God, from whom I cannot get away, and that the God who confronts me there is the Living God of the prophets and of Jesus Christ. Equally deep was the feeling that the Christian life was certainly 'the Way.' "

Doctor Gore's words serve as admirable introduction to this situation which we are reviewing. The authority of a dogmatic tradition is gone. The old uniformity is broken which held Protestants and Catholics together in common allegiance. There is the realization that we must be free in our thinking. There is wide diversity in the result. There is a desire to do justice to new insights that come from natural science, psychology,

the social sciences, and history. There is a desire for reality, to build upon the empirical. And there is question and doubt as to what man can know. But through it all these truths which this conservative scholar has emphasized in his preface come out again and again: There is a God from whom man cannot get away; the noblest conception of this God, however hard to hold, and the one in which we discern the supreme issue for faith, is the Living God of creative love; and the one way of life for men is the way of Jesus. In other words, taking the movement as a whole, the living awareness of God grows more significant for religion, and Jesus keeps his central place. Doctor Gore's latest volume, *The Philosophy of the Good Life*, should also be mentioned here.

Into every theology three elements necessarily enter. There is the element of tradition, the great ideals and ideas which we all take in with every breath of our intellectual life. There is an empirical aspect which the strictest traditionalist does not escape, and which includes alike the knowledge of the world about us and the intimate moral and religious experience of our own life. And there is a rational, or philosophical aspect, which drives us to compare and criticize, to understand, to see things whole in the light of ideas which will give unity and meaning to our world. These elements enter into all theology but not in equal measure. The relative attention given may help us somewhat to discriminate among the men whom we consider. In connection with Doctor Gore we will consider two other writers who illustrate with him the Anglican interest in tradition with the varying attitudes.

One of the best of recent books on God is that by Dean W. R. Matthews, of King's College, London, *God in Christian Experience*. Doctor Matthews is a liberal Anglican. He illustrates at once the appreciation of tradition and the necessary criticism. For the Christian tradition means two things. On the one hand there are the ideals and insights which the New Testament shows and by which Christian men since then have lived, the faith in the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, in the life that man may live with God, and in the life in the spirit of Jesus which he must live with men. For this tradition Dean Matthews stands as strongly as Doctor Gore, but he does not rate so highly the forms in which traditional theology set forth these convictions. He shows how the conception of God lying back of them was taken on the one hand from Greek philosophy with its thought of God as pure activity, as ultimate essence, as contrasted with all human qualities, even at their highest, and how the other element was the idea of the absolute monarch as set forth by Calvin. Through

both of these, those personal and ethical values suffered which are dominant with the prophets and Jesus. This faith he seeks to set forth with a right regard for the forms of thought available for us to-day. He brings a living, creative, ethical, personal God. He sees a universe with real change, real achievement, creation as an adventure of God, and he denies to God absolute foreknowledge.

Canon Charles E. Raven is one of the most vigorous and independent of younger theologians, combining scientific training with his theological knowledge. His most recent volume is *Jesus and the Gospel of Love*. He, too, is interested in the Christian tradition, in determining by a fresh study of its origin and history what the Christian message really is and its validity for our day. Taking the ethical-historical approach as against the metaphysical, he finds that Jesus, though misrepresented by later theories of incarnation and atonement, embodies for us the truth about God. He minimizes the apocalyptic and emphasizes the ethical and immanent as against the transcendent. John is for him the great interpreter and the later creeds do not do justice to the Christian elements in the idea of God. This book should be compared with the very notable interpretation of Christianity given by F. C. Porter, of Yale, in his *Mind of Christ in Paul*.

All theology that is worthy of the name makes its appeal to reason. It seeks to look at things whole, to find in the idea of God a rational interpretation of the world and life. Where this element is emphasized we may speak of the philosophical approach. Usually it involves a stress upon the intellectual in religion as compared with the ethical and emotional, and a confidence in the power of reason to discover to us the truth. The approach is not in line with the temper of the day, though there are signs of a movement in this direction. Dean Knudson of Boston, Professor Edwin Lewis of Drew, and Dr. F. R. Tennant of Trinity College, Cambridge, present us with recent works that might be put in this class. All three are pronounced theists.

In his *Doctrine of God*, Dean Knudson has given us one of the most vigorous and effective statements of theism of recent years. His stress upon the moral quality, the Christlike character, of God makes his theology Christian at the crucial point, as some more conservative theologies are not. There is, however, little appeal to the materials of Christian tradition of the New Testament period, and the treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity shows that any precise expression given in the creeds is not vital for him. The Christlikeness of God is for him the essential truth in the

doctrine of the Trinity, and a true appreciation of what person means rules out the old formulation. Nor does he appeal to the ongoing religious life. His theology rests upon a philosophical basis, that of personal idealism, and his first interest is to establish this.

Doctor Lewis' point of view in his *God and Ourselves* is essentially the same as Dean Knudson's. Its distinctive character is the incisive discussion of present-day movements of thought. As against all suggestions of a limited God, he stands for "the universal Sovereign." As against a naturalistic humanism he asserts the reality of God and his meaning for religion. He draws upon philosophical idealism to support the belief in God, but gives place for a chapter on moral values and the idea of God. His suggestive discussion of the problem of evil is perhaps the most realistic portion of his volume. It reaches its height in the chapter on God as "The Universal Servant." In "The Inevabilities of Life" there is a protest against the cruder supernaturalism which creates unnecessary difficulties for religious thought. Religious interest and insight are apparent throughout this work.

Doctor Tennant's volume, *The World, the Soul, and God*, like Dean Knudson's, is part of a larger work intended to cover the field of theology. It is described by its general title, *Philosophical Theology*. These two works show the same systematic arrangement and logical discussion, the use of technical terms to secure exact statement, and the desire to establish theology upon a definite philosophical basis. Doctor Tennant makes little appeal to the historical tradition of Christianity, or to that which comes through religious and social (ethical) experience. There is a somewhat dry intellectualism which appears in the statement that religion is but the practice of the belief that is formulated in theology. His special claim is that his theology is empirical, and his empirical basis he finds mainly in a study of the natural order. Here is "natural theology." Cosmic teleology is the significant fact, the evidence of purpose in the world. But the cosmos includes man and the higher values that here come to light. So we move toward an ethical and personal God, "a determinate Spirit who is an artist and a lover as well as a geometrizer." But because he is a determinate God, a God with a definite character and purpose, he is necessarily a limited or conditioned God. Theology must get away from the assertion of abstract perfection and consider just what the goodness and power of God mean.

In broad agreement with the conclusions just considered, we have those writers whose method might be called philosophical but whose

primary approach is through the data furnished by the moral life. Following in the line of Kant, Lotze, and Ritschl, and the more recent work of W. H. Sorley on *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, we have *The Interpretation of Religion*, by John Baillie, of Union Seminary, *Faith in God*, by his brother, D. M. Baillie, of Scotland, and the Gifford Lectures, *The Faith of a Moralist*, by A. E. Taylor, whose article on Theism in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* gives such an admirable historical survey.

These men insist upon the empirical as much as any naturalistic philosopher, but for them experience demands interpretation, interpretation is discovering meaning, and man's most significant experience is in the moral realm. That experience points to God, to the way that we know God, and the kind of God we know. John Baillie bids us turn from the way of reason which makes religion philosophical speculation, and from romanticism which turns it into feeling, and from the idea that we reach God by some special intuition, to the way of moral insight. Here is the way we find God. God is not given us as a conclusion of reason, nor directly reached by mystical awareness or immediate intuition. Religious experience "is essentially reflective in character—born of reflection and constituted by reflection."

Thus it follows, as D. M. Baillie points out, that faith is basic for religion and that the knowledge of God is a knowledge of faith. Faith here has two sides, belief and trust; knowledge but one that involves trust; trust but one that implies knowledge and is not blind. And the basic element in trust is the belief that "our highest values must and do count in the scheme of things," in other words, that what is highest in value is one with what is most real. D. M. Baillie's work is too little known on this side the water. It deserves to be placed beside the notable volume of his brother, both of which are set off from much current religious discussion by solid scholarship and coherent argument. A. E. Taylor's great work rests on the same conviction. "What confronts us in actual life is neither facts without value nor values attached to no facts, but fact revealing value." "Serious living is no more compatible with the belief that the universe is indifferent to morality than serious and arduous pursuit of truth with the belief that truth is a human convention or superstition."

Valuable in these works is the realization of the place of faith in the knowledge of God. In this connection may also be mentioned the chapter contributed by E. W. Lyman to a volume later mentioned, *Religious Realism*. One may well raise the question, however, whether these works do full justice to the religious experience. There is no high religion with-

out this ethical faith, but is that all there is in high religion? Is there not in the high religion of the prophets and Jesus a sense of the holy that goes beyond (though not higher than) that? There is no religious experience, or any experience, without interpretation, but do we conclude then that religion is simply "constituted by reflection"?

E. S. Brightman of Boston and W. P. Montague of Columbia, both philosophers and both interested in religion, have made interesting suggestions which move somewhat along the same lines. Both are concerned with the problem of evil as raised by the world of nature which modern science reveals. They see a creative purpose at work moving toward the achievement of a higher good. Both are theists, but to both the world seems to show a creative Spirit that is hindered in its efforts. They seek a theory to enable them to hold to their faith in a good God and yet face these facts of evil.

H. G. Wells tried to solve this question in his *God the Invisible King* by suggesting an unknown God who was the Power that lay back of all, and a known God, finite, struggling, fellow worker with men, and their leader. Professor Montague, in his *Belief Unbound*, repudiates any thought of two gods. There is one God and one world, but the unity in this world has not yet been fully achieved, and this lack of a fully achieved unity rests back upon the nature of God. God's consciousness pervades the universe, his will is perfect goodness. But there are forces with which he has to struggle, recalcitrant members that he does not fully control. The evil is not of his will, of his character, and yet it is within himself. We may have faith in this God, for we believe that in him what is deepest in nature is one with what is highest in spirit. But it is not a victory already won. God must fight and we must fight, and so we need a Promethean religion.

Professor Brightman's volume, *The Problem of God*, also suggests a dualism within God. On the one side God is reason, goodness, creative will; on the other side there is in God something passive, inert, a hindering and irrational element. He is hindered not simply by the evil in men but by something, not necessarily to be viewed as a moral evil, within himself. This is "The Given." One might think of the given as like the material which the artist uses, at once necessary for his work and yet always somewhat recalcitrant, something that has to be mastered and overcome. Doctor Brightman does not use this figure, but he does say that God's will and reason act upon "The Given" and so produce the

world. It is not quite clear how much is gained by putting this hindering element within God, instead of without.

These writers, and others, make one thing plain. We have something to learn not merely from mystical experiences and ethical ideals and the lofty spiritual insights of the past, but from the larger knowledge of the world that has come to our day. Religion's supreme concern is whether the highest that man knows is some way one with the most real, whether when he envisages the good and says, "Our Father," he can also say, "who art in heaven." That is what religious faith asserts. Traditional theology formed a theory for that faith, the theory of an absolute good and an absolute God. Creation meant a perfect world made at a stroke by a word of power. Imperfection, disorder, sin, were viewed as mere appearance, or as the passing and evil influence of man. And some day by another deed of absolute power the perfect good that always had been was to be established by a divine saving act. For such a theory the imperfect is an unmeaning contradiction.

But in the world that we actually know it is different. The higher life in this world comes at the end, not at the beginning. Goodness is achievement. Creation involves toil and conflict and pain. That does not exclude God. Nor does it mean a growing God, or a God who is himself a product of the process. But it does mean that if we believe in God as creative Good Will, then there must be a new conception of creation—and in that creation two elements. One will be the element of freedom, a certain independence of being, a certain power that has been handed over by a God, who stands "a handsbreadth off" and gives this finite world a chance to achieve, knowing that there can be no creation which is not achievement as well. The other will be the divine element, not a God of power who stands aloof and creates a finished world by his *ipse dixit*, nor a God who is merely that basic order without which there could be no being at all. This God is that higher order, leading, luring, like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, toward the good that waits to be realized; and he is a God who, unlike Aristotle's God, is the conscious and loving purpose and power that somehow moves in all things as creative and redemptive force. The elements that make this problem of evil do not lie in God himself as some mysterious, incongruous force or thing; they lie in the very nature of finite being as that which can only come to be by the way of slow and struggling achievement, a principle that we have seen in human nature and must extend to the whole range of being, unexplained but accepted "with natural piety."

To complete this review, then, it would be necessary to turn to that rapidly increasing list of those books which, not limited to the discussion of the "conflict" of science and religion, are trying to see if science has some word to speak as to God and his work in the world. That would exceed alike the compass of space and of the writer's knowledge. The study would include physicists like Eddington, Jeans, Millikan, and Pupin, but even more those who use the biological approach rather than that of physics. Of especial interest would be the increasing influence of the organicistic point of view, and the realization that there is a purposive activity at work which proceeds by shaping ever larger and more significant wholes and so moves on to the creation of higher values. *The Fitness of the Environment*, by L. J. Henderson; *Emergent Evolution*, by C. Lloyd Morgan; *Development and Purpose*, by L. T. Hobhouse; and *Holism and Evolution*, by Jan Smuts, will suffice as examples. An interesting illustration of the use of this scientific material as pointing to God is given in the chapter on "God and Emergent Evolution," by W. K. Wright, in *Religious Realism*. For the general field several popular symposiums may be suggested. *Has Science Discovered God?* edited by E. H. Cotton, is a volume to which sixteen scientists contribute constructive statements the more interesting because of their variety. It is perhaps the best of the three books here mentioned. In *God and the Universe*, edited by J. Lewis May, we have three discussions by religious leaders. *Science and Religion*, with a foreword by Michael Pupin, gives twelve interesting chapters by English scholars, mainly scientists. Most striking is the fact that the scientists who speak are deeply interested in religion and God, that is, in the search for meanings that lie below facts and their relations, and in the question whether the final Power means goodness and whether man can trust. Two conclusions would seem to follow from the present state of discussion. First, science as such, even if we include history, psychology, and the social sciences, cannot either give us God or deny him. Second, the world about us and the story of man's past can and must help us toward an understanding of God and of his relation to his world.

Religious Realism, edited by D. C. Macintosh, of Yale, is a volume of especial value for those who wish to study the movement of thought to-day. Its fifteen contributors show a wide variety alike as to position and method, ranging from the impersonalism of Doctor Wieman to a pronounced theism like that of Professors Lyman, Wright, and Macintosh. For our consideration, we will select from this volume Professors Wieman,

Macintosh, and Horton, making reference to other publications of theirs, and adding Dean Shailer Mathews. These four show, with all their differences, a certain kinship in their empirical approach that is significant for our present situation.

Doctor H. N. Wieman is one of the most independent and suggestive of present writers on philosophy of religion. He combines with the philosophic mind a religious spirit which enables him to appreciate religion from within. His most recent books are *The Issues of Life* and *Methods of Private Religious Living*. His earlier works are *Religious Experience and Scientific Method* and *The Wrestle of Religion with the Truth*. He makes a double appeal, and first on the intellectual side to those who have reacted from authority and speculation under the influence of the empirical spirit and find it hard to believe in God. To them he offers a very simple solution of their difficulty. "God," he says, "is that in the universe which will yield maximum security and increase of human good when lives are properly adjusted to him." It is difficult to see how any one can object to this, even the most pronounced atheist. For surely there are goods that are being achieved in human life, and there is obviously something in the universe, some force or order or process, which makes this possible. Of course, many people are a little doubtful about this method of settling problems by definition. For as Doctor Haydon, who is a colleague of Doctor Wieman, has suggested, "If to live in dependence upon the cosmic and social environment for the achievement of our values is to have a belief in God, then there are no atheists, for we can live in no other way."

But Doctor Wieman does not stop here. This position by itself would hardly involve any religious attitudes, any more than the "kindly" attitude of the farmer toward soil and rain and sun and succession of seasons which make his harvest possible and to which he must adjust himself after scientific study. So Doctor Wieman goes on. God is an order, a process, a principle of integration, an energy that is working. Here, of course, are philosophical assertions to call forth difference of opinion. The differences become more marked when one notes his negatives. God is not the whole order of the universe, nor necessarily the basic order or the ultimate power. He is just the aspect that we find helpful. The word God might simply be a blanket term to cover everything that makes life and progress possible for us. Nor is he personal. On this point Doctor Wieman in his later writings has become emphatic. Apparently he holds that you must choose between the conception of God as a personal individual on the one hand, and on the other the idea of God as an order that makes personal life

and its values possible and that may include them. He seems to leave out of consideration the position of modern theism. His argument is: "If God constitutes the greatest value, he cannot be a personality."

Perhaps the chief appeal of Doctor Wieman, however, is to those who are concerned with religion as a way of achieving life, and particularly to those who seek guidance in worship. Here, on the evident basis of his own experience, he gives stimulating discussion and concrete direction as he sets forth a special type of mysticism. The limitations of his contribution at this point follow naturally from his conception of God. The religion of personal fellowship is necessarily ruled out. Doctor Wieman does indeed use "he" and "him" in referring to God. He justifies this by suggesting that "some words are warm and vibrant with emotion because of the associations they carry." But it is not, of course, possible really to say "Thou" to an impersonal order or process, and there can be on God's part no personal awareness or response. We have here an anthropocentric religion, whose very definition of God is in terms of his use to man. The test of the "converted" man, we are told, is that he has come to "prize" most highly "that upon which we are dependent for the greatest values. That is God." This is what it means to "cherish" or to "love" God.

Alike in his emphasis on what an empirical approach may mean and in his discussion of the importance of an experimentally determined adjustment, Doctor Wieman has made valuable suggestions to theology. That his method does not need to stop where he does is indicated by the conclusions of others who use much the same approach. Doctor Macintosh had anticipated Doctor Wieman in a definition of God, given in his *Theology as an Empirical Science*, as "a Power which makes for some dependable result in and through us, when we relate ourselves to that Power in a certain discoverable way." His position is developed in the volume *Religious Realism*, of which his chapter constitutes over one fifth. His plea is for "progressive experimental religion," more rational, more moral, more scientific, concerned more with "inner readjustment and integration and the development of a good and efficient will." But one wonders whether the God of vital religion is not one who has made himself known to man's heart and will in more direct fashion than is traced out by this careful rational process, and whether this academically correct religion is that by whose power, for example, the early church triumphed.

Dr. W. M. Horton, of Oberlin, contributes to *Religious Realism* a suggestive chapter on "Authority without Infallibility." He has discussed

the modern situation in two recent volumes, which are suggestive in criticism but give only a general outline of his idea of God. *Theism and the Modern Mood* gave a good discussion of non-theistic humanism. In a *Psychological Approach to Theology* the author necessarily transcends the limits set by his title, recognizing that psychology as such cannot answer the final questions of religion.

Dean Shailer Mathews, in his *Growth of the Idea of God*, follows his interesting historical treatment with two closing chapters that reflect his own idea of God. The characteristic approaches to the problem of God to-day, he says, are the idea of values and that of the evolutionary process. Human life and human values are not a thing apart in the universe. As Pringle-Pattison insisted, man is organic to the universe and the universe cannot be understood without man. And so man as personal points to personality-producing forces in the universe. We are not to think of God as a super-individual; we are to think of him as personal but not as individuality. "God is our conception, born of social experience, of the personality-evolving and personally responsive elements of our cosmic environment with which we are organically related." This concept of God has its purpose in securing for us right adjustment to our world. Its value "will be determined on the one hand by its accord with such knowledge of the universe as we may possess, and on the other hand by its capacity to further the personal values of life."

Though the criticism does not apply equally, many will consider this group as too anthropocentric in its conception of religion, too little appreciative of the aspect set forth in Rudolph Otto's great work on *The Idea of the Holy*, and with too little understanding, in their calculating experimentalism, of the nature and place of faith.

The English reader is still decidedly limited in the available means for the knowledge of Karl Barth and the other spokesmen for the "dialectical" theology, or theology of crisis: Brunner, Gogarten, Bultmann, and Thurneysen. We have now several volumes which seek to interpret Barth: *The Significance of Karl Barth*, by John McConnachie; *The Karl Barth Theology*, by A. S. Zerbe; *The Teaching of Karl Barth*, by R. Birch Hoyle; and *Karl Barth*, by Wilhelm Pauck. Professor Pauck's volume has the special value that he gives extensive extracts in translation and follows the development of Barth's thought in a chronological study of his writings. No adequate criticism of Barth has yet appeared in English, nor indeed can it very well be offered till we have a more complete and sys-

tematic presentation of this theology. Invaluable for English readers is Emil Brunner's *The Theology of Crisis*.

Whatever one's own conclusion may be, Karl Barth and his movement demand our consideration. A distinguished American teacher of theology said in private conversation a couple of years ago, referring to the Barthians: "Why, those men are crazy." They certainly represent a point of view which he rightly saw as diametrically opposed to his own humanism. But that may be an excellent reason for studying Barth. American readers will find him hard to understand. Not only the point of view, but the background of religious life and thought, and the method of discussion are so different from that of America and England. But the fact remains that he has something to contribute to our day. Barth feels that religion has lost God and made man its center. God, he thinks, has been simply merged into the world. Our mystical religion and our psychologizing studies have resolved God into the processes of man's emotions and ideas. Our historical studies have eliminated God and revelation, and left us simply a story of development. Our idealisms have tried to make human nature divine and so have lost the realization of what is really divine and holy. Our social enthusiasms and our confidence in our own strength have substituted a mythical human ideal for that kingdom of God which can only come by God's deed. Humanism, social idealism and optimism, the religion of culture and progress, these have taken the place of Christianity, of the religion which believes in God. Europe, sharing with us these idealisms and optimisms, saw their breakdown in the World War and in the years that followed. Many, therefore, have been ready to hear his moving appeal once more to enthrone God and make him central.

Barth's emphasis upon God is one thing, his doctrine of God is another. Our only volume of Barth's in English is a collection of earlier addresses translated by Douglas Horton and entitled *The Word of God*. His more significant work is still the one that brought him the first wide recognition, his *Roemerbrief*. His most recent work is his *Dogmatik*, Vol. I. Barth's position, in reaction from the religion that has made man everything, would make God everything. In doing this he presents an extreme dualism in the separation of God and man that reminds one of the Greek philosophy which so strongly influenced the early creeds. On the one hand is God, holy, transcendent, infinite, unchangeable, unknowable, utterly opposite to all that is finite and human. On the other hand is man the finite, evil, corruptible, perishable, under the law of sin and death. The emphasis is not as with the prophets and Jesus upon the

ethical, but primarily upon the metaphysical. Characteristic is the fact that it is death rather than sin that is most stressed. With this idea of the transcendent and unknowable and "totally different" God goes a Calvinistic emphasis on the sovereignty of God, including an acceptance of double predestination.

Religion lives by two convictions. One is the otherness of God, the faith in the "farness" of God, in a God who transcends in goodness and power all that is finite. The other is the nearness and the likeness of God; God draws near to man, and there is a likeness that makes a real relation possible. Only as God is more than man has man any reason for turning to him in reverence and worship and trust. And only as there are nearness and likeness is it possible for man to turn to him. In our thought of God there is always the problem of seeing both these truths and uniting them. Here Barth fails. He sees one aspect only. The crucial point with him is not the emphasis on the supremacy of God, but upon the otherness of God. He has made frequent appeal to two significant words. One is Kierkegaard's declaration as to "the infinite qualitative difference between God and man." The other is the Calvinistic idea, *finitum non capax infiniti*.

The theological results of Barth's position appear in his *Dogmatik*. Since God is totally other, man cannot know God; so we have a basic agnosticism. Barth indeed makes central his assertion that all depends upon a word of God which comes to us. But it is not plain just how God can speak to a being that is wholly other. He does not identify the word of God with the Bible or the church. When he is asked how he recognizes the word of God, he has no answer to give. He simply says, paradoxically: "I recognized it before I recognize it, thus and therein that God has spoken to me." So in the effort to make God everything and man nothing, Barth comes around to the position he has reprehended, the individual and subjective. It is Barth himself that decides; he knows it because he knows it. And what it is that Barth decides for is made plain by his *Dogmatik*: it is the traditional theology, that of the Greek church as seen in the old creeds and that of Calvin, including the impersonal humanity of Christ in the former and the double predestination of the latter.

The results in terms of religion are more serious. The "totally different" God cannot be united in a real and saving relationship with man. Barth scoffs at the idea of prayer as "the communion of the saint with God conceived as personal and experienced as present." Religion as a transforming power working ethically in man is impossible; man as man, even

the best of saints, must remain a sinner whose salvation lies wholly in the future. Any idea of the social redemption of humanity must also give place to this eschatological emphasis; when the final salvation comes, we are told, it will have no relation at all with what went before in human life. Human history and human effort lose any divine meaning. Even the earthly life of the historic Jesus is no revelation of God.

Barth deserves study, especially in America. His protest and his emphasis alike demand consideration. He is entering religious thought as a needed ferment. But he has not solved the problem as to how we are to think of God, or as to how God comes into saving relation with man.

No question recurs more often in the discussion of God to-day than this: How can a man know God and be sure of him? In the older theology the answer was twofold: the knowledge of God is given by revelation; the certainty of God is established by proofs. But men are not convinced by these to-day. Confidence in authority and reason alike has been undermined by "the acids of modernity." So we have suggested to us new types of religion. Either God becomes an impossibility for belief and we are to embrace, with Mr. Lippmann, the "high religion" of stoical renunciation and moral disinterestedness; or God becomes at best a postulate and religion an experiment that never gets beyond human search and human effort.

Of recent books which seek to meet this situation three may be mentioned here in addition to volumes before referred to: *Pathways to Certainty*, by William Adams Brown; *The Finding of God*, by E. S. Brightman; and *Pathways to the Reality of God*, by Rufus M. Jones. These books still give arguments to show that belief in God is rational. They have a place, too, for revelation. But rational does not mean merely logical, and revelation is no external and absolute affair but always has human experience as its correlate. What is new is their concern with pointing out how men may find God in their life and in his world, and come to know him.

Rufus Jones is guided by the thought of the immanence of God. There is less than one would expect as to methods of personal religion, though he has three chapters devoted to faith, the mystical experience, and prayer. His main interest is to point out how God may be found by man in nature and history, in human experience, and in the historic Christ. Doctor Brightman's volume has a more intellectualistic tone. He keeps in mind the important fact that the difficulties for faith are often connected with a wrong conception of God and gives a careful discussion of the ways

of knowing on the one hand and of the idea of God on the other. Professor Brown's work is directed especially against Dewey's volume, *The Quest for Certainty*, a more significant and representative book for our day than Walter Lippmann's *Preface to Morals*. Sharing not a little in Dewey's general viewpoint, or at least agreeing in much that Dewey opposes, he points out the kind of knowledge and the kind of certainty which the religious man asks and needs for the business of life.

Valuable as these works are, there is still room for a volume which, taking full account of the modern background, shall address itself to the problem with which we are all personally concerned. Religion is more to us than a teaching about God given us by any kind of tradition. Knowledge of God is more than a conclusion drawn from rational considerations. The man of religion wants not just to know about God or to be persuaded that God is; he wants to know God. He wants God in the knowledge of a personal relation and he wants the completeness of life that can only come in this way. This book, though with an underlying point of view clearly held, should help men definitely and concretely to find the ways by which such fellowship and life may be achieved. It might be called *The Way to God*, or *The Ways of Life*; it would necessarily deal with both. And perhaps it is not one book but many that will be needed to meet this need.

Christian Doctrine in Ibsen's "Peer Gynt"

(A Study in Egotism)

By O. E. RÖLVAAG

I

IT is rather strange that no Ibsen scholar except our late Professor Eikeland¹ should, as far as I know, have pointed out the close relationship between *Brand* and *Peer Gynt*. That Peer, the man, was born long before *Brand* met his tragic end in the avalanche of the snow can be proven by a mass of strong circumstantial evidence. *Brand*, the drama, finally came into being after long fumbling and much intense struggle; a hurried reading of *The Epic Brand* proves this statement beyond any point of doubt. In the character of *Brand*, Ibsen has drawn the life of a man who, through superhuman self-sacrifice, gains mastery over himself. In a material sense his heroic struggle ends in futility, but he wins the crown of eternal life. How could the poet have worked out a destiny like *Brand*'s without conceiving the counterpart, the human creature who blindly follows the urge of his own ego till at last he obtains salvation through the sacrifice of another? Contrast is likely to call up contrast. It is after coming from the baptismal scene by the waters of Jordan, after meeting the Father, through the Holy Spirit, that Christ has to face the dark floodwaters of temptation. In the composition of *Peer Gynt* the poet apparently experienced little difficulty. Though a longer drama and though so much richer both in poetry and in human understanding, *Peer Gynt* was written in a much shorter time than it took to compose *Brand*. Fullgrown Peer Gynt, the man, leaped out of Ibsen's soul pretty much as Pallas Athena sprang from the forehead of Zeus. In a letter to Peter Hansen, dated Dresden, October 28, 1870, Ibsen says: "After *Brand* came *Peer Gynt*, as though of itself. It was written in southern Italy, in Ischia, and at Sorrento. So far away from one's readers one becomes reckless. This poem contains much that has its origin in the circumstances of my own youth. My own mother—with the necessary exaggerations—served as the model for Aase."

In order to prove that Peer Gynt at last experienced conversion in conformity with the Lutheran formula of faith, first of all it becomes necessary to invoice his bag and baggage as he embarks on his life's voyage.

¹ Professor of Norwegian Language and Literature, St. Olaf College, 1900-1920.

When we meet him he is a youth in his early twenties. He is well built and good looking. His father is dead. Peer is living with Aase, his mother. Once upon a time the Gynt family has known affluence, but long before the opening of the drama the Gynts have been reduced to penury. To Peer that does not matter at all; he dreams of great ambitions. In his mental makeup he is a picturesque, lovable rascal of a boy whose versatile brain is a rich storehouse of fairy tales and fantastical dreams, which seem at times so real that he lives them as though they were reality itself. With perfect unconcern he lies to the one who bore him; the sense of moral values seems to be lacking in him, and in his mother too. Always he is the hero of his own imaginings. What has happened before might well happen again. Why not to him as readily as to any other? He loves nothing better than to let his fancy take flight without restraint of any sort. In his daydreaming he is to be kaiser, king, anything and everything but himself. What he may be cut out for you cannot tell. Perhaps poet, a creative genius of some kind, actor, novelist; perhaps a great captain of industry, empire builder, discoverer, explorer. His fancy is strong enough to carry him anywhere. As yet he has seen no life's mission; he is not aware of any particular call. He dreams of kaiserdoms and kingships, but feels no call.

As the play opens Peer has been away from home for many days, idly roaming the mountains, hunting reindeer and acting the rôles of heroes in old fairy tales. On his return his clothes are torn to tatters. Roundly his mother scolds him, the good-for-nothing he is! He meets her attack with a glorious tale of fierce adventures, which he impersonates so vividly that she listens breathlessly. She soon, however, realizes the utter falsity of his story. Though she is angry and disgusted with him, her maternal solicitude sweeps all other considerations aside. Oh, won't that boy ever be decent! Will he never turn to things worth while? While he has been away doing nothing, he has lost Ingrid, the wealthiest girl of the neighborhood, whom he might have married. Now Ingrid has accepted the hand of another suitor, the wedding takes place today! Lightly Peer hears the news. Today? Why, then there is plenty of time yet. Is he not equal to any task? Immediately he sets out for the wedding at the Hægstad's farm.

II

At this point the action of the play starts. For the next thirty years we will have to follow Peer's doings rather closely. Peer and his mother are on their way to the wedding. He, the Ne'er-do-well, the carefree

scapegrace, in this last minute of the eleventh hour is going to get the bride, Aase nagging and scolding him. He is stubborn and self-possessed. To rid himself of her he puts her up on the roof of a mill they are passing. His clothes are in rags. But he cares nothing for his appearance. People on their way to the wedding are passing him, casting taunting remarks at him. For all his irresponsibility Peer smarts under their gibes. By his neighbors he is known as an inveterate liar; they call him scatterbrain and a hopeless good-for-nothing. As he listens to what the people say about him Peer's feeling of shame soon turns into mere indifference. By the roadside he flings himself down in the heather, watching a cloud change shape, and again he lives the fanciful panorama of his kaiserdom. Even so, the scornful remarks of the passers-by sting him. They are dressed in festive attire. Glancing down at his unfit clothes he is about to turn back. Just then the music of the wedding strikes up and carries him headlong into the midst of the revellers.

In coquettish alarm the girls draw away from him; on all sides he meets scant welcome. But the bridegroom is as shamefaced as he is, for the bride has locked herself up and he has not the cunning to reach her. At this moment Peer meets a young girl by the name of Solveig, a newcomer in the settlement. She is fair of face and very beautiful. His meeting with her is a call to him, a call to all that is noble and pure and sweet, a call to his better self. At this first meeting between Peer and Solveig, Destiny is present and touches the lives of both profoundly. With this meeting begins the salvation theme of the drama. Though man, according to the Lutheran formula of faith, is saved by grace and by grace alone, the miracle comes about through some human agency. In Peer's case, Solveig is that agency.

Solveig refuses to dance with him, at which he is hurt and begins to drink. We see him moving from group to group; we hear him relate his marvelous escapades. In a fit of pique following Solveig's turning him down, he hearkens to the pleadings of the bridegroom. Will he rescue the bride from her seclusion? Ay, to be sure, Peer is willing—that and much more too! He has met a rebuff in Solveig's purity, and now, as we should expect, devilment is awake in Peer Gynt. And so he steals Ingrid, the bride, taking her away with him up the mountain side. By that act he outlaws himself in the community and becomes an outcast.

How profoundly Solveig has affected him we judge from what follows. His lust satisfied, he is done with Ingrid for good. His spirits are low and dull. 'Says he to Ingrid:

"Devil take all recollection!
Devil take the tribe of women—
All but one!"²

Ingrid has not the purity of Solveig. She does not sanctify with her presence. Asks Peer of her:

"Is your hymn-book in your kerchief?
Where's the gold-manè on your shoulders?
Do you glance adown your apron?
Do you hold your mother's skirt-fold?
Went you to the Pastor?
This last spring-tide?
Is there shyness in your glances?
When I beg, can you refuse?
Does your presence sanctify?
Speak!"

Ingrid:
"No, but—"

Peer:
"What's all the rest, then?"

And so Peer abandons Ingrid; he simply leaves her as he would a passing humor. Old Aase excuses him by saying:

"Some take to brandy, and others to lies;
And we—why we took to fairy tales
Of princesses and trolls, and all sorts of beasts,
And of bride-rapes as well."

Soon after having abandoned Ingrid he falls in with three girls, milk maids at mountain dairies. Glad girls these are! And immediately the sensuous side of his nature wells to the surface. There is drinking and much hilarious revelry. "I'm a three-headed troll, and the boy for three girls!" Peer boasts as he dances away with them.

He emerges out of this wild scene rather sick at heart. Solveig's purity has not lost its hold on him yet. He is alone up in the Ronde Mountains. Drowsiness overtakes him. Again there are curious clouds in the sky. He sees two eagles soar on in their stately flight. In the cold breath of the wind he longs to ride himself pure of soul. Thus run his musings:

"Yonder sail two brown eagles.
Southward the wild geese fly.
And here I must splash and stumble
In quagmire and filth knee-deep."
(Springs up.)

²The quotations from *Peer Gynt* used in this essay are taken from the translation made by William and Charles Archer. *The Collected Works of Henrik Ibsen*, Charles Scribner's Sons.

"I'll fly too! I will wash myself clean in
The bath of the keenest winds!
I'll fly high! I will plunge myself fair in
The glorious christening-font!
I will soar far over the sæter;
I will ride myself pure of soul;
I will forth o'er the salt sea water,
And high over Engelland's prince!"

And so far, far away he hies with the wandering of his fancy; he sees the former wealth of his father. "Thou art come of great things," he cries, "and great things shall come of Thee!" While thus dreaming, the Green-Clad One creeps in upon him; she is no lesser dignitary than the daughter of the Mountain King himself, hence, a real princess.

Let us look at these female figures Peer has met since leaving Solveig. Ingrid doesn't scale high in value; nevertheless she is a human being. After abandoning her he falls in with the sæter girls; they grade considerably lower than Ingrid; they are half human and half trolls. Next comes the Green-Clad Woman. About her there is nothing human whatever, she is the real troll. And thus with the episodes, ethically speaking: The one in which Ingrid figures is bad enough; the one in which Peer sports with the sæter girls is a good deal worse; but the scene in the Hall of the Dovre-King is worst of all. In other words, Peer goes from bad to worse. This descending course of Peer's is not only sound Lutheran doctrine of sin but it conforms pretty well with universal experience.

The episode in the Hall of the Mountain King Peer lives in a dream; it is the nightmare of his past experience. Yet the scene is real enough both for the spectator and to Peer himself. So merciless is the logic of it that, though it is only a dream, and we know that it cannot be anything else, we are forced to experience it as vividly as though we were living actual reality. In it Ibsen achieves a remarkable artistic triumph. By placing it outside the realm of reality he gets a chance to unloose his poetic power. The effect is marvelous. It is a gorgeous scene, conceived and executed by a master poet. To analyze the art of it, or to expound its philosophy, lies outside the scope of this essay. But let us look at it because of its moral significance. Peer has entered the King's Hall and is suing the King for the Princess' hand. The King is rather a tractable old fellow, he will give his consent provided Peer is willing to become a troll entirely, which means, translated into ordinary prose, abandoning all human qualities and turning into a beast. On this point Peer is not unreasonable. He realizes that in order to win a kingdom and become

king one must sacrifice something. After all, the difference between man and troll is not so great. Asks the Old Man:

"What difference is there 'twixt trolls and men?"

Peer:

"No difference at all, as it seems to me.
Big trolls would roast you and small
trolls would claw you;
With us it were likewise, if only they dared."

The Old Man:

"True enough; in that and in more we're alike.
Yet morning is morning, and even is even,
And there is a difference all the same.
Now let me tell you wherein it lies;
Out yonder, under the shining vault,
Among men the saying goes: Man, be thyself!
At home here with us, 'mid the tribe of the trolls,
The saying goes: 'Troll, to Thyself be—enough!'"

Here we need to linger for just a moment. Brand strove all his life to obey the command, "Man, be thyself!" His struggle was made glorious by it, and through it he reached immortality. Peer takes the opposite course; his ideal, or rather, his urge, is "To thyself be—enough!" He has no consideration for others, he thinks only of himself, lives in himself and for himself. While Brand goes clear through to a glorious victory over himself, Peer sinks even deeper into the quagmire of egotism. This too is sound Lutheran teaching!

For our particular study Peer's exit from the King's Hall is of more importance than his entrance there. At last he is forced to flee because the Old Man insists on making a slit in his eye in order that he may see things troll-fashion. When Peer learns that never again can he look at the world through human eyes, he bolts. The word *never* is not found in his vocabulary, nor will he hear of it. Brand's awful motto, "All or nothing" is as foreign to Peer's nature as fire to water. Though he has no serious objection, for a while, to being a troll, to eat troll food and drink troll brew, and even to wearing a tail, the way out must be kept open!

And so, intent on escape, Peer fights his way out, tortured by innumerable nixies and creatures of the supernatural. Finally the church bells toll,⁸ and he is out of this abode of Darkness—that is, ethically speaking, on his

⁸ The ringing of the church bells is a fairy-tale motif. According to popular superstition, if a person had been lost in the woods or up in the mountains, it might be the trolls that had taken him in. One way of saving him was to ring the church bells, for then the supernatural creatures would lose their power over him.

way upward. But now he encounters the most inhuman monster, the Great Boyg. He battles fiercely; first he tries to go forward, then backward, but no matter whither he turns the Boyg is there to block his progress. Go through he cannot, and so he does what the Great Boyg bids him to do, he goes around. Much useless speculation has been spent on solving the symbol of the Boyg. The solution seems so easy. Haven't we all encountered the Boyg? Haven't we all of us heard its voice within us, "Go roundabout"? And it was always when we encountered moral difficulties, when we were facing demands made by moral duty, demands unwelcome and displeasing to our ego—when we tried to climb upward from the troll King's Hall that we met the Great Boyg. Never on our way thither! No, indeed, on our way down, Old Adam, our Depraved Nature (if you prefer that term), never gave us much trouble. This episode telling of Peer's fight with the Great Boyg is perhaps the cleverest piece of symbolism in all literature. And it is the Lutheran doctrine of man's depraved nature, translated into sublime poetry. From this nightmare's fight with Old Adam, Peer wakens up to find himself near the Aase's sæter. At a distance he catches a glimpse of Solveig. "Beg her," he pleads with her little sister Helga, "beg her not to forget me!" By this exclamation Peer elicits our sincere sympathy.

After having witnessed Peer's fight with the Boyg, at the close of the second act, we expect to see him encounter some rather rough play during the course of Act III; the dramaturgical laws governing the construction of a five-act play demand it. We are not disappointed in our expectation. And that the struggle must be of an ethical nature, we know, for his protagonist is Old Adam. How will it turn out? Will he—religiously speaking—go through, that is, experience conversion? The spectator doubts it. Yet there are signs pointing both ways. As the act opens we find him up in the mountains building himself a cabin. While thus occupied he sees a strange sight—a terror-stricken youth maiming himself in order to escape military service. Ah, here is a lad that goes clean through! The incident is a ringing call from on high to Peer to do likewise. This is how the call affects him:

"A lad! One only. He seems afraid.
He peers all around him. What's that he hides
'Neath his jacket? A sickle. He stops and looks around—
Now he lays his hand on a fence-rail flat.
What's this now? Why does he lean like that—?
Ugh, Ugh! Why, he's chopped his finger off!
A'whole finger off!—He bleeds like an ox.

Now he takes to his heels with his fist in a clout.
What a devil of a lad! An unmendable finger!
Right off! And with no one compelling him to it!
Ho, now I remember! It's only thus
You can 'scape from having to serve the King.
That's it. They wanted to send him soldiering,
And of course the lad didn't want to go.
But to chop off—? To sever for good and all—?
Ay, think of it—wish it done—will it too—
But do it—? No, that's past my understanding!"

Having heard this speech our doubts increase, Peer will hardly go through. Just then an unbelievable thing happens. Solveig, after giving up all, comes to live with him. Her sacrifice is so stupendous, so overwhelming in what it has cost her, so superhuman, nay, almost divine in its sweetness, that a miracle should result. With the spirit of a true crusader of Christ she sacrifices her pure life in order that this scallawag of a man might be saved. One is reminded of John 15. 13, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." If the call we heard a moment ago was ringing, this one is deafening. Surely now he must heed it. And at first it looks as if he might. He is touched most profoundly. A peculiar change comes upon him, for a moment he is turned into another man; in the bright radiance emanating from Solveig his sensuous nature is submerged—not with a finger would he touch her! One would not suspect to find so much goodness left in Peer. Will it last? No. It cannot last. Whatever else you might call him Peer is no fool. He soon realizes that in order to live with this angel of light, this *Virgo Sancta*, he must mend his ways quite considerably; not only must he confess his sin before men, but he must repent—in dogmatic terminology, he must pass through the process of contrition, and finally, conversion. Imagine Peer Gynt contrite! He is bent on winning a kaiserdom, on becoming king. A dull, cheerless sort of a life this would be! And worse still—in the serene light of Solveig's purity, constantly he will remember his soiled past. The Green-Clad One appears and tells him what would happen:

"Just try if you dare!
Ho-ho, Peer Gynt, I've no fear of blows!
Be sure I'll return every day of the year.
Through the door, set ajar, I'll peep in at you both.
When you're sitting with your girl on the fireside bench—
When you're tender, Peer Gynt—when you'd pet
and caress her—
I'll seat myself by you, and ask for my share.

She there and I—we will take you by turns.
Farewell, dear lad, you can marry to-morrow."

Peer (Meditating):

"The Boyg said, 'Go roundabout!'—so one must here.
There fell my palace, with crash and clatter!
There's a wall around her whom I stood so near,
Of a sudden all's ugly—my joy has grown old.
Run about, lad! There's no way to be found
Right through all this, from where you stand, to her.
Right through? H'm, surely there should be one.
There's a text on repentance, unless I mistake.
But what? What is it? I haven't the book,
I've forgotten it mostly, and here there is none,
That can guide aright in a pathless wood.
Repentance? And maybe 'twould take whole years
Ere I fought my way through. 'Twere a meager life, that.

• • • • •

Go in after this? So befouled and disgraced?
Go in with that troll-rabble after me still?
Speak, yet be silent; confess, yet conceal—?

(Throws away his ax.)

It's a holy-day evening. For me to keep tryst,
Such as now I am, would be sacrilege."

And so Peer does the inevitable—he goes roundabout. Religiously speaking, it means that he fails to heed the call of the Holy Spirit; looked at dramaturgically, that he has made his choice, he is past the climax of the play. Aase's death is simply an echo of the call, a poetic episode thrown in for good measure. From this point on to the catastrophe Peer's course is determined by his act of leaving Solveig. He has refused to take up the burden of the sacrifice and from now on follows the urge of his own ego. Philosophically speaking, it means that, for the present, Ibsen is done with Norway and the Norwegians.

I cannot leave Aase's death scene without making a comment or two. Compare the death of Brand's mother with that of Aase, and more particularly, the two men concerned. Brand said to his mother that if she should repent her ill-begotten gain and then send for him, he will come. His assumed stoicism means a gruelling sacrifice to him. Thus is Brand. Now look at Peer. He sees his mother in the final throes of death, a glossy fixedness spreading over her eyes, and he dodges the issue. In a spirit of fantastical bravado he drives her, with the bedpost for horse, to the very gates of heaven, forming legend upon legend, drowning the death-rattle in the noise of his make-believe. In true American fashion he "puts it across," that is, he lies his mother into heaven. The scene is throbbing

with human value; the sheer wantonness of its action is compelling. This scene is one of the highest expressions of Ibsen's poetic genius.

"For all your days I thank you,
For beatings and lullabys!"

III

About thirty years or so pass before we see Peer Gynt again. Then we pick him up as a middle-aged man on the coast of the island of Morocco. He is in company with friends whom he is giving an excellent dinner. He is just the way you would expect him to be—an incarnation of the sensuous, pleasure-seeking egotist, but as such men go, a dandy fellow.

"Drink, gentlemen, if man is made
For pleasure, let him take his fill."

For some time Peer has lived in America. There Fortune has smiled upon him. He has become a Babbitt of considerable proportions. Listen to him reminisce to his guests:

"Well! Luck, you see, was kind to me;
Old Fate, too, was accommodating.
I prospered; and, by versatility,
I prospered better still and better.
In ten years' time I bore the name
Of Croesus 'mongst the Charleston shippers.
My fame flew wide from port to port,
And Fortune sailed on board my vessels."

Mr. Cotton:

"What did you trade in?"

Peer:

"In Negro slaves for Carolina
And idol-images for China."

And later on:

"What could I do? To stop the trade
With China was impossible.
A plan I hit on—opened straightway
A new trade with the self-same land.
I shipped off idols every spring,
Each autumn sent forth missionaries,
Supplying them with all they needed,
As stockings, Bibles, rum, and rice."

Peer is feeling kind of seedy now. He is seeking a well-merited rest and whatever pleasure he can pick up. Babbitt has changed into Mr. Dodsworth going traveling. Kaiser he has not succeeded in becoming yet,

but he is far from giving up the idea. As to the future he has a well-defined program:

"But I must be myself *en bloc*,
Must be the Gynt of all the planet,
Sir Gynt throughout from top to bottom."

Notice, if you please, that Peer Gynt wants only the whole planet, nothing less will do. He is the fully-developed, hard-boiled egotist. This development has come about by a process of natural law. Any man refusing to take up the burden of sacrifice becomes like Peer Gynt, that is, he suffers a hardening of his spiritual arteries. In the Norwegian we call the process *forhardelse*, which term expresses the idea better. As we now meet Peer he has reached the point of saturation in egotism. He is a perfect specimen. There is, ethically speaking, nothing more remaining for Ibsen to do than to show us how this man will behave throughout the fall of the play.

This Ibsen does by projecting a series of ingeniously painted pictures. Act IV contains, as Professor Eikeland points out, a miniature play of five acts; that is, Peer passes through five different stages, each succeeding stage more grotesquely ridiculous than the one preceding. In the first act of this miniature play Peer is the great civil engineer who is to change the desert of Sahara into a fruitful garden, by leading the ocean into it. This new continent is to bear the name *Gyntiana*, with *Peeropolis* as its capital; in the second act he becomes a prophet in an Arabian tribe; in the third he elopes with a young Arabian woman; from now on he is to build his life's happiness on love and eternal youth—the most insane notion of all, and the climax of the piece; when the wench runs away from him he turns scientist, which constitutes the fourth act; in the fifth he is crowned kaiser at the madhouse down in Cairo, the logical outcome of his actions. That is, a man so richly endowed as Peer Gynt was, but conducting himself as he did through life, symbolizes the worst form of insanity which is—unbridled egotism. Our political opportunist should study this drama!

From the ethical point of view Act IV is a most interesting piece of writing; it reveals so clearly Ibsen's moral philosophy at the time he composed *Peer Gynt*. The first four scenes are concerned with revealing to us what this man has become after a lapse of thirty years. Incidentally he gets the chance of throwing the searchlight of his genius on some of the leading nations at that time, Sweden, England, Germany, and France. It reveals an ugly sight. We might well echo Andy's famous exclamation: "I is regusted!" During the remainder of the act, we see Peer in action.

Note this interesting fact: Of the five stages we see him pass through not one of them is an act of volition; he slides into each one because, in the present difficulty, it is the easiest way out. What does this mean ethically? Simply, that Peer Gynt is a man without character. He is neither moral plus nor moral minus; to him morality is an unknown quantity. He sees no other ideal in life than self-gratification. The process of hardening is now complete, as a pleasure-seeking egotist he has reached the ideal.⁴

Can egotism take on a worse form than it has now in Peer Gynt? Oh, yes, Ibsen answers, it can; there is one side of this monster that you do not visualize clearly yet. And it is this, that just as Peer wants everything for himself he cannot bear to see anyone else enjoy things that he himself may not have. This trait Ibsen shows us at the beginning of Act V. Peer is on board a ship on the North Sea, off the Norwegian coast. It is sundown and rough weather; a real storm is brewing. Uneasiness creeps upon him. In order to make friends with God, Peer promises the captain that, in case any of his crew should be needy, he has money, and might be willing to spend some on the sailors' comfort. The captain thanks him for his generous offer, informing Peer that the wages are low; all the men are married and have big families, and can scarcely make ends meet; if they now could bring home an extra shilling, there would be great joy in many a hut. At that information Peer frowns hatefully:

"What do you say? Have they wives and children?
Are they married?

"Married? They have folks that await them at home?
Folks to be glad when they come? Eh?
And there they sit snug! There's a fire on the hearth!
They've their children about them! The room's
full of chatter;
No one hears another right out to an end,
For the joy that is on them—!
(Thumping the railing)
I'll be damned if I do!
Do you think I am mad? Would you have me fork out
For the sake of a parcel of other folks' brats?
I've slaved much too sorely in earning my cash.
There's nobody waiting for old Peer Gynt."

At this point Peer passes right into the catastrophe of the drama. All of a sudden, the tables are turned on him, and he has to face his past life.

⁴ How stone blind a great critic may be to that which is perfectly obvious George Brandes illustrates in his comments on this act. He says: "What great and noble powers are wasted on this thankless material! Except in the fourth act, which has no connection with what goes before or after, and is witless in its satire, crude in its irony, and in its latter part scarcely comprehensible, there is," etc.

It's a terrible, pitiable experience. All he has done, and more particularly all that he has not done but which he ought to have done, step up to accuse him. The accusers are here, there, and everywhere, twelve of them in all. These twelve are unanimous and the verdict is: Guilty.

It might be of interest to review the members of the jury that Ibsen has drawn to sit in judgment on Peer Gynt's case. The first one is the Strange Passenger. He is a fellow traveler with Peer, sailing on the same ship. He has been on board all the time, but has not been seen till the moment it becomes clear that the ship is doomed; then of a sudden he appears. The figure symbolizes the fear of death which in the hour of grave danger is likely to seize a person like Peer. The symbol is a complex one, it stands for more than the dread of death; in it you will find also a morbid curiosity for what the process of dissolution really is, and also a fleeting shadow of an awakening conscience. This strange being is here to get Peer's body for dissection purposes! He is an exceedingly unpleasant traveling companion. The ship goes under. Peer is saved, but stripped of all earthly belongings. The next accuser is a funeral eulogy which Peer hears pronounced over a man who once upon a time chopped off a finger in order to escape military service. The act was done because only by maiming himself for life could he serve those who were dependent upon him. The sermon is a tremendous preaching over one that has been himself. Peer pricks up his ears, listening carefully. The sermon might do in his own case—has not he too been himself? The third accuser is the auction scene at his parental home. He is present as a total stranger. Annoying memories crowd in upon him, the place is full of them. With increasing uneasiness Peer listens to the talk of the people present. Though no one recognizes him, they all remember Peer Gynt quite well—he was a ne'er-do-well, a scallawag, an inveterate liar, a great rascal; over in America he has been hanged long ago! The fourth accuser is an onion, just an ordinary raw onion. Peer picks it up and begins peeling it, layer after layer. Not a trace of a kernel—the identical picture of Peer himself! A great soberness overtakes him now. The feeling increases as he meets the fifth accuser, a small log cabin up in the mountains. In it sits a woman, grown old now, singing strange songs about one who has gone away but who has promised to return. Pale and ghost-like, Peer leaps up, exclaiming:

"One that's remembered, and one that's forgot.
One that has squandered, and one that has saved.
Oh, earnest!—and never can the game be played o'er!
Oh, dread!—*here* was my kaiserdom!"

Just as he did thirty years earlier, so he does now, he takes to his heels and runs away from Solveig. Across a barren heath he hies, while the very barrenness under his feet rises up to accuse him; as barren as it is so has his life been; what once was a luxurious forest is now burnt over, changed into a terrible desolation. Thereupon everything turns into accusing spirits. There are balls of thread rolling before his feet, saying:

"We are thoughts;
Thou shouldst have thought us;
Feet to run on
Thou shouldst have given us;
•
We should have soared up
Like clear-ringing voices,
And here we must trundle
As gray-yarned thread-balls."

Withered leaves flying in the air accuse him, thus:

"We are a watchword;
Thou shouldst have proclaimed us!
See how thy dozing has woefully riddled us."

He hears singing in the air and the accusations get worse:

"We are songs;
Thou shouldst have sung us!
A thousand times over
Hast thou cowed us and smothered us.
Down in thy heart's pit
We have lain and waited;
We were never called forth.
Thy gorge we poison!"

The very dewdrops are turned into accusers:

"We are tears
Unshed for ever.
Ice-spears, sharp-wounding;
We could have melted.
Now the barb rankles
In the shaggy bosom;
The wound is closed over;
Our power is ended."

Even the broken straws turn against him:

"We are deeds;
Thou shouldst have achieved us!
Doubt, the throttler,
Has crippled and riven us.

On the Day of Judgment
We'll come a-flock,
And tell the story—
Then woe to you!"

The last phantom arising out of his dissolute past is the voice of his departed mother, accusing him of having taken her to the wrong place. She did not get to the Castle of Heaven, which he promised her. There are in all twelve accusers. Notice that only one out of the twelve blames him for wrongs actually done. The others accuse because of deeds not done, deeds, acts, achievements that he should have achieved but ran away from. He is in a desperate situation, in every sense, bankrupt. Save "his foolish hide" there is nothing left of him. You cannot picture to yourself, no matter how hard you try, a human being more utterly stripped.

And now the Judge appears on the scene, the Button-Moulder, the symbol of cold, clear Reason, looking back over a wasted life. Peer is to be thrown into the great casting-ladle and molded anew because he has frustrated his own design. Listen to the judgment:

"Now you were designed for a shining button
On the Vest of the World; but your loop gave way;
So in the Waste-box you needs must go,
Now there, as they phrase it, be merged in the mass."

Peer protests loudly. Anything and everything rather than that kind of treatment! We would expect him to raise objections, for how can an egotist consent to the blotting out of his own Ego? Then there would be nothing left of him. No, says Peer, then he would rather take eternal Perdition. All right, agrees the Judge, he will send him there, but on this condition only, that he bring proof of having been a great sinner, not only a half-way man. Well, that should be easy, Peer reasons. And now we see him running hither and yon to procure reliable witnesses. But he cannot find any; no one will give the right kind of testimony. His sin does not consist in what he has done; rather in all the things he has neglected to do, chief of which are all his great gifts that have been left undeveloped. He has become waste matter. Peer is in a bad fix. Only two alternatives are open to him: The Casting Ladle and Eternal Perdition. But into the Casting Ladle he will not go and the door to Perdition is closed! The Castle of Heaven does not enter his mind. For one thing, he would have small chance of getting in; for another, it would be a dull life there, full

of self-denial and that sort of thing. There is no other way out, he must secure proof of the fact that he has been a substantial sinner! He is in desperate straits. He realizes how utterly useless and wasted his life has been, which, religiously speaking, means that he has come to the stage of the Prodigal Son. Peer is as bankrupt as the man in the parable was.

Again he is nearing Solveig's little cabin. We are reminded of Luke 15. 20, "But when he was yet a great way off, his father saw him, and had compassion, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him." What will happen to Peer next? You must bear in mind that Ibsen is not writing a sermon, or a treatise on conversion, but a great drama portraying human emotions and man's earthly destiny. Through what we see take place we can only infer what the results will be religiously.

As Peer is near the cabin the Button-Moulder calls out warningly:

"Set your house in order!"

Peer:

"Set my house in order? It's here! Away.

Get you gone! Though your ladle were huge as a coffin
It were too small, I tell you, for me and my sins."

But the Great Boyg is not dead yet. Peer hears the call of the monster, and is on the point of going around. Even now he finds it almost impossible to go through. But he must. Destiny, inscrutable Fate, has at last found him out and brought him to a pass where there is no turning around. It's the morning of Whitsunday. We hear him exclaim:

"No! like a wild, an unending lament
Is the thought; to come back, to go in, to go home.

(Takes a few steps, but stops again)

Round about, said the Boyg!

(hears singing in the hut)

Oh no; this time at least

Right through though the path may be never so straight!

(He runs toward the cabin; at the same moment Solveig appears in the doorway, dressed for church, with a psalm-book wrapped in her kerchief, and a staff in her hand. She stands there erect and mild. Peer flings himself down on the threshold)

Hast thou doom for a sinner, then speak it forth!"

Solveig (sits down beside him):

"Thou hast made all my life as a beautiful song.

Blessed be thou that at last thou hast come!

Blessed, thrice blessed be our Whitsun-morn meeting!"

At that Peer cries out in anguish: "Then I am lost!" He cannot yet

grasp the idea that there is salvation for such as he. Solveig, however, knows better; she answers quietly and serenely:

"There is one that rules all things."

Peer:

"Yes, I am lost! Unless thou canst answer riddles."

Solveig:

"Tell me them."

Peer:

"Tell them! Come on! To be sure!

Canst thou tell me where Peer Gynt has been since we parted
With his destiny's seal on his brow;

Been as in God's thoughts as he first sprang forth!

Canst thou tell me? If not, I must get me home,—
Go down to the mist-shrouded regions."

Solveig (smiling):

"Oh, that riddle is easy."

Peer:

"Then tell me what thou knowest!

Where was I, as myself, as the whole man, the true man?

Where was I, with God's sigil upon my brow?"

Solveig:

"In my faith, in my hope, and in my love!"

Peer (starts back):

"What sayest thou—? Peace? These are juggling words.
Thou art mother thyself to the man that's there."

Solveig:

"Ay, that I am; but who is his father?

Surely he that forgives at the mother's prayer."

By this she means: You have been in my faith, in my hope, in my love, in my heart, not as you have conducted yourself, but such as I, at our first meeting, felt that God meant you to be. In other words, it's the boy "with God's sigil upon his brow" that has dwelt in her heart. And He who has created him in such a way that she could get that picture of him, he will also, on her intercession, forgive him.

Peer (a light shining in his eyes):

"My mother; my wife; oh, thou innocent woman!

In thy love—oh, there hide me, hide me!"

(Clinging to her and hiding his face in her lap. Long silence. It is Whit-sunday morning.)

Solveig (sings softly):

"Sleep thou, dearest boy of mine!

I will cradle thee, I will watch thee—

The boy has been sitting on his mother's lap,
The two of them playing all the life-day long.

The boy has been resting at his mother's breast
All the life-day long. God's blessing on my joy.

The boy has been lying close into my heart,
All the life-day long. He is weary now.

Sleep thou, dearest boy of mine!
I will cradle thee, I will watch thee."

The Button-Moulder's Voice (behind the house):

"At the last cross-road we will meet again, Peer;
And then we'll see whether—; I say no more."

Solveig (sings louder in full daylight):
"I will cradle thee, I will watch thee;
Sleep and dream thou, dear my boy!"

By now Solveig has taught him two things: First, that, since she, whom he has sinned against the most, has forgiven him, God, on her intercession, must do likewise. Secondly, she has taught him the nature of love, which is, to devote one's self unselfishly for another. To paraphrase one of Brand's famous sayings to Agnes: No soul can embrace all souls who has not learned to love *one* sincerely. Thus it becomes a psychological necessity for Peer to love Solveig, really and truly love her. And the moment real love is kindled in his own soul, the power of egotism breaks down, for "love seeketh not its own." The Great Boyg is overcome, and salvation is possible. In a dramatic sense Peer has failed; all he has striven for is lost and gone. But in losing all he comes to the very gate of heaven. As Brand was saved through grace alone so also Peer Gynt. Yet notice this difference: While the former fought his way through battle after battle, winning glorious victories over his own ego, the latter goes roundabout till there is no turning point left. He must follow the example set by the Prodigal Son. These two figures, Brand and Peer Gynt, will forever stand there as symbols of the plus and minus of human nature. I could name no other two dramas so intensely ethical in their preaching as *Brand* and *Peer Gynt*.

IV

To bring this study to a close without paying more attention to Solveig than I have done so far would be treating her about as shabbily as Peer Gynt did. She compels one's interest. She is so fair and lovely in her purity. How different from Hjordis and Nora, and from Regina and Maja! In the first half of his authorship Ibsen seems fond of portraying

such women characters. There are Dagny in *The Vikings of Helgeland*, Margrete and Ingebjorg in *The Pretenders*, and Agnes in *Brand*. In pure idealism, in serene loftiness Solveig outshines them all.

In order to judge her justly, you will have to remember that Peer Gynt was published in 1867, which fact gives us an approach, but does not explain her. At that time romanticism in Norway had passed its highest peak. Solveig represents the finest flower of the romantic movement in Scandinavian literature. She is a mid-Victorian figure. If you apply the acid test of present-day psychology and criticism to her she is liable to come out of the process a bit ridiculous. Were there such women in those days? If so, the type has become extinct long since. What would you think of a girl that ran away to live with a man like Peer Gynt? Suppose it was your daughter? True, she brings a fine excuse for her action—Ibsen saw to that! It isn't the real Peer she sacrifices her pure life for, but for the potential Peer, for the boy "with God's sigil upon his brow." Is that the reason why so many fine girls choose seemingly worthless husbands? Can it be that the maternal instinct has endowed them with powers of divination? Or is it only a popular fallacy that a high percentage of fine women waste their affections on worthless men? I am inclined to think so. The percentage is perhaps equally high the other way.

No matter what opinion you hold on this question, you must agree with me that there is a strange air of unreality surrounding the figure of Solveig. It cost her so enormously much to go and live with this man. That she does it, I can understand. Not that she stays on. Why did she not go back to her parents? The distance wasn't great. Was she afraid to face the music of her action? If so, her greatness immediately crumbles to dust. Or did her naiveté trick her into believing, after all she had heard and seen of Peer Gynt, that he would return? In that case her judgment was worse than childish. The neighborhood was a small one; what one heard soon became common knowledge. Didn't her folks ever tell her that Peer had skipped the country? Thus I could go on, leading you into an impasse. How shall we judge her then? Did Ibsen in the delineation of Solveig prove himself the worst of romantic bunglers?

Even after the most superficial study it must be apparent that Solveig stands for an abstraction. She is a symbol as much as the Great Boyg, the Mountain King, and the Button-Moulder are symbols. What does she symbolize? The highest religious ideality. Nothing of this earth clings to her. In all she does you will look in vain for one act that shows trace of sin. The Solveig that comes to the mountains to live with Peer is a

Virgo Sancta, and the Solveig we find there after a lapse of thirty years has grown into a *Mater Sancta*. In this symbol of religious ideality Ibsen approaches the Catholic conception of sacred womanhood.

What interests us most in this picture is Ibsen's own conception of ethical values. We meet it often in his plays. In *Pillars of Society* it is Lona Hessel that saves not only Johan, but the whole outfit of *Dramatis personæ*. Rebecca West, in *Rosmersholm*, comes to the house of Johannes Rosmers as a deeply depraved human being. After staying there a while her wild desires are cowed. In that drama Ibsen teaches clearly that while Evil is contagious, Goodness too may be infectious. I fail to see how Ibsen possibly could have paid a higher tribute to Christian ideals and to the doctrine of vicarious atonement than he does through the symbol of Solveig!

Through this drama, first of all, Ibsen addresses himself to the Norwegian people, showing them what a foolish, self-indulgent romanticism will lead to; ethically he addresses himself to the whole world. *Peer Gynt*, through unforgettable pictures, illustrates what the power of egotism, once it is allowed to run unchecked, may do to a human life. But religiously, the drama glorifies the efficacy of unselfish sacrifice. We might state the ideal thus: Take up your cross and follow me!

Recent Excavations and Bible Study

OVID R. SELLERS

THOSE who try to keep up with the literature about the Bible must be aware of a shift in emphasis that has come about since the war. During the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth the so-called higher criticism sprouted, grew, and flowered. Comparative language study, too, brought out new examinations of the sacred texts with improved interpretations and a multitude of proposed changes in difficult and obscure passages. Commentaries, some worthless and some of great value, appeared by the score. Books of the Bible were divided, subdivided, and rearranged; new translations were offered; the sections were dated and assigned to different authors with superb confidence on the part of the scholars and also a remarkable lack of agreement. Some Old Testament passages were dated by rival expositors in varying periods extending from Moses to the later Maccabees and New Testament passages were distributed over the first two centuries A. D. All this had its value; much of the literature produced was sane and sound, some of it brilliant. Both those who accepted the principles of criticism and those who rejected them were led to a more thorough study of the Bible and a better understanding of it. But since the war there has been a sharp decline in the publication of new commentaries. Only a few, and those for the most part of the highest worth, have passed the editorial rooms of the publishers. There is now a new emphasis in the study of the Bible, which we understand better than did those who fixed the canon.

This new emphasis is the result of the tremendous development in biblical archaeology. Archaeology had played its part in the studies of the previous half century. Textual studies were made possible by the decipherment of the Egyptian and Assyrian languages and the discovery of new Greek texts in the style of the New Testament rather than that of the classical writers. In Syria and Palestine there had been extremely important finds by excavators and explorers; but the most significant objects, such as the Moabite Stone with King Mesha's account of his war with Ahab and the Siloam Tunnel inscription about Hezekiah's workmen telling how they brought the water from the Virgin's Well into the city, were found by good fortune, not by scientific search. There was little public interest in excavations; funds were scarce and the political situation discouraging.

Even the competent archaeologist with money at his disposal had to

endure tedious months of negotiation, distributing baksheesh among officials, politicians, and land-owners. After his excavation was begun, too, he was apt to be halted repeatedly by intrigue, necessitating loss of time and additional expense. Moreover, he was under compulsion to produce museum objects and startling finds to justify his activities to his financial backers and encourage a further supply of funds. Equipment had to be transported over bad roads on the backs of camels and donkeys, and the anopheles mosquito flourished in the land. All honor is due to such pioneers as Bliss, Macalister, Schumacher, Sellin, and Watzinger, who excavated under such trying conditions at the sites of Gezer, Moresheth, Taanach, Megiddo, and Jericho and helped lay the foundations for the later archæological developments.

One has only to glance at the recent important publications in the biblical field to see what a tremendous rôle the recent excavations have played. Garstang's *Joshua Judges*, a study of the first days of Israel in Palestine, which appeared last summer, is devoted largely to archæology. Its author is one of the most active and distinguished workers. Olmstead's splendid *History of Palestine and Syria*, recently published, abounds in illustrations from the recent excavations which have made possible a history of the Holy Land far superior to any of its predecessors. The writer of a new commentary must search the archæological journals for material bearing on his subject or else his book will be hopelessly antiquated before it appears. Even the recent church-school literature, so far as it deals with Bible study, must take into account the findings of the excavators. Just as the study of Latin and classical history is being revived by interesting textbooks filled with pictures of scenes and objects dug up by archæologists in Italy, Greece and Crete, so the study of the Bible takes on new life and reality when presented with illustrations now available showing what David and Ahab and Isaiah and Paul saw and how they worked.

Undoubtedly the chief explanation of the post-war development of archæology in Palestine is the British government. Shortly after England took over the mandate it organized a Department of Antiquities and established a museum. It surveyed and catalogued the possible excavation sites and laid down rules by which the expeditions must work. Before digging in any of these sites it is necessary to secure a permit from the Department. Unqualified or irresponsible adventurers cannot secure permits, but competent excavators are given every encouragement.

For several years, in case the owners of a site were inclined to refuse permission to dig or to set an unreasonable price for the use of their land,

the Department would force the lease at a suitable figure. Since the riots in 1929, however, the Department wisely hesitates about coercing the Arab owners and will force a lease only in extreme circumstances. There is such an abundance of promising sites, however, and the economic condition of the land-holders is so low that in most cases negotiations are not difficult. An expedition will pay considerably more than could be realized by the raising of vegetables or grain on the site and the employment of the owners' kin as workers on the excavation brings a good deal of money into the community. The German expedition at Shechem and the Danish expedition at Shiloh have had exasperating trouble with the owners; but most of the other expeditions have nothing more than the bargaining that is the rule in Oriental transactions. The University of Chicago, after long negotiations, bought the entire site at Megiddo.

Of the objects found the Department takes its choice for the museum. Thus, as is right, the best of the finds remain in Palestine. A new and imposing museum, made possible by a \$2,000,000 gift of Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., is in course of construction, so that in future years the visitor to Palestine will find the best of the ancient remains of the country adequately housed and exhibited. Even after the Department has taken its share, there is always a valuable collection of antiquities for the excavator to take home.

Another encouraging feature is the co-operation of all the archæologists of different nationalities. Professor W. F. Albright, who served for ten years as director of the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem, was one of those most instrumental in bringing this about. Now all the archæologists in Palestine—British, French, German, Danish, Italian, Swedish, American, or Arab; Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or Moslem—use the same terminology and work under the same guiding principles. Thus any excavator has an abundance of expert counsel at hand to help him in the interpretation of anything that he finds. Of particular service here are the Dominican Fathers of the Ecole Biblique. Though they seldom engage in their own independent excavations, the Dominicans have in their faculty some of the best archæologists and Bible scholars of the world. Père Vincent is the foremost authority on Palestinian pottery. He and his colleagues are ever ready to put their experience and learning at the disposal of an excavator.

Though Palestine has yielded no spectacular discoveries like those in Egypt or Babylonia, it has received impetus from the world-wide interest in the finding of Tutankhamen's tomb by Mr. Howard Carter and the

late Lord Carnarvon and of the royal burials at Ur of the Chaldees by Mr. C. Leonard Wooley of the British Museum. These discoveries created such widespread public interest in archæology that they have stimulated investigation in all lands. An archæological find of any importance can now make the front page.

The coming of the automobile has played its part. Good roads extend throughout Palestine. From any excavation site it is possible to drive to Jerusalem in a few hours at most. Some directors live comfortably in town and drive out to work every day. No longer is the excavator an adventurer cut off from modern civilization and comforts.

In Palestine the post-war technique shows a marked improvement. This is due to two main causes: the added security, which allows an expedition to take the time that it needs, and the coming of several archæologists with long experience in Egypt. In 1908, 1909 and 1910 Professors G. D. Lyon, G. A. Reisner, and Clarence S. Fisher dug at Samaria for Harvard University. They introduced the technique which Reisner had worked out in Egypt. Since the war Fisher has directed the expeditions at Beth-shan, Megiddo, and Jerash. The technique which evolved after years of excavation along the Nile is applied with necessary modifications to the Palestinian mounds. The area to be studied is scraped off stratum by stratum. Each level is thoroughly surveyed, drawn, and photographed before the next level is attacked. Every object is catalogued with reference to the exact spot where it was found. Hence it is possible to reconstruct the civilization and culture of the city at each period.

The ideal site shows one city built above the ruins of another. This is called the "layer cake" arrangement. Such a site is Tell Beit Mirsim, the biblical Kirjath-sepher, where Drs. M. G. Kyle and W. F. Albright have dug in the summers of 1926, 1928, and 1930, for the Xenia-Pittsburgh Theological Seminary and the American School of Oriental Research, Jerusalem. They have found ten cities, the lowest dating about 2200 B. C. and the topmost coming down to 598 B. C. Each city was burned, so that a layer of ashes separates it from the one above. Though much of this mound remains to be dug up, it has already thrown considerable light on economic and social conditions in South Judah during Bible times. It shows, for instance, a highly organized industrialism in Judah at the time between Rehoboam and the fall of the Southern Kingdom. Kirjath-sepher, as hundreds of loom weights and numerous dyeing vats testify, was the center of a weaving and dyeing industry.

The opposite kind of site is Beth-zur, where the Presbyterian Theo-

logical Seminary, Chicago, and the American School of Oriental Research, Jerusalem, worked last summer. Practically no stratification was found there. During the last period of occupation (500-100 B. C.) the Hellenistic builders had sunk their foundations to bed rock and had so torn up all remains of preceding occupations that in more than half the baskets of pottery we found sherds of four periods, extending from about 1700 to 100 B. C. Fortunately we had the results of previous excavations to guide us. The experienced archæologist can indentify almost any piece of pottery by its shape and texture.

Styles in pottery changed in ancient days. Happily these changes were slow, so that one style could last a century or longer. The Department of Antiquities, in co-operation with the schools of archæology in Jerusalem, has classified these styles with approximate datings:

- Early Bronze, 3000-2000 B. C., Canaanite.
- Middle Bronze, 2000-1600 B. C., Canaanite.
- Late Bronze, 1600-1200 B. C., Canaanite.
- Early Iron I, 1200-900 B. C., Judges, David and Solomon.
- Early Iron II, 900-600 B. C., Divided Hebrew Monarchy.
- Early Iron III, 600-300, Persian.
- Hellenistic, 300-50 B. C.
- Roman, 50 B. C.-350 A. D.
- Byzantine, 350-650 A. D.

Each age shows its peculiar types of pottery and in most cases there are sharp distinctions. There has not been much opportunity to study the pottery of the Early Iron III and the Hellenistic periods, however, and some archæologists are inclined to group them together. Our excavation last summer, although it showed some forms unmistakably Persian and some imported from Greece, revealed no general difference between the two periods. As some historians have held, and as our excavation bore witness, the conquest of Alexander the Great caused no break in Palestine. Even during the Persian supremacy of the fifth century B. C. the influence of Greece was strong in the Holy Land. Greek coins, not Persian, were the medium of exchange. Alexander, with all his enthusiasm for Greek culture, brought no new civilization to Palestine. The Hellenistic movement had preceded him by a century and a half.

The bearing of this on the Bible is apparent. From the literary evidence many scholars have inferred that the Second Isaiah, the author of Ecclesiastes, and other post-Exilic writers of the Old Testament knew

something of Socrates, Plato, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, and the other Greek thinkers who flourished in the fifth century. In these discoveries we have objective evidence of intercourse between Greece and Palestine at this time.

At least ninety-nine per cent of the objects found in an excavation (unless the site is strictly prehistoric) are broken pottery. And, though very little of this broken pottery finds its way to museums or is thought worth picking up by souvenir hunters, it is extremely important in dating the walls that appear and the other objects that are found. In fact it is this broken pottery that furnishes identification for many sites. When George Adam Smith was gathering material for his *Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (which still is the best book covering its subject), no one knew much about ancient pottery. So he had to rely on tradition and geography for his identifications and many of them were wrong. Kirjath-sepher or Debir, for instance, by tradition has been identified with the modern Dahariyah and so you will find it on the maps; but the identification is impossible since there is no ancient pottery around Dahariyah. Tell Beit Mirsim in its location fitted the Bible references just as well and it showed an outcropping of pre-Exilic pottery. When the excavators dug there they found an ancient city which proved beyond all reasonable doubt to be the biblical Kirjath-sepher. Beth-zur in tradition and on all the maps is located on a hill north of Hebron which has on it the ruins of an Arab castle and bears the name Beit-sur. But in 1924 and 1925 the French, German, and American Schools visited the locality in field trips and found no ancient pottery on the traditional site, while an adjacent hill, Khirbet et-Tubeiqeh, showed pre-Exilic and post-Exilic pottery and hence was identified as the biblical Beth-zur. The excavation at the latter place bore out all the biblical references, including those in 1 Maccabees. No one to-day would think of excavating a site until either by surface examination of the pottery or the digging of a sounding shaft he had made sure that he had a place worth investigation.

Nearly all the expeditions now are organized along certain approved lines. The director has a staff of assistants to take care of the sorting of pottery, the recording of objects as they are found, the photography, and the surveying. If the history of the site continues after the sixth century B. C., some one must look after the coins. All the whole or nearly whole pieces of pottery must be drawn to scale and all inscribed pieces or works of art drawn as well as photographed. Generally there will be a staff of Egyptian foremen to boss the gangs of workmen. There has been so much

excavation in Egypt that there is a good supply of competent, trained foremen in that country. On the whole, the Palestinian Arabs will work better under an Egyptian foreman than under one of their own number and with a foreman from outside there is less danger of favoritism or intrigue. A few local foremen are being trained, however, and doubtless will become thoroughly capable. The pick men, hoe men, and basket carriers will be recruited from the neighborhood. In some localities women work as basket carriers, while in other districts the sentiment will allow the employment of men only. In a small excavation all the dirt is moved by the basket carriers; but in the larger excavations, such as those at Megiddo and Jerash, the work is speeded by the use of Decauville railways with dumping trucks.

Though you may have read a good deal of "the Bible and the spade," you will have a hard time finding a spade in most excavations in Palestine. The ground is too rocky. It is loosened with picks, scraped into baskets with hoes, and then carried on the heads of the women or under the arms of boys to the dump heap. The workers are on the sharp look-out for objects, for the finding of a whole jar, a piece of jewelry, or an ancient coin means a bit of baksheesh. After a workman has had a little experience he is not apt to drive his pick into a whole jar or to overlook any valuable object.

Though Palestinian archaeology still is in its infancy and hundreds of undisturbed sites invite the excavator, the labors of the expeditions already undertaken have thrown a vast amount of light on the Bible. One important result, at least so far as Christians are concerned, has been the re-establishing of the reputation of the Bible for historical reliability. Not many years ago in erudite circles the Bible was under grave suspicion. Though its religious value was unquestioned, as it showed God developing from a crude, anthropomorphic, tribal deity demanding human sacrifice into a benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent, loving spirit, ready to forgive and showing mercy, its historical value was open to grave doubt. The accounts written years after the events which they described were held to be highly colored. The writers were considered as religious and political propagandists promoting their own ideas and playing fast and loose with the facts. But the excavations have verified the Bible statements many times over. Even the books of Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, which reached their present form in late post-Exilic times, are recognized now as trustworthy in essential features. This does not mean that we are to take as history what was not intended for history, that all discrepancies are cleared away,

or that the numbers in every instance are accurate. For example, six hundred thousand and more is an impossible number for the men who came up from Egypt, as given in Exod. 12. 37; Num. 1. 46; 2. 32; 11. 21; 26. 51. "Half a million fighting men implies at least two million souls, a number which, without accounting for the animals, would have involved on the journey from Egypt a continuous column of four abreast extending over the whole length of the desert wandering between Succoth and Jericho at its maximum estimate of 400 miles. The whole Jordan valley could not have contained their camp. The armed men alone if formed up ten abreast when encompassing the walls of Jericho would have formed a column forty miles in length, requiring two whole days for their defiling." (Garstang, *Joshua Judges*, p. 120.) Clearly there were mistakes made in copying the text or in the transmission of the story. But, though we cannot be bound to the verbal inerrancy of the Bible in any of the existing versions, we can rely on its reliability and honesty in statement of historical facts. Historians now take the Bible accounts at their face value, unless it is clear that the author was using figurative speech or there is something palpably wrong with the text.

For those who never have bothered themselves about the historicity of the sacred narratives the chief value of the excavations lies in making the Bible more intelligible and the additional knowledge that we gain of the Holy Land and the people who have dwelt in it.

The Bible contains no statement of what happened in Palestine before Abraham came over from Ur of the Chaldees by way of Haran. We are told that the Canaanite was then in the land (Gen. 12. 6), that the Perrizite was there too (Gen. 13. 7), and that there were the cities of Sodom, Gomorrah, Admah, Zeboiim, and Zoar, each with its king (Gen. 14). Thus we find Palestine a settled country when first we meet it in the Bible. How its inhabitants came to be there and what they were doing we are not told. Here is where the excavators are supplying the information. They have shown that man was in Palestine at least 20,000 years ago. Mr. F. Turville-Petre and Miss Dorothy A. E. Garrod have brought to light an imposing array of human remains from the Early Stone Age. The most famous of these is the skull of the "Galilee Man," probably in reality a young Neanderthal woman, found in the cave of el Zuttiyeh on the north-west shore of the Sea of Galilee. They have found also near Athlit, south of Mount Carmel, the remains of a cave-dwelling people who tilled the fields and raised crops, but made no pottery. In the Jordan valley, in several wadies, in a few cities, on Mount Ophel in Jerusalem have been found

crude pottery and flint implements showing that Stone Age man in considerable numbers inhabited Palestine.

In the Early Bronze Age (3000-2000 b. c.) Palestine was fairly well populated with nomads, cave dwellers, and people living in fortified towns. The people had learned to use the potter's wheel and to turn out some rather graceful vessels. Importations from both Egypt and Babylonia were coming in. As yet no extensive excavation of an Early Bronze level has been made. However, some of Miss Garrod's caves, Tell Beit Mirsim and Tell en-Nasbeh, where Dean W. F. Badé of the Pacific School of Religion excavated in 1926 and 1927, have produced fair Early Bronze remains and at Beth-zur was found a small pocket containing a few Early Bronze sherds. All of these deposits date from before the coming of Abraham.

The Middle Bronze Age saw the fall of the Middle Kingdom in Egypt and the reign of the Hyksos kings. The Hyksos remind us of Alexander the Great and his attitude toward Greek culture. They were non-Egyptian, Asiatic rulers of Egypt, thoroughly hated by the Egyptians, yet enthusiastic spreaders of Egyptian culture. They seem to have ruled Palestine also, for we have their scarabs and impressions from their scarabs in many places. Abraham may have come into Palestine about the time that the Hyksos gained their supremacy. The excavations in the older Middle Bronze levels show social conditions just about as they are represented in the stories of Abraham. The houses were large, with thick walls, and not crowded together. The stage of civilization was comparatively high. Abraham was no mere wandering Bedouin sheikh. It is true that he lived in a tent most of the time, but he had spent his boyhood in a large city and he was in the midst of cities in south Palestine.

Allowing for Orientalisms and poetic license as to detail, there is nothing unreasonable in the story of the moving of Jacob and his sons to Egypt. The Hyksos kings were of the same Asiatic stock and would welcome their fellow Semites. As a matter of fact, moving from Palestine to Egypt was nothing more than moving from a province to the mother country. The oppression of the Israelites, too, can be understood in the light of resentment of the Egyptians after they had regained control of their country. Some scholars think that the Exodus is the aftermath of the expulsion of the Hyksos from Egypt.

At Gezer and Megiddo in the pre-war excavations were found Middle Bronze remains. Probably the best Middle Bronze site so far discovered is Tell Beit Mirsim. Six of its strata, showing six destructions and rebuildings within a period of four hundred years, are from this period. This site

gives an accurate and detailed picture of the changes in the pottery types of that period. At Megiddo, in the season of 1930-31, Mr. P. L. O. Guy found a Middle Bronze necropolis with an excellent array of whole jars. Beth-zur, too, yielded a mass of Middle Bronze pottery—mostly fragments of jars, some of the handles of which were stamped with Hyksos scarabs.

The Children of Israel under Joshua entered Palestine (at least some of them did) in the late Bronze Age (1600-1200 b. c.). The Bible tells little about the land in this period, but the excavations have shown that it was an Egyptian province ruled by the XVIIIth and XIXth Dynasties. The Tell el-Amarna Letters found in Egypt contain some of the correspondence between the Egyptian kings and their local representatives in Palestine. The University of Pennsylvania Museum excavation at Beth-shan, begun by Dr. Clarence S. Fisher in 1922 and continued by Mr. Alan Rowe and then Mr. G. M. Fitzgerald, has given the evidence at the other end. Beth-shan was an Egyptian garrison town with two Egyptian temples. The Hittites occupied it for a time and left their art objects, but the Egyptians took it again. In this age we see the liberal use of cult objects, particularly little figures of the goddess Ashtoreth. The same kind of figures were found at Tell Beit Mirsim, which has an excellent Late Bronze stratum. Beth-shemesh enjoyed the heyday of its civilization during the Late Bronze period, while not very far away Beth-zur was completely abandoned. When the Megiddo excavation gets into the Late Bronze level we may expect some interesting results.

Israelites and Philistines entered the land about the same time, toward the beginning of the Early Iron I period (1200-900 b. c.), though there is no doubt that there were Hebrews there at least two centuries earlier. The Israelites seem to have been rather crude in comparison with the Canaanites whom they displaced. At least the pottery of Early Iron I is much cruder than that of the Late Bronze Age. The Philistines brought some pottery types with them. There is still a great deal of mystery in connection with the Philistines. We have some portraits of them and some of their jewelry, but we are unable to tell with certainty where they came from. Excavations in the Philistine country have been carried on by Sir Flinders Petrie. A great deal of Philistine pottery has been found also at Beth-shemesh by Professor Elihu Grant of Haverford College.

Practically every excavation in Palestine, except the prehistoric caves, shows occupation in the Early Iron I period. Two of the most interesting recent finds have been the Jebusite wall, which kept David out of Jerusalem

until Joab climbed through a watercourse and entered the town from below, and the stables of Solomon at Megiddo. The Bible indicates that Megiddo was a city where the horses and chariots of Solomon were kept (1 Kings 9. 15, 19). The remains of extensive stables have been found there. The frontispiece in Olmstead's *History of Palestine and Syria* is a restoration of these stables and the surrounding area. A similar installation was found by Mr. John Garstang in his excavation at Hazor.

About the time of the schism in Israel the pottery changed in style, so that the Early Iron II period represents the time of the divided monarchy down to the Exile (roughly 900-600 B. C.). During this time the cities were more densely populated than formerly and specialization in industry developed. One of the early happenings was the invasion of the Egyptian king, Shishak. Kirjath-sepher was taken by him and the ruins show it so completely destroyed that it remained unoccupied for a quarter of a century. The Bible records his coming only as far as Jerusalem. Shishak himself on a wall at home put down the names of the towns he had taken, Megiddo among them. Some scholars doubted his going that far north, but the University of Chicago found at Megiddo an inscribed stele with Shishak's name on it.

An expedition at Samaria, headed by Mr. Crowfoot of the Palestine Exploration Fund, with a large and distinguished staff, is finding some imposing remains of Ahab, including a section of wall built by Phoenician architects whom Jezebel evidently imported. From reading the prophets of this period we know that there was a tremendous contest between the devoted followers of the Israelite God and the fertility cult represented by the local Baalim and Ashtaroth. That the prophets had a real problem on their hands is shown by the many little clay images of Ashtoreth found in the levels of this period. Some of these images are well done and some extremely crude, but they all bear mute evidence to the truth of the prophets' accusations.

The period closes with the coming of Nebuchadnezzar and the Exile. Some scholars have held that the Exile was of little importance, that only a few of the nobles of the country were carried away to Babylon, and that outside of the destruction of the Temple at Jerusalem there was little change in the career of the population. The excavations show, however, a general destruction of the Judaean cities at that time. Kirjath-sepher was destroyed and never rebuilt. When activity was resumed there was an entirely new type of pottery and art objects. The pre-war diggings at Gezer and Marissa and last summer's expedition at Beth-zur are the only excava-

tions covering the Early Iron III-Hellenistic phase with any degree of thoroughness. They show that there was a great deal of wine drinking at this period and that women were profuse in the use of cosmetics. Spatulas of bone, ivory, and bronze for the smearing of paint on the eyelids were recovered by the dozen. Finger rings, earrings, and bracelets were common.

For the Roman period the most interesting finds have been at Samaria, Capernaum, and Jerash. The Bible dictionaries will tell you that the site of Capernaum is not certain; but the excavations of the Franciscans have closed the question. Capernaum is Tell Hum, where there is a splendid synagogue, possibly contemporary with Christ. Jerash, in Transjordan, is a complete Roman city with theater, hippodrome, baths, pagan temples, and many early churches. The excavation there by Yale University and the American School of Oriental Research, Jerusalem, under the immediate direction of Dr. Fisher, will show the best ancient Roman city to be found anywhere in the Near East, except Palmyra, which the French are digging. At Sepphoris last summer Professor Leroy Waterman of Michigan found a Roman theater and an early Christian church.

This brief survey has made no attempt to take account of all the excavations or excavators; it merely mentions those with which the writer is most familiar. All are making contributions—from the small summer enterprises, in which the staff lives in tents and works only for a few weeks, to the magnificent excavation at Megiddo, which has a large building with all conveniences, the very best of equipment, a highly competent staff and adequate provision for the continuation of work until the entire hill is finished to its lowest stratum.

Some excavations most important to biblical study are outside the bounds of Palestine. At Ur Mr. Wooley has found a thick layer of mud dating back to 3000 b. c. or farther, with pottery above and below, but no pottery in it. This shows that there was a flood which covered the entire Mesopotamian Valley for quite a period. In all probability this was the flood which gave rise to the Babylonian deluge stories and Genesis 6-9. The French excavation under M. Schaeffer at Ras Shamra in the last three years has found over eight hundred lines of inscription in a cuneiform alphabet hitherto unknown. It is an old Canaanite or Phoenician text from between 1400 and 1200 b. c., containing mythological narratives and mentioning some names found in the Bible. When this material is fully published it should throw much light on the language and vocabulary of the Old Testament and explain some obscure passages.

Theocentric Religion

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

WHAT is the test of a man-centered *versus* a God-centered religion? It is not the mere fact that theism is professed as over against humanism. They who love God least but use his name most may not know how man-centered they are, for the same reason that the most self-centered people are generally most unconscious of their own selfishness. Some who are most humanistic in fact are most insistent in the profession of theism.

Nontheistic humanism does not degrade God to a utility, as some forms of theism do. It simply denies there is a God. We may call that God which is a mere utility. Still worse, we may cherish our beliefs about God because they sustain and inspire, but without regard to the true nature of the actuality which is God. Nontheistic humanism has refused to do either. It has denied that anything can be called God which is a mere utility or a mere belief. We believe nontheistic humanism has chosen the more honorable course. But there is something better still, and that is a genuinely theocentric religion.

What is the test of a theocentric religion? Do I cherish beliefs about God primarily for their human value, that is, because they sustain and inspire men, or primarily because of the weight of tested evidence which supports them? Only in the latter case am I actuated by love for God, because only then do I cherish the belief because it seems to be the truth about God. In the former case I cherish it because it makes me happy or because it seems otherwise to help me and my fellow men. Hence in such case I am man-centered instead of God-centered.

If the word God, in the above paragraph, should be confusing to some, because it is in their mind identified with inspiring belief rather than truth, let us state the test a little differently. There is some actuality carrying the highest values that ever can be. It is either one or many, personal or impersonal. To know this fact does not make anybody religious. Knowledge about this actuality does not make anybody religious. What makes a man religious is to make this actuality the supreme concern of his living, no matter how little he may know about it, only knowing that it is. What a man believes about this actuality will give form and character to his religion. But these beliefs do not constitute his religion. He may have exceedingly few and meager beliefs about it, and his religion be no less potent and passionate than one with a whole arsenal of beliefs. What

constitutes his religion is his reaction to this actuality as supremely important. To react to it as supremely important is to react in various ways, such as with awe, reverence, fear, love, passionate seeking, passionate serving, passionate devotion.

So let us state again the test of a theocentric religion. If I cherish my beliefs about the actuality carrying highest value, primarily because they sustain and inspire me and my fellows, I am man-centered in my religion. If I cherish my beliefs about it primarily because these beliefs seem to meet the severest tests of truth, I am God-centered in my religion. I am man-centered in the first case because my chief concern there is not to have beliefs which are true to God, thus enabling me to live for God as he truly is, but my chief concern is to have beliefs which satisfy the desires of men. I want beliefs about God that will make us all happy, the truth about God being quite secondary. A man-centered religion is, I believe, a false religion or pseudo-religion.

By the test just proposed, we hold that the religion of Western civilization is in great part not theocentric and has been becoming less so for some time. In great part our religion declares, by implication of practice if not by open profession, that beliefs about God are more important than the actuality of God. This was not always so. When beliefs were thought to be derived from infallible authority, it was impossible for men to select or construct beliefs that were comforting and inspiring. They had to take what authority offered. Hence hell and devil were as much believed as God and heaven. Truth was the truth, and nothing else could be considered as belief on any ground whatsoever. But to-day there is no accepted infallible authority. Almost all beliefs are more or less tentative. Hence to-day a real issue arises. On what ground shall I hold my beliefs? On the ground of hard evidence and severe tests, or on the ground of what I think I need and my fellows need? Religious people to-day have answered this question for the most part in favor of human desire and against hard evidence. As authority wanes, they are doing so more and more. Hence our religion is becoming less and less theocentric.

But there is a limit to this movement, for in the end it is self-defeating. You can believe what you want to believe, as long as you are not clearly conscious that you are believing that way merely because you desire to do so. But when you do become clearly conscious of this, your belief becomes make-believe, and loses most of its power to sustain and inspire. That is precisely what is happening in the world to-day. We call it being disillusioned. It is a very wholesome experience, providing an austere and

truly theocentric religion can rise out of it. We believe it can and will. The manifest self deception and pollyanna perjury of man-centered religion becomes more and more contemptible in the eyes of men as they become clearly conscious of it. At last it arouses a passionate revulsion. We have not gotten to that stage yet. It may be a long time coming. There may be many revivals of man-centered religion. Indeed we cannot hope that man-centered religion will ever be entirely eliminated. It can only be subordinated. But it will be subordinated when a theocentric religion arises, for the latter is incomparably more powerful when it is once fully aroused. When a theocentric and anthropocentric religion are contemporaneous, the theocentric will inevitably dominate. It will not only dominate every other kind of religion, but also the entire life of man within the area of his operations.

In a man-centered age religion is the central theme while God is never mentioned except when one is forced to it. The reason for this is plain. A man-centered age is more interested in religion than in God because religion is a human affair. But religion is not God any more than hunger is food. Man has an impulse that leads him to seek food. This seeking we call industrial activity. He also has an impulse that leads him to seek what he can love and adore above all else, with complete abandon of devotion. This seeking we call religion. Industrial activity yields certain values in itself, quite apart from the utilities which it seeks to attain. So also does religion. But the difference is that the values found in industrial activity, such as fellowship, culture and the like, may be higher than the value of the food sought. The food is indispensable to keep life going, but these other values may make life worth living. But the values found in religion, apart from the end sought, which is God, can never equal the value of God himself. Therefore the perversion of industrial activity from its rightful function of providing food for all involved, can never be as great an evil as the perversion of religion from its rightful function of finding God. The evils of a perverted industrial activity, such as unemployment and starvation, are more flagrant, but they are not so deadly as the evil of seeking the values of religious activity apart from the value of finding God.

But the modern age has turned from God to religion. Most theists are more concerned with religion than with God. They discuss religion, far more than God. They preach religion; scarcely ever do they preach God. They direct and augment the forces of religion, rather than awaken and deepen in themselves and others that mystic, passionate love for God

which constitutes theocentric religion. When they do speak of God it is generally in terms of this man's God and that man's God, a traditional God and a modern God, his God and my God and Mr. Jones's God. Apparently God is a private possession shaped by each man to suit his fancy.

Religion, in our man-centered age, is often valued as a sort of reserve battalion with nothing particularly to do except to come to the aid of any worthy cause that needs help. When it is not helping the unemployed or fighting for prohibition or trying to promote social justice or doing something else which is regularly done by agencies which do not pretend to be religious, it does not know what to do with itself. It is like one all dressed up with nowhere to go. Indeed, many theists condemn religion as rather worthless when it is not promoting some work which, taken by itself alone, would not be called religious at all. Perhaps they are right in this condemnation, for a man-centered religion has nothing to do of much importance except to lend its aid to other agencies which are doing something that is not religion. What can it do, when not so engaged, except to stimulate pleasant states of consciousness?

In a man-centered age "religious experience" is held to be the test of the truth of a religious belief. Religious experience, as generally conceived, means the peace, joy, courage, hope, zeal for righteousness or other desirable attitudes of personality which are engendered by holding as true some belief or other. Thus the subjective state, or other beneficial effect upon the subject, which results from accepting the belief as true, is taken to be evidence of its truth. This is exactly opposite to the requirements for testing the truth of a belief in any other walk in life. It is precisely these effects upon the subject which result from assuming the truth of the belief which must be avoided when one wishes to find out whether a belief is true. Of course, if one wants to know what transformation of personality will result from assuming a belief to be true, he must take note of what results do ensue when a belief is so accepted. But what is then shown to be true is the proposition that believing so and so will have such and such effects upon the personality of him who so believes. It gives no evidence whatsoever to show that the belief producing this transformation is true. It only shows the truth of the proposition that such a belief will produce such a transformation in a particular person. For example, I believe I am Napoleon or Jesus Christ, or I believe some one is constantly trying to kill me. Such belief will have a very profound effect upon my personality. But that effect does not prove the truth of the beliefs. If I believe I am the most sublime personality that ever walked, that belief may make me

very happy. But my happiness does not prove the truth of the belief. But religious experience means precisely these subjective effects which result from believing something which is held to be religious. A man-centered religion is much more concerned about the subjective effects of a belief than about the objective truth of it. It is much more concerned that a belief about God should have the desired subjective effects than that it should be the genuine truth about the actuality of God. Or, rather, we should say, this issue never arises, for the subjective effects are all that is taken into consideration.

It is rather refreshing to turn to the works of the atheistic humanists where it is passionately denied that anything can be called God which is sought and found in this way.

The requirements of a theocentric religion we should list under five heads. They are: (1) God must be recognized to be whatever actuality carries highest possibilities of value, no matter how different it may be from our cherished beliefs about it. (2) God shall be adored chiefly not because he loves us and takes care of us, not because he helps us to escape from our social ills and reconstruct society the way we think it ought to be done, but because we commit ourselves in absolute devotion to that actuality which carries highest possibilities of value, even though its ways should require our destruction or some other kind of social order than what we cherish or even the annihilation of Western culture and everything which comes within the scope of our present vision. (3) The object of our supreme and passionate devotion shall be God, the actuality, and not our beliefs about it. (4) We shall accept as true no belief about God, nor about anything else of religious significance, unless it be sustained by observational and experimental evidence under the control of rigorous reason. (We call this *scientific method*, for lack of a better term.) (5) God shall be mystically apprehended.

Mysticism and Scientific Method

Let us consider the last condition first, for that will be the chief stumbling block for many. Mysticism means many different things, and most of the meanings which it generally carries are not what we mean here. By mysticism we mean to react with love or other strong emotion toward what exceeds the scope of our understanding, and with full recognition that our patterns of thought fall far short of its full reality. When a mother reacts to her infant as a tender and beloved little organism, with no regard for the unknown possibilities which this budding personality

must carry, she is *not* reacting to it mystically. But when she loves the infant because of these unfathomed possibilities, even while not knowing what they are, she is reacting mystically. Or again, if she reacts to these mysterious possibilities, not with love nor with passion of any kind, but treats them only as a problem, the subject matter for intellectual investigation, she is not reacting mystically. Or again, if she claims to know just what these unknown possibilities are; if she asserts that this child of hers is going to be just this sort of a man and no other, and loves the infant because he is going to be just the kind of person which she claims to know he is going to be, then she is not mystical.

Thus there are three ways of being non-mystical, whether in respect to God or child or anything else. One is to ignore everything which lies beyond the reach of our present knowledge, everything which is unfathomed, restricting our traffic solely to what is known or assumed to be known, familiar, even conventional. Such is the life of Mr. George F. Babbitt. The second way to be non-mystical is to recognize the encompassing mystery of existence and possibility, but treat it solely as a problem to be solved and as a field for intellectual inquiry. The third way is to build up a screen of dogmatic beliefs which claim to comprehend the totality of all that is, and to map it before our minds as clearly as the streets of our home town.

Anything that awakens in me a strong love or fear or other great emotional response to what I do not yet comprehend makes me mystical. Certain aspects of nature do this. Some kinds of art do it. All noble love between human personalities is mystical in this sense. That is to say, if in loving another person I regard not merely that meager fragment of him which I can portray in form of clear concepts or adapt myself to by way of established patterns of behavior, but his real and total personality which is in great part unexplored, and if I do not treat this unknown reach of his personality merely as material for cold intellectual inquiry but as something to love or fear, and if I do not claim to know what I do not know, then my love for him is mystical. A love which is not mystical in this sense is scarcely worth having.

Mysticism in this sense requires the restriction of belief, or claim to knowledge, to what can be ascertained by the method of observation, experiment, and reason. Therefore scientific method is a necessary adjunct to mysticism of this sort. We cannot react to God with mystic love unless we limit our beliefs about God to such beliefs as can be sustained by rigorous reason and the most accurate observation of which we are capable. What

knowledge we can attain in this way about the actuality which carries highest possibilities of value is very meager and abstract. But this meager and abstract knowledge will not be what we love with such passionate and mystic devotion, any more than the human personality which we love can be restricted to the very limited knowledge we have of that personality. To be sure, our knowledge must throw some light on the nature of the object. It must provide us with the criteria by which we recognize our beloved; but it is the reality of our beloved that we love, and not merely our knowledge about it. This is true whether my beloved be my child or my lover or my country or God. Therefore the object of my love will be held before my consciousness not by means of my accepted concepts, however important these may be, but by means of poetic symbols which shall bring entrancingly to mind that actuality which I cannot conceptualize.

Concepts about child or lover or country or God must be achieved by scientific method and we must have such concepts if there is to be any intelligence and any helpfulness in our dealings with the beloved. But our love cannot be limited to such concepts. What we love is more than they. Our love would die if what we could love was nothing more than what we can fully comprehend, not because reality is unlovable, but because our understanding is so limited. But how can we know that there is anything to love, beyond what we know? That is an old sophism which should have been exploded long ago, but it seems to trouble many still. The surest thing we know is that there is much we do not know, both of good and evil. The surest teaching that scientific method has to give us is that all our knowledge is only approximate, and that therefore the actuality and its possibilities with which we deal are always more than, and most probably somewhat different from, our findings about them.

Therefore, our claim is that only he who is scientific can be mystical in the most worthy sense. We do not mean by that to assert that every one who is most rigorously scientific is on that account mystical. As we have already indicated, it is quite possible to be coldly scientific without mysticism. One may react to the unknown without love or other emotion, treating it only as a problem to solve. Then that one is not mystical. But the best kind of mysticism is possible only when all knowledge is based on scientific method.

What we have just stated should not be confused with the kind of mysticism represented by Eddington. Eddington claims that mystical experience is somehow a way of getting knowledge. That is exactly the

opposite to what we are upholding. We are saying that a worthy mysticism is possible only when we limit all claim to knowledge to what can be attained by observation and reason and give our highest love and devotion to that actuality which carries highest value without claiming to know what we do not know. Eddington's mysticism opens the gates to man-centered religion by allowing us to fashion our idea of God without the checks of scientific method, and thus to make an idol to satisfy our heart's desire. Thus God becomes a utility shaped to satisfy our wants. Our wants may have been shaped by tradition. In that case we shall have a "traditional God." Or we may have broken free of tradition. Then we shall have a "modern God." But in either case it will be "our God," so fashioned as to give us the kind of "religious experience" we crave. God will not be the objectively existing actuality about which authentic knowledge cannot hope to be more than approximate, very limited, and achieved only by the method of observation and reason.

Science has demonstrated that scientific method is the only way we can subordinate our hopes and desires, our wishes and needs and all the surges of human passion, and deal with objectivity as it is so far as it is possible for human kind to do that. Applied science, on the other hand, is man-centered. It uses the objectivities unveiled by pure science to serve human interest. But the method which pure science employs has succeeded better than any other method in subordinating the egoism and sentimentality of man to the realities with which he deals. Man is humbled by scientific knowledge, but grows conceited with practical scientific control. Even to get scientific knowledge about a flea one must be sensitive and responsive to the flea, holding all his own desires in abeyance in order to know what the flea wants, seeks, does. Scientific method will make him no less object-centered, self-effacing, and responsive when he seeks knowledge of God in the same way. But when he seeks knowledge of God in any other way he becomes arrogant, conceited, shaping his idea of God in such manner as to give him the "religious experience" he desires, rather than shaping it to meet the requirements of observation and evidence.

God and Scientific Method

As we have already stated, we mean by scientific method observation under the control of reason, and reason under the control of observation. It requires the utmost use of imagination. No one can discover anything of importance by this method unless he has great powers of imagination. But the imagination must be under the control of observation and reason.

The imagination must construct a theoretical order. Then this order must be applied to the observable world to see if it will fit what can be found there. Generally it cannot. Then it must be modified on the one hand, and observation redirected and controlled on the other, until some order does seem to become apparent. When this new order is thus discovered in the sensible world, it can be followed by rational imagination far beyond the reach of the senses. But it must always be possible to come back again to the sensible world to test the truth of these flights of rational imagination. The imagination soars in science. Even in physics that is true. Note the cosmic imagination of a Newton constructing in theory the gravitational order of the Universe, or Einstein fashioning in imagination a universe that can be shared in common by all and yet is different for each. But of course all this imagination must be under the control of the most rigorous reason and accurate observation that is possible. *And its truth is never more than approximate.* But this approximation may be progressive and generally is, when the searchers keep true to the method.

Now how can imagination, under the combined control of reason and observation, be so used as to achieve the truth about God by way of progressive approximation? In other words, how can scientific method be used in seeking knowledge about God?

Perhaps that question can best be answered by stating a belief about God that is based on the use of this method. We do not claim this belief is any more than a first approximation. But we think it of very great importance, nevertheless. Also we do not claim that this belief about God is at all new. On the contrary it is very ancient.

We must begin with negations in order to clear the ground of certain presuppositions which make impossible the application of this method to the problem of God. God must be conceived not merely as the possibilities of highest value. God is the actuality which carries those possibilities. God is not a possibility, merely. He is a present, potent, operative, existing actuality. Since he is what carries highest possibilities, he has all the value of these possibilities, for without him they could not be possibilities.

In the second place, God is not the ultimate ground of all existence. It is highly improbable that all existence has any one single ground. Evidence seems to indicate that there are several different grounds, all equally ultimate. God may be one of these several ultimate realities, as Whitehead says. According to Whitehead there are three ultimate realities, (1) creativity or process, which is not God, (2) abstract forms, which are not God and which are innumerable, (3) the actuality which is God, that pro-

motes maximum ingressions of abstract forms into the process. We do not mean to set up this doctrine of Whitehead as the final truth. We mention it only to show that a multiplicity of ultimate realities is a theory that can be defended as well as any other. The only point we want to make is that God is not *the one* ultimate reality. He may be one of several ultimate realities, or he may be some part or phase or expression of the one ultimate reality. The only certainty is that God is what carries highest possibilities of value, no matter what may be the status of such an actuality with respect to ultimate reality. Why is God not the ultimate ground of all existence? Because he is not the ultimate ground of murder, lust, treachery and all the horrors of existence. To try to revere such a reality as God, is to try to initiate a religion that is worse than voodooism.

With these presuppositions out of the way we can proceed to apply the method of observation and reason to the problem of what is that actuality which carries highest values.

We find by observation and reason that greatest values seem to be carried by that kind of interaction between individuals and groups by which the richest possible body of sharable experience is attained. By sharable experience we mean the experience which the ages can share, and not merely the experience which Tom, Dick, and Harry may happen at the moment to undergo in common. We mean a body of experience which all men everywhere, in every age, can share together providing they are given opportunity, and submit to the required cultivation of reason and taste. It is the experience found in great art, in great philosophy, in scientific knowledge and in the brotherhoods which span the centuries.

In discussing value at all we are immediately confronted with the difficult problem of what constitutes value. We cannot here take space to present the theory with which we are now working. But we believe that what we say about the accumulation of a maximum body of sharable (not necessarily shared) experience leading to highest values can be shown to be true with most theories of value that have been proposed. In other words, the truth of this statement does not depend on one and only one theory of value.

Shared experience does not mean merely repetition of experience due to continuance of the same conditions, as for example the constant repetition, age by age, of the experience of war or murder or good dinners. Such experiences are not shared with the ages. They are only repeated. But experience is shared by the ages when it is expressed in the form of the great works of art, or the great philosophic systems, or in scientific knowl-

edge, or in the tradition of a great brotherhood such as Jesus and his disciples initiated, or Buddha and his adherents, or Socrates and his friends, and others that might be mentioned.

This interaction, by which such a body of sharable experience is accumulated, is not initiated by men, but rather is what initiates men, for it is what generates human personality after the infant organism has been born into the world. An infant becomes a human being by entering into the community of shared experience with other humans. Hence the kind of interaction which goes on between parent and child and other loving members in a home, which generates and enriches personality, has in it something divine. That is the justification for using the family, or some member of the family, to symbolize God. Jesus, for example, used the term Father. But Jesus was not trying to insist that God is a male. Therefore he was using a symbol, not a literal statement of fact. Under other historical conditions he might well have used the symbol of mother, or even that of the child. What he was symbolizing was this kind of loving communicative interaction between individuals and groups by which the richest possible body of sharable experience is accumulated. It is not, of course, limited to the home. And some homes may have very little of it. It is an operative fact more or less pervasive throughout human history. It must be symbolized and Jesus did it by using the term Father.

While great historic formulations of sharable experience in the form of art, philosophy, science, and brotherhood, are often the works of certain rare and great men, the actual experience which is thus formulated is the product of the interactions of innumerable men whose names are never known. And the experience thus formulated is their experience quite as much as that of the great man. Even the work of achieving the final formulation which goes down to posterity, while it is rightly said to be the work of some rare and great man, is his work only in the sense that he is peculiarly sensitized to these social interactions of his age, happens to hold a very strategic position so that these interactions can work through him, and happens to have other rare opportunities which make him the resonator of his time. But the kind of communicative interaction between individuals and groups and generations which is the real creative agent in producing such bodies of sharable experience is not the activity of any single man. It is rather a kind of interaction going on among many men. It does not by any means include all their activities, but it includes some of them. And it does its work quite beyond the intent, plan, or purpose of any man or any group of men. Hence it is superhuman. It is one aspect of that

actuality which carries highest possibilities of value. It is one aspect of God.

This belief about God may serve to illustrate what is meant by seeking guiding propositions about God by way of reason and observation. It gives us a meager, abstract, and inadequate knowledge of God. But nothing is more important than that we recognize and openly confess that our knowledge of God is inadequate. There is no greater evil than to coddle our own complacency by covering our ignorance out of sight by an assumed knowledge which is not genuine. The evils of this are legion but we here mention only one. When we set up a lot of beliefs because they comfort and inspire and strengthen us, and cannot be disproved, but have no positive evidence to support them, we shut out, to that extent, that mystic love of God which we have seen is the necessary supplement to scientific method in any religion that is to be theocentric. When we set up beliefs because of their usefulness to us, and not because they are true to the actuality of God according to all the tests at our command, we have a man-centered religion, not a God-centered.

Scientific method should not be confused with positivism. Positivism is the view that we get our knowledge by sensation alone. Somehow, so this claim runs, an accumulation of sensations gives us ideas and thus knowledge. But sensation alone can never give us knowledge. Neither can abstract reason alone give us knowledge of anything that exists. We must first discover by observation under the control of reason some order in the field of sensuous experience. Having found such an order, we can follow it by pure reason beyond the reach of sensuous experience. But we must start with what is sensible, and we must be able to come back to what is sensible for verification. Knowledge according to this method is not limited to sensation, but neither can it dispense with sensation. Also it cannot dispense with imagination. Rational imagination must construct a theory with which to guide further observation. Sometimes such a theory springs full fledged into the mind and is almost immediately authenticated by observation or memory. Then we call it intuition. But all such intuition or imagination must be constantly under the control of reason and observation, else it will give us only the constructions of human fancy and build around us a wall of dreams to shut out objective reality. Therefore, if we are to be object-centered rather than subject-centered, we must commit the conduct of our lives, as well as our thinking, to this method of reason and observation.

Whether the object be God or atom, friend or stone, we can live for

the object rather than for our own subjective desires and beliefs only when we rigorously conform to the stern requirements of this method. It is the only method thus far discovered by which we can escape from anthropocentric living into a kind of living which is centered in the object and shaped by the object. If the object is atoms, this is the only way our thinking and our conduct can be atom-centered. If the object is a machine, it is the only way we can be machine-centered in our living. If the object is a beloved personality, it is the only way we can shape our thought, feeling, and conduct to meet the requirements of that other person, rather than dealing with him at the dictate of our own desires and impulses alone. If the object is God, it is the only way we can become God-centered.

But these abstract propositions about God, tested by utmost use of reason and observation, must be supplemented with mystic devotion to that fullness of actuality which lies beyond the reach of our present attainments in knowledge. Every actuality that exists is always more than our knowledge at any given time has been able to comprehend. The more vast and complex the actuality, the greater is that portion of it which exceeds our comprehension. Therefore, if we love any actuality, we love that which exceeds the scope of our cognition, and so love it mystically. But all too frequently man's love is not genuine. He does not love the actuality. He only loves the feelings which he can experience when he is able to hold fast to certain cherished beliefs about it. In this self-centered way we may "love" child and wife, and friend and country and God.

No man can have a theocentric religion until he learns to love what he cannot comprehend, and to live for what is still hidden. It is a kind of faith; but not in any sense a form of knowledge nor belief. It is a driving interest, not an intellectual assent. It is a compulsive lure, not a proposition to be accepted. It is a way of having God, through love, as a mystic possession and an endless cognitive quest. We would not strive for him by practical social reconstruction, had we not found him as the inspiration of all our efforts. He who has God thus needs no certified belief to inspire him to utmost practical effort, to renew his zeal when discouraged, to comfort him when loneliness and sorrow wring his heart.

The most ignorant and lowly can have God in this way as fully as the most learned and intelligent. For anyone can have God thus who will "give his heart to God." This is a very ancient and very simple gospel. Furthermore, he who stands at the beginning of the God-quest of history can have God as fully in this way as he who stands at the culmination of all the findings of the generations.

The Sin of Accidie

DONALD MACKENZIE

DO certain sins die out like some biological species? Can we say of them, "They are as dead as the dodo"?

The student of medieval literature comes frequently across a sin called accidie—one of the seven (or eight) deadly sins which seem to have been at one time very prevalent. To-day the word is obsolete. Does this mean that what it stood for no longer exists?

Lecky, the historian, and Sidgwick, the moralist, with robust English common-sense treat it as a pathological sin caused by the unnatural life of the recluse, and so summarily dismiss it. And yet, like a criminal, the sin itself may still exist under an alias or an alibi. It may flourish outside the cloister.

It has to be confessed that the name accidie was unfortunate. For one thing it was so like acidity, or sourness, that the two were easily confounded. When melancholy was attributed to black bile, and sanguineness to red blood in the system, it was natural to attribute accidie to acidity. Even modern advertisements attribute something very like it to the same source. "It isn't laziness but malaise . . . Too much acid in the system lowers the vitality." Then again to popularize and perpetuate such a word was difficult, so Edmund Spenser uses idleness instead of it, and William Dunbar, the Scottish poet of the thirteenth century, uses "sweirness," which is just laziness. Yet William Langland, the author of *Piers the Ploughman*, still employs it—"And after all his excess he had an accidie that he slept Saturday and Sunday." That Sunday morning accidie among his members is a real problem to the modern preacher. Perhaps it is due in some measure to excess in sport or late amusement on Saturday, and our fathers tried to guard against it by preparing for the Sunday on the Saturday evening as the Jews also did. In the *Canterbury Tales* Chaucer puts a sermon on accidie into the parson's mouth. He calls it the rotten-hearted sin of accidie and sloth.

Perhaps the best known literary treatment of the sin by its name accidie is in the two passages in Dante. In one of these passages he pictures its doom, which was to be buried in a blanket of Stygian slime; in the other he sees the lazy accidians seeking to be purged—so earnest now that they have no time or inclination to pass the time of day with any one. "Let no time be lost through slackness of affection." And yet,

in spite of these excellent precedents, literature let the word drop and Shakespeare does not use it at all.

The medieval treatment of this sin from Cassian downward is well known. Bishop Paget, of Oxford, who some forty years since tried to revive the word in his *Spirit of Discipline*, gives an excellent account of it.

The medievalists looked on it largely as a spiritual malady to be cured by ghostly remedies, although Jerome had the good sense to say that it needed Hippocrate's fomentum rather than spiritual monitions, and even Cassian recommends hard physical work as a cure. The word "accidie" having become extinct, what of the sin itself? Before we can determine this let us give two definitions of it. Spenser calls it "sluggish idleness the nurse of sin," and Aquinas defines it thus: "Sloth or accidie is a heaviness and sadness that so weighs down the soul that it has no mind to do anything. It carries with it a disgust of work." Doctor Paget, analysing it, finds in it the three ingredients of "gloom," "sloth," and "irritation," and Mr. Saintsbury, in his *Last Scrap Book*, says its essence is sullen discontent rather than laziness.

Now if accidie be laziness there is little reason to believe that it is defunct, or to doubt that it is a grievous sin. Most moderns would agree with the old Spanish proverb, "While Satan tempts all men, the idle man tempts the devil." Not only is it a sin in itself, but it is, as Spenser calls it, the "nurse of sin." Great Britain, after the war, in order to provide for men out of work, devised a scheme of National Insurance Benefit, which is sometimes contemptuously called the dole, and yet it had much to recommend it as an emergency measure. Its gravest defect was not the drain on the exchequer, but its moral effects. It failed to provide work, and so tended to produce in honest men made idle through necessity a sour accidie of spirit, more dangerous to the country's morale than to its purse. It seems to be true from the experience of all ages that it is better for men to be engaged even in unproductive labor than to be altogether idle, and statesmen and industrial leaders might well employ themselves in having in reserve schemes of public work for those who are by the uncertainties of modern industry thrown unexpectedly out of employment. It may also be the case that the disgust ever found associated with this sin has its physical and physiological counterparts, and so Bishop Martensen recommends dietetics, regular work, mixing with our fellow men, and delight in nature as a cure. Even the body has its rights, and there is something wrong when a man like Saint Bernard speaks of it contemptuously as "his brother the ass." We are told by the medieval

writers that this sin attacked monks with restless disgust as they waited for their meager mid-day meal, and there can be little doubt that in many cases it was largely physical, and needed bodily rather than spiritual treatment.

The main object of this paper is not to appraise the medieval treatment of this sin—that has often been done—but to approach it from the scriptural side to see if any light can thus be thrown upon it, and if we can determine whether the sin, like the word, is out of date. I have accordingly examined the ten usages of the word in the Septuagint—it is not found in the New Testament—and arranged the matter for convenience under the following heads, reminding the reader that the word had not yet become fixed or technical in meaning.

I. We have first what may be called *academic or sapiential accidie*. In Sirach 6. 18-37 the young student is warned against initial discouragement in his pursuit of wisdom. At first she puts fetters on the feet and a chain about the neck and a burden on the shoulder, but he is not to be “accidized” by her bonds, for at last she brings rest and gladness and strength, a robe of glory and a riband of blue. In a well-known modern series of popular books—The Peoples’ Libraries—we are told that “not only is it possible to have learning without tears, but it is also possible to make the acquiring of knowledge a thrilling and entertaining adventure.” Let us hope that this is true, although to many students, not only at the outset but in the course of learning, it is difficult to realize. To them it appears as true as the amiable legend over the dentist’s shop—“Painless extraction of teeth.” It may be that divine philosophy is charming and a perpetual feast of nectared sweets where no crude surfeit reigns, or that the path of duty, which is practical wisdom, leads at last to the shining tablelands, as Milton and Tennyson remind us, but that is rather an achievement at the end than an initial axiom. Perhaps Sirach’s way is the safest and the sanest in the long run, namely, to remind the seeker after wisdom to be on his guard from the start against the inevitable slough of accidie through which the road of truth and duty goes on its way to its glorious goal. The promise of a wisdom without tears, or an everlasting entertainment, lacks in many appeal and disappoints because it is not in accordance with experience. It tends to make accidie not only an epidemic but an endemic malady.

It is reported of Martin Luther that as a young monk he declared to his teacher that he was worn out with his studies and austerities and likely to die. “What good then is it to go on?” and the wise teacher said:

"Martin, Martin, there is great need of learned doctors up in heaven." Literature is full of this academic accidie from the old preacher's saying: "Of making many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness to the flesh," to Goethe's

"Ach Gott, die Kunst ist lang,
Und kurz ist unser Leben,
Mir wird bei meinem kritischen Bestreben
Doch oft um Kopf und Busen bang."

Many try to escape this accidie as Omar Khayyam did. He had attended all the schools of philosophy to no purpose. He came out by the same door as he went in, and so he tried pleasure and forgetfulness of life's seriousness. Sirach 22: 13 knows this and he warns the student against it. In pictorial form, the result of deserting wisdom has been portrayed for us by a young artist, Franklin C. Watkins, in the first prize picture of this year's International Art Exhibition, "Suicide in Costume," considered by the judges a true expression of this widespread weariness—this suicidal accidie of pleasure. Opinions may vary as to its artistic merits, but one requires no technical training to appreciate the moral significance of this somber picture. Gruesomely sprawled upon the table, in motley garb, lies the dead clown, limbs grotesquely distorted, clutching the still smoking pistol—last refuge of the disillusioned fool. Behind him are the toy trumpet and the empty glass, emblems of fame and indulgence. Both have failed. The accidie of wisdom can be cured not by deserting wisdom, but, as Bacon said, by drinking deeper at its sacred streams. Nobler souls take the road of agnostic pessimism and this leads to quietism and despair. Have we forgotten that this world is a vale of soul-making and life a noble probation? A recent writer has paradoxically stated that "it is the purpose of education not to prepare children for their occupations but to prepare them against their occupations." Man is greater than his business and man's greatness consists in character. Dr. Abraham Flexner has just written a scathing indictment of adhocism in education. If we are to save the soul of our generation from academic accidie, which falsely finds refuge in pleasure or pessimism, we must, it seems, get back our faith in truth and duty—recapture the infinite horizons and let our restless hearts find rest in God, the home of goodness and the guardian of truth, not by deserting wisdom, but, as Sirach tells us, by pursuing her and making her our own. "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom and the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding."

II. Besides academic accidie there is also mentioned by Sirach (29: 5) the

accidie of the exchange—the accidie which comes to the man who lives on borrowed money and who spends what he has not earned. When the day of reckoning comes and he cannot pay, then comes sorrow. Micawber has expressed the philosophy of this in a well-known sentence: "Annual income, twenty pounds; annual expenditure, nineteen, nineteen, six; result, happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure, twenty pounds, nought and six; result, misery. The blossom is blighted, the leaf is withered, the god of day goes down upon the dreary scene, and—and, in short, you are forever floored. As I am." It is extremely difficult for simple men to understand or to justify a social system which makes it possible for clever men to get rich in a day by speculation when good men with hard labor can scarcely get the necessities of life. Such a system tends to breed accidie in the body politic. Not long ago a young man said to his minister: "Since finishing high school I can get nothing to do. Only crooks and gangsters can flourish. Why should I not follow their example?" Of course he was wrong, but there is not a little of this temper abroad. It is to the credit of Sirach that he counsels us to exercise charity and mercy even if we have been defrauded—and his advice to live within our means is the fundamental axiom of political economy which we can not violate without disaster.

III. Lastly, there is the accidie due to the evident slowness of righteousness, the seeming victory of evil. After the war we were looking for the millennium. It looks as if we had been deceived by a mirage—and so we have the weariness of spirit due to disillusionment and seeming futility. Of the ten references to accidie in the Bible, no less than six of them refer to this futility. It is an infirmity of noble minds and presupposes faith in God. Luther knew it well, but he fought it with prayer and ink bottles and anything else that was ready to his hand, and he prevailed.

IV. The passage in Isaiah 61: 3 which our Lord took as his first text in Nazareth has in it the sentence—"the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness." Curiously enough this was the phrase that historically had most influence on the development of the idea of accidie. "The spirit of accidie" passed into the ethical language of the church. Cassian equates it with the "destruction that wasteth at noon-day" (Ps. 91: 6). The "*demonium meridianum*"—the noon-day demon which attacked monks with disgust and restlessness before their mid-day meal. But "they are as sick that surfeit with too much as they that starve with nothing"—and a serious problem for our age is the sublimation of the sin of accidie—which characterizes those who have too much food and too much leisure

and no purpose in life. Obviously the rich and leisured need a cure for accidie just as did the poor medieval monks. We see it in the ennui which Carlyle scathingly denounced—"If you could mount to the stars and do yacht voyages under the belt of Jupiter or stalk deer on the mug of Saturn it would still beguile you."

Paul Bourget has further allegorized the phrase in a book which he calls *Le Demon du Midi*, maintaining that middle life is subject, in a peculiar way, to this sin—lack of enthusiasm for goodness—love of ease—loss of passion for truth and right, and Tennyson, in *Gareth and Lynette*, seems to agree with him. It may be so, and yet Hermas, in his *Pastor*, associates this rather with senility than with mid-life, and says it was prevalent in the church of his day—a sign of premature decay. The truth seems to be that it is found at every stage of life. The minister who becomes discontented with his business, who thinks his own parish hopeless, may be suffering from this disease in a sublimated form. The restless fretfulness, the sullen revolt against one's lot, is not always the divine discontent of the poet. Perhaps the worst form of ministerial accidie is this—which goes clean contrary to Paul's "This one thing I do" and does everything except that which ought to be done—a hectic activity doing nothing in particular, keeping other people's vineyards and neglecting one's own. Time for everything except what we are specifically here to do—"As thy servant was busy here and there, behold he was gone."

If Mr. Saintsbury is right in tracing the essence of this sin to discontentedness, there is much evidence that it is by no means dead. Now this same writer reminds us that the opposite of it is the mood of the writer of the 23d Psalm—a cheerful faith in God, and surely the prevailing temper of the New Testament is gladness. Hermas characterizes the Holy Spirit as hilarious, and while there is what Mr. Gladstone called evangelical sadness—that is not incompatible with evangelical gladness. The one is the variable weather—the other the climate of the Christian faith.

A sad and sullen and discontented world—sad even in its gaiety and discontented in its successes—needs nothing more than it needs this climate in which accidie—"the foul and lazy mist within the soul" vanishes and disappears. The word accidie is dead, but the thing itself still persists, and it can perish only as the soul becomes alive to God and the common life of man becomes obedient to his eternal laws of righteousness and love. This is not a matter of temperament but of faith—a faith that can turn our grief into a gospel, and stretch a hand through time to grasp the far-off interest of tears.

Recent Arrivals on My Shelves

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

ONE of Walter Bagehot's *Literary Studies* is devoted to Edward Gibbon. This essay contains the following rather delightful morsel: "In early life there is an opinion that the obvious thing to do with a horse is to ride it; of a cake to eat it; of sixpence to spend it: a few boys carry this further and think the obviously natural thing to do with a book is to read it." Bagehot evidently did not think very highly of the inhabitants of the United States in this regard, for in the same essay he says: "Catch an American at thirty; tell him about the battle of Marathon; what will he be able to comprehend of all that you mean by it, of all that halo which early impression and years of remembrance have cast around it? . . . He may say, 'Well, sir, perhaps it was a smart thing in that small country; but it is a long time ago, and in my country James K. Burnup' did that, which he will at length explain to you." Doubtless it is good for us to read this sort of thing once in a while. After all, Walter Bagehot might have been prophesying the advent of that assured and complacent ignorance which regards history as "bunk." On the other hand, this republic has not been without a masterful and distinguished tradition in the appreciation of history and of letters. And at no time has this line been represented by men of vaster erudition and of more penetrating critical powers than we now possess in Professor Irving Babbitt and Dr. Paul Elmer More. When one passes from mordant and masterful critics like Arthur Clutton Brock and C. E. Montague to Professor Babbitt and Doctor More one leaves two brilliant and polished writers with no end of keen thoughts for two masters of literary dialectic who move in a region of erudition and analysis on a definitely higher altitude.

I

One day last spring I was having lunch with Professor Babbitt at his home near Harvard Yard. The talk had been moving about the centuries in a fashion which is very natural with the dean of American criticism. At length my host began speaking with warm appreciation of a recent book by Professor G. R. Elliott, of Amherst College, dealing with *The Cycle of Modern Poetry*. This volume is published on the other side of the Atlantic by the Oxford University Press and on this side by the Princeton University Press. A recommendation from Professor Babbitt comes to a good many of us rather as a command and so I was soon in possession of

The Cycle of Modern Poetry. One quickly becomes aware in reading Professor Elliott's book that he regards the great romantic impulse which rose in the latter part of the eighteenth century and culminated in the nineteenth as "now pretty much exhausted." He accepts the distinction expressed by Matthew Arnold in the words, "Man must begin, know this, where nature ends." And he is ready to lift the question as to whether we are not willing, after our pursuing the possibilities of naturalistic romanticism into every aspect of experience, now to go back to the sagacious humanism of Milton, thus rounding out the cycle and coming once more on a new level of experience to sanctions and to values by means of which we may move forward to new achievement. The volume deals in particular with Shelley and his solitude, with Byron and his relation to the comic spirit, with the nature of the real tragedy of Keats, with the lyric melancholy of Arnold, with the gentle shades of Longfellow, with the Whitmanism of Browning, with Thomas Hardy and his spectral etching, with Robert Frost and his neighborly humor, and with the relation of Milton to the present state of poetry. These very subjects suggest that a clear and brave mind has here attacked the tasks of criticism. You must be prepared for many quick and understanding flashes of insight, as when we are told that Byron lacked the subtlety of imagination which gleams in Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats, and Coleridge. "They were penetrated by the Romantic mood, and he was merely cloaked in it. It made him swagger because it fitted him imperfectly" (page 29). You get at the very heart of Professor Elliott's position when he pictures "Keats swaying between Wordsworth and Milton, unable to follow either, caught between the current humanitarianism, which his critical instinct was very suspicious of, and the true humanism, which he did not imaginatively comprehend" (page 54). One is glad to have an ironic word spoken of the contemporary poets who "are smugly drawing their inspirations from the spent naturalism of the last century" (page 79). There is something very masterful about the fashion in which Robert Frost's poetry is described as "freed from the overstrained wonder of a hundred years" (page 115). "Nor does he seek the social mud, like those post-Shelleyan writers who, unable to fly, are determined to crawl, because they will not learn how to walk" (page 118). Even those who do not agree with the critic will find food for thought in his words: "His (Wordsworth's) sense of traveling on a highway, when he is actually on a byway, accounts for the strain of false grandiloquence in his style" (page 151). On the other hand, Milton's "grand style is the vesture of a certain grand conviction" (page 158). Over

against this put "our conceited effort to be at home in chaos" (page 174). We have learned how to describe "a slimy, squirming tangle of appetites" and to produce a "superb moving picture nightmare of subconscious desires" (page 189). At least some of our writers have done this. But we need to be recalled, as we are recalled, by "our two chief critical thinkers since Arnold, Irving Babbitt, and Paul Elmer More" to "the region where the moral intellect and the imagination are deeply at one" (page 175). Most serious readers will feel that there is more to say in a positive way for Wordsworth and Browning than has been said by Professor Elliott. But after all qualifications as to some of his positions have been established it continues to be possible to acknowledge that he has conducted a process of critical thought of fundamental significance for our time. And his pages fairly glitter with sentences glowing with understanding and rich with slowly gathered knowledge.

II

Stuart P. Sherman's famous volume of criticism, *On Contemporary Literature*, was reprinted for the sixth time in March of 1931. A feeling of sadness comes over the reader as he looks at the dedication, "To Paul Elmer More," and finds his way back to the year 1917, when the book was first published, when Sherman was fighting shoulder to shoulder with Babbitt and More in the cause of critical humanism, and when he had not yet made the great surrender. We would be willing to have wiped out the years when, caught in the swirl of lawless waters, he moved dizzily with the current. Once he had possessed a rudder ready for use in just such wild seas. But the rudder he had thrown away. It is good to go back to the earlier days when vital standards dominated his mind and guided his pen. It was then that he wrote such masterful and potent criticism as is found in the volume, *On Contemporary Literature*. Sherman too had felt the power of Matthew Arnold's words. For he quotes on the title page of the book the memorable sentence, "Man must begin, know this, where nature ends." He had lighted his torch at the same fire which later was to share its flame with Professor G. R. Elliott. Very revealing are his words in the introduction: "The great revolutionary task of nineteenth century thinkers, to speak it briefly, was to put man into nature. The great task of twentieth century thinkers is to get him out again—somehow to break the spell of those magically seductive cries: 'Follow nature,' 'Trust your instincts,' 'Back to nature.' We have trusted our instincts long enough to sound the depths of their treacherousness" (page 10). When Sherman begins to deal

with particular writers his mind moves with remarkable steadiness and quiet assurance. "Mark Twain does not give us much help toward realizing our best selves; but he is a rock of refuge when the ordinary self—'the divine average'—is in danger" (page 44). When he comes to H. G. Wells he is astonished that this clever man should fail to see the absurdity of clamoring for order, measure, and control in the external world while reserving a silly sentimental yet tremendously destructive anarchy in the heart" (page 73). "Mr. Wells has invented his God, but he has not yet invented his righteousness" (page 82). Professor Sherman dealt with tremendous severity with the "barbaric naturalism of Theodore Dreiser." "He has deliberately rejected the novelist's supreme task—understanding and presenting the development of character; he has chosen only to illustrate the unrestricted flow of temperament" (page 94). Of one of the characters of Dreiser representing the author's own attitude Sherman says: "He acquires naught from his experiences but sensations" (page 99). "A naturalistic novel is a representation based upon a theory of animal behavior. Since a theory of animal behavior can never be an adequate basis for a representation of the life of man in contemporary society, such a representation is an artistic blunder" (page 101). In the discussion of Henry James one comes upon this telling passage: "Precisely because he keeps mere carnality out of his picture, holds passion rigorously under stress, presents the interior of a refined consciousness—precisely for these reasons he can produce a more intense pleasure in the reader by the representation of a momentary gush of tears or a single swift embrace than most of our contemporaries can produce with chapter after chapter of storms and seductions" (page 249). Writing of George Meredith, he says: "Civilization implies for him the emancipation of human conduct from nonrational controls" (page 279). Light is thrown upon many matters old and contemporary by this passage: "The philosophical mind of Shakespeare's age began the work of reflection by cleaving the universe along three levels. On the lowest is the natural world, which is the plane of instinct, appetite, animality, lust, the animal passions or affections; on this level the regulation is by necessary or natural law. On the middle level is the human world, which is regulated and, in a sense, created by the will and knowledge of man, working upon the natural world, but governed by reason, the special human faculty, and illuminated more or less from the level above. On the third level is the supernatural world, which is the plane of spiritual beings, and the home of eternal ideas" (page 294). It is safe to say that this volume of penetrating criticism will be taken seriously long

after some of the later writing of Professor Sherman is remembered only as it throws light upon the aberrations of a powerful mind.

III

Gorham Munson is definitely on the side of the angels. He has read omnivorously. He has thought prodigiously. He rushes about striking out vigorously and sometimes wildly. It would be too much to claim that he has a clear and easy and firm grasp of his materials. He is capable of rather stultifying self-contradiction. But in all this he is representative of an age where there is more sincerity than intellectual discipline, and more good intention than potent and fundamental thought. And all the while Mr. Munson is busy making a map of the great continent of the mind. He has flashes of uncanny understanding. If he lives long enough his whole mind may become civilized. If he sometimes embarrasses his friends, much more often he brings alarm to his enemies. And his friends, of course, are the great humanists who are finding their way out of the morasses of naturalism to the tablelands of a free and disciplined life. His book, *The Dilemma of the Liberated*, is of very great significance for anyone who wants to understand that critical humanism which is going forth to such stout and vigorous battling all over the world. If he does not always use all the materials with complete command of their meaning he does know where almost all the important materials are to be found. With a sure insight he goes back to the Oration on the Dignity of Man, by Pico della Mirandola, for sentences which have the very essence of critical humanism in them: "Thou shalt have power to decline unto the lower or brute creatures. Thou shalt have power to be reborn unto the higher or divine according to the sentence of thy intellect" (page 12). With unhesitating zest he probes to the heart of our present dilemma: "We are held together not by a grand ideal which is both social and individualistic, but by a number of pseudo-ideals winning mass acceptance" (page 23). He describes in vivid and energetic phrases the new battle of the books which is waging between the followers of Professor Irving Babbitt and Dr. Paul Elmer More and the bright and facile critics of the flux. In a very significant chapter he gives an account of the classical revival abroad and then he enters upon an earnest discussion of the humanism which he advocates. He has flashes of very acute perception, as when he accounts for the acrimonious attacks upon critical humanism as coming "because American Humanism dares to question the unconscious assumptions of our age" (page 165). Criticizing certain liberals, he says: "They were never asked to

revolutionize and reform the inside of their own minds, or to ponder what, if any, the relation might be between political self-government and individual self-government" (page 246). He puts our problem in one rather terrible sentence: "We know or shall know all the existing ideas and there is not a comprehensive regenerating idea in the ensemble" (page 299). Mr. Gorham is all the while seeing depths below depths, and in the midst of his flashes of bright understanding you are all the while coming on what we may paradoxically call flashes of darkness. But there is something not unlike a rush of air from the mountains in his determination to face all of life honestly and to listen to those voices which call for permanent principles in the midst of the dissolving experiences of the passing years.

IV

The men who come to life not with standards but with a vast and varied genius of understanding are, of course, all the while having their say. And work of this sort is done with distinction and skill by Joseph Wood Krutch in his volume of biographical criticism, *Five Masters*. He writes of Boccaccio, Cervantes, Richardson, Stendhal, and Proust. The fleshly aspects of the experience and writing of Boccaccio he describes and interprets with skill and understanding. But he moves rather like a blind man in the dark whenever he comes to speak of his deeper ethical or spiritual experiences. In their presence he has only the rubber-stamp phrases of depreciation with which the spiritual is described by those who always look upon it from without and never from within. Probably the best work done in the volume is found in the section on Cervantes. And here, indeed, we do meet with the world of standards. "Humanism, the name which we give to the most characteristic philosophy of the Renaissance, during its period of highest development was not, essentially, either the revival of classical learning or that materialistic skepticism with both of which it has been identified, but rather an attempt to realize the implications of the fact that life is led upon two planes—the human and the natural—which intersect but do not coincide. It attempted to determine where the assumption that man is merely a shrewder sort of animal was fruitful and where it was not, and 'Don Quixote' is a statement of this problem in comic terms" (pages 95 and 96). "Thus the quixoticism of Don Quixote is more than mere chivalry and more than a generous folly in dealing with persons or events. It is the expression of a faith in the power of the human being to create values by virtue of his faith in them, and to generate a world above the world of nature in which his human, as opposed to his

natural life, may be led" (page 96). Here Mr. Krutch is bringing in principles which in our own time have been vigorously advocated by critical humanists because they help to explain the achievement of Cervantes. But he by no means sails under these high authorities himself. When he comes to Stendhal and Proust he accepts them upon their own terms and does not judge them by any humanistic standards. He is never more subtle than in following the strange processes of the mind and art of Marcel Proust. You feel that he is allowing this exotic and brilliant mystic of the senses to speak for himself. If Mr. Krutch cannot compass the imaginative sympathy which would understand the life of ethical spirituality from within he is quite capable of that weird feat of intellectual sympathy which makes the very psychological (should one say psychopathic?) experiences of Marcel Proust his own. No doubt the sort of understanding which Mr. Krutch brings to his work represents a definite achievement, even if we find it odd that it is easier for him to comprehend Proust's artistic interest in homosexuality than the influence of ethical religion upon the later years of Boccaccio. But at its best the criticism of understanding does not become quite first class unless it rises to the level of the criticism of judgment. "Ours is a lost cause and there is no place for us in the natural universe," Mr. Krutch has told us in that famous book, *The Modern Temper* (page 249). You need to have this sentence in mind when you read Mr. Krutch's utterances as a literary critic. If standards themselves are an illusion you may expect the critic to be a mirror. You can scarcely expect him to be a judge.

V

In the year 1931 Mr. Gamaliel Bradford published *The Quick and the Dead*, another of his series of biographical studies. He likes to call his interpretations of personality exercises in psychography. It is a rather ugly word for a delicate and penetrating and graceful form of criticism. But if Mr. Bradford likes the word he is surely welcome to it. I think I have read fifteen of Mr. Bradford's books. And I keep going back to them again and again. I suppose he regards Sainte Beuve as his master, and while he has no such clairvoyant perception as the great French critic sometimes exercises, and not at all Sainte Beuve's subtle capacity to see experiences most foreign to his own character from within, it remains true that Mr. Bradford has done work which gives him a place all his own among us, and work which confers honor upon the republic of which he is a citizen.

In *The Quick and the Dead* Mr. Bradford deals with "The Fury of

Living: Theodore Roosevelt"; "Brains Win and Lose: Woodrow Wilson"; "Let There Be Light: Thomas Alva Edison"; "The Wheel of Fortune: Henry Ford"; "The World as Idea: Nikolai Lenin"; "The World as Will: Benito Mussolini"; and "The Genius of the Average: Calvin Coolidge." Mr. Bradford is always vivid and vital. Speaking of Roosevelt, he says: "When his father warned him in his childhood that his delicacy of physique would betray him if he did not discipline himself, he answered through set teeth, 'I'll make my body,' and he made it one of the most superb instruments that a human will could have" (page 5). There is a wealth of understanding in such a sentence as this, also written of Roosevelt: "He killed mosquitoes as if they were lions, and lions as if they were mosquitoes" (page 24). In the chapter on Woodrow Wilson, the President is quoted as saying: "It is no compliment to me to have it said that I am a 'great intellectual machine.' Good Heavens, is there no more in me than that? I want people to love me—but I suppose they never will!" And Mr. Bradford comments acutely: "Yet, what strikes me is that all the emphasis is on being loved, not on loving. The truth is that these great people who do great things are too absorbed to waste much life on loving" (page 63). A part of Mr. Bradford's power lies in his capacity for brilliant and understanding quotation, as when he uses regarding Wilson the President's own words: "A man may be defeated by his own secondary successes" (page 78). This same power to unearth the defining word of some other student of men and to quote it at just the right moment is seen in the phrase of Dean Marquis which Mr. Bradford introduces into his study of Henry Ford: "He has in him the makings of a great man, the parts lying about in more or less disorder. If only Henry Ford were properly assembled!" (page 147). We find in these studies a keen eye for a man's most significant achievements: "But undoubtedly the climax of his (Lenin's) human triumph was the making of elements so antagonistic as Stalin and Trotzky act together in harmony, so long as he led them, though they split and severed as soon as his control was taken away" (page 164). You feel a kind of astonishment at such penetrating flashes as this: "But God is in the other world. In this world is Mussolini, and Mussolini is almost the whole of it" (page 212). And one can scarcely forget this passage regarding Calvin Coolidge: "I have long studied the photographic portrayals of Coolidge's face, though I have never seen the reality. Even with the utmost sympathy of contemplation it is hard to find power in it. There is no suggestion of quick and eager response. It is a pinched, drawn face, certainly not hard, but anxious, the face of a man

perpetually confronted by a problem a little too big for him" (page 225). Altogether Mr. Bradford is one of the contemporary writers who bear their own credentials to anyone who really wants to study human nature. He is meticulously careful. He thinks and thinks and thinks about the material which he so carefully gathers. If there is a touch of unconscious cynicism and sometimes a touch of scarcely disguised malice, these things need not disturb the fascinated reader. Because Mr. Bradford helps him in some ways it does not follow that he serves his needs in every way. Mr. Bradford is a cultivated gentleman who does not quite believe in the heights of life. It would be rather terrible to have him write about Saint Francis. But away from the heights he has a mastery all his own.

VI

Long ago I capitulated to the spell of Dr. Gaius Glenn Atkins. The subtle richness of his mind, the cool, quiet strength of his analysis, the low lovely music of sentences whose cadences are the creation of disciplined art, his easy movement about the ages from whose vast harvest fields he comes bringing his sheaves with him—all this and much more led me captive to a mind which has given new distinction to the American pulpit. There must be untold numbers of ministers whose whole life has been made a more gracious experience by Doctor Atkins' books. It should be said at once that his *Life of Cardinal Newman* is full of memorable observations. "Oxford has always educated her sons not so much by formal process as by the give and take of inquiring and challenging minds" (page 31). "Newman says he himself could not get on well with superiors—one of the few windows he opened to let us see deep into his peculiar temperament" (pages 228-229). "He (Newman) is always at issue with an unseen adversary" (page 247). "His (Newman's) aloofness from the world saved him from getting caught in petty concerns—his essential interest is in the timeless" (page 257). "And yet the preacher who could thus make a Platonic music of words could make a fog of them as well and empty them of every meaning which makes them a trustworthy medium of shared experience, when it suited his purpose" (page 264). "He (Newman) had also the strange introverted pride of the humble" (page 279). "He possessed the most precious and perilous of gifts, a birthright citizenship in the realm of the ideal, a golden gift with words, an imagination to walk with hidden presences and bring back mystic reports of the unseen" (page 283). Doctor Atkins came to the interpretation of Newman with a ripe and exquisitely sensitive mind. His work is done with great

industry and thorough care. He has written with honesty and often with noble distinction. He understands the sacramental view of life too well to please bitterly belligerent Protestants. He has such sternly uncompromising stuff in his fiber as a Protestant that his writing is sure not to satisfy Catholics. The combination is unusual enough in a biographer of such a character as Newman. And so the book itself will always have its own place among the studies of a great and baffling personality. Perhaps one may be allowed to regret that for about eight chapters of the book he did not allow Newman to appear according to the genius of his strange and glamorous individuality, so that the evasive and potent figure which gave such haunting quality to the pulpit of Saint Mary's might have stood once more in the memorable silvery gray of the gracious shadows cast by other days. Then in the last two chapters the brilliant and striking analysis of the limitations of Newman might have found place. Doctor Atkins has such rare gifts as a painter of portraits of men's spirits that in this instance it is a little disconcerting to find the artistry of the portrait broken by the cross lights of deft and skillful criticism.

VII

Jacques Maritain is professor of modern history and philosophy at the Institut Catholique of Paris. He was once a student of Bergson and now is one of the leaders of the amazingly vital Neo-Thomist movement. His recent book, *The Angelic Doctor*, deals, of course, with Saint Thomas Aquinas. But in one way or another it turns out to be a profound study of the mental and spiritual life of the contemporary world. He feels that we must learn to appraise "the world and the present moment in the light of eternal truths" (page viii). He is interested in finding a "Humanism of the Incarnation" (page 51). With deep understanding he says: "Man cannot find his unity in himself; he finds it outside himself, above himself. It was his determination to be self-sufficient which ruined him" (pages 71 and 72). "The love of humanity without God could not end otherwise than in a state in which the last resource of everyone is merely self-worship or suicide" (page 77). Speaking of our time, he says that its "great distress is that it has forgotton the union of the intellectual and the spiritual life," and he adds that its "most profound need, more or less obscurely felt, is to recover such a union" (page 141). The picture of Saint Thomas is full of a kind of tender understanding. And all the while one feels that whenever Jacques Maritain is speaking of those fundamental matters upon which the whole Church of Christ—Greek, Latin, Lutheran, Anglican, and

all the Free Churches—have a right to agree, he expresses himself with indubitable intellectual potency and moral and spiritual vigor. The fact that he expresses his own loyalties in the terms of the Latin Communion ought not to blind the reader to the superb power with which he sets forth the claims of spiritual religion in a secular world. Even more emphatically this observation must be made of his little book, *The Things That Are Not Cæsar's*. Read as a brilliant exposition of the supremacy of the spiritual the book is seen to combine a confident energy with a very effective dialectic. When Jacques Maritain fastens all this to an unhesitating and thoroughgoing declaration of the finality of the authority of the Pope, of course we do not go with him. And it is quite possible to appreciate the striking power with which he sets forth the finality of the spiritual without at all following him as to the relation of that authority to the head of the Latin Communion. "The only salvation," he says, "is in the whole truth" (page 68). "God is the leader of history; the common task is merely to prepare the way, each of us doing his duty to the best of his ability, in the first place by raising his mind and heart to the height of the whole truth" (page 72). He feels that "a stern contest is being waged on the frontiers of the mind and art and philosophy." The operation of grace is preparing great things "in a youth stirred by a yearning for the absolute, the more ardent of whom are turning to-day to God" (page 115). We must save youth from a situation in which it finds itself "strolling in its own humanity as in a museum: it sees its heart in the show-cases" (page 102). Jacques Maritain is writing about one tense experience in France and he is writing as a member of a communion many of whose assumptions are impossible to a large part of the Christian world. But his passionate advocacy of the supremacy of the spiritual, his trumpet-like assertion of the fact that our first duty is to God, has meaning for all of us. But where he puts the masterful figure of an historical personage in Rome we would put the mighty spiritual presence of the Living Christ.

VIII

No end of travelers spending a little time at Hotel Frontenac, and looking down from the heights upon the city below, must have tried to reproduce in fancy, with the aid of such historical knowledge as they possessed, the life of the early days of this fascinating town, which is so like a bit of Europe tossed across the Atlantic and lodged on a rock above the Saint Lawrence River. The end of the seventeenth century and the earlier years of the eighteenth century caught the interest of that distin-

guished writer, Willa Cather. Already, in *Death Comes for the Archbishop*, she had shown what she could do for the Southwest. Now, in *Shadows on the Rock*, she has set about capturing some subtle magic which belonged to the life of the Northeast as it unfolded long ago in the town above the majestic river. You learn a great deal about the far-off community—a bit of France in the new world. You have striking pictures of historic characters as they move across the old landscape or, to use the figure which gives a title to the book, as their shadows fall upon the rock. The remarkable thing about the book is the fashion in which permanent values emerge as you look upon an old bit of life with the insight of distance and the understanding of brooding contemplation. The style has a simple and yet gracious beauty. There is a spiritual stillness like the deep calm of a starlit night after a day of fierce heat and roaring tempest. The spiritual serenity of the book is perhaps its outstanding quality. It is frank enough about dark and bitter evils. But you see all this from some deep center of stillness full of the serenity of human kindness and the grace of God. To turn to this book with its disciplined beauty from the staccato energy of a good deal of contemporary writing is like going from the sunburnt and dust-drenched street of a hot and restless city into the still and quiet and aspiring loveliness of a Gothic cathedral. After a while you come back to the hot and disillusioning street. But you come with a fountain of spiritual beauty playing in your heart.

IX

There is always some sort of tension and strain about the tale told by the Honorable Evan Charteris, K. C., in *The Life and Letters of Sir Edmund Gosse*. There is the strange conflict of temperament and conviction between Gosse and his father already given something like immortality in that much discussed book, *Father and Son*. There are all the tugging energies of a sensitive and responsive spirit whose achievement lay rather in the quality of surface it exposed to experience and in its subtly skillful capacity to record whatever it felt than in some deep intuition into life's meaning and some profound commitment to great sanctions. There was a period too when the reputation of Gosse ran ahead of his actual accomplishment, and the period of bitter suffering which came when somewhat roughly the public was introduced to the limitations of this rather dazzling person was intense enough. So the tale fairly quivers with all sorts of emotional responses delicate and sometimes deep. Gosse knew pretty much everybody who had any sort of literary fame and a good

many of the mighty in the fields outside *belles-lettres*. The book is a kind of rosary of great names. In this sense Gosse enjoyed counting his beads. There is something bright and clever on every page. The keen edge of wit often has a self-conscious, restrained vanity, which you forgive for its thrust, its gusto, and the penetrating flash of it. Of course, when Gosse said farewell to fanaticism he also said farewell to some of life's deepest experiences. Finding a nasty insect eating out the heart of a beautiful lily, he determined to destroy the insect, and unknowingly destroyed the lily too. His life was full of gracious, beautiful and lovely things, amid which there was a golden key which he had lost. Perhaps the real tragedy is that he never missed the key and never knew the beauty which lay beyond the doors which were closed to him.

X

And now I have only space to say a little of a most delightful book. Dr. Richard Roberts has made a place specifically his own among the minds at work on this continent. His deep and brooding spirituality and his disciplined subtlety of perception have made him a sort of spiritual director to a good many people who would be very lonely without his guidance. In Canada, in the United States, and in England, there are men and women whose faces brighten at the mention of his name. Recently he gave a series of lectures at Union Theological Seminary in New York City which have been published under the title, *The Preacher as Man of Letters*. Anybody who has it in him to love books—preacher or layman—will read this book with happy relish. Doctor Roberts has a style which is his own, but which no end of masters have had a hand in whipping into form. The literary loves of a lifetime are allowed to become articulate in this little volume. Wise and memorable sentences fall easily from the author's lips. The hours when he has been alone with great books, the hours when he has been alone with seminal ideas, release their treasure and something which comes from the long and rich silence of the mind as well as something which has coiled about the mystery of printed words passes freshly and vividly into the reader's thought.

Surely the reader of these words of mine is ready to pass from the discussion of books to the books themselves. The door of the library is open. The books are waiting. And though the best of them are stern old aristocrats they will unbend and tell great and memorable secrets to those who approach them with the humility and the good manners of those who are really ready to care for beauty and truth.

The Given and Its Critics

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EVERY theory must be based on experience, yet must also somehow transform and transcend it; and so with religious faith. Experience is a mixture of good and evil. Faith declares that God is absolutely good. Whence, then, the evil? How is it related to the will of God? To human will? To human thought about God? To redemption and worship?

With such questions in my mind I have written *The Problem of God* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1930; hereafter referred to as PG) and *The Finding of God* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1931; FG). The first book was a philosophical defense of a new idea of God, written in a popular style. The second, more practical and religious in aim, sought to show some of the ways in which God could be found in our experience and then to consider what kind of God is actually found. The more empirical approach of the second book increases my confidence in the theory proposed in the first.

What, then, is this new idea of God? As stated in PG (p. 113) it is:

God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, and supremely creative, yet limited both by the free choices of other persons and by restrictions within his own nature.

The new factor here, obviously, is the statement that God is limited by restrictions within his own nature. These restrictions I call The Given. In PG (same page) The Given is said to be "something which makes the effort and pain of life necessary"; "a passive element which enters into every one of (God's) conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem for him." At present I prefer to enlarge the meaning of The Given, so that it includes all that is eternal and uncreated in the divine nature, other than the actual will of God. As I now use the term, The Given includes both the "passive element" referred to above and also the eternal divine reason, with its principles of truth, beauty, and goodness. The Given is thus both eternal content and eternal form. The Divine Personality consists of The Given and of Creative Will which acts under the conditions set by The Given. Leibnitz speaks of "the eternal truths which are in the understanding of God independently of his will"; these truths are eternally given. To Leibnitz's eternal truths, I add an eternal subject matter within the divine consciousness which is equally inde-

pendent of his will. The Divine Will does not work in a vacuum; rather, the Divine Will acts according to reason on the subject matter furnished by the Divine Nature.

God, thus conceived, I have called finite; more explicitly (in FG), The Finite Controller of The Given. This terminology may be criticized. But it was intended to direct thought toward the problem. Judging by the discussions which have taken place, it has been successful in that respect.

Why should one think of God as finite? Why ascribe to him real struggles and real problems? Is he not omnipotent, so that he accomplishes his ends "lightly," like Pallas Athene in Homer? But omnipotence is, to say the least, no obvious trait of the power for good at work in experience. The Good Power seems to be fighting an Evil Power, God opposing Satan. Any realistic religion must give an account of the facts which led Plato to his dualism, the New Testament to its belief in the Devil and demons, Marcion to his break with the God of the Old Testament, and Schopenhauer to his atheistic pessimism. The ugly fact of evil is there, and no faith can deny it, nor does forgetting remove it. It is true that we can rightly ascribe moral evil to human freedom and to it alone; yet God created man. But natural evil cannot be wholly man's fault. The extra-human factors which delay or thwart the realization of what is ideally best must ultimately be ascribed to God in all detail—either to his will or to his nature. Tornadoes, earthquakes, tidal waves, volcanoes, idiocy, insanity, hysteria, cancer, infantile paralysis—all of these ills somehow come from God. Traditional theism has ascribed them to his will. I revolt against this as a hideous doctrine, and ascribe the evils not to his will, but to his struggle with The Given. They occur in spite of his will; but his will is adequate to extract value even from the most adverse possible circumstances.

What are the alternatives? In the presence of natural evil we may say one of three things. First, with traditional theism and absolutism, we may hold that there really is no (natural) evil, for all apparent evil is concealed good, meant for our benefit, or the benefit of unknown recipients, by the perfect, if inscrutable, divine. Secondly, we may go to the atheistic extreme, and say that there really is no God, for the universe is indifferent to values; to the atheist, both good and evil are inscrutable. Thirdly, we may assert that both evil and God are real, but that God's good will is supreme. Such is the theory I propose. The other alternatives seem to me to rest on selected facts and too much inscrutability. If we face all the facts, we are led to recognize the controlling power of reason and goodness in history and evolution, and also the tragic obstacles against which this power

contends. This Given must be within God himself, for if it were external to him, either its cause or its effects would have to be found within him. Dualism would be mere evasion. Natural evil is God's own inner problem.

Thus the ongoing of the universe is the ongoing of progressive reshaping of The Given by the Divine Creative Will. The fact that W. P. Montague in *Belief Unbound* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930) and R. A. Tsanoff in *The Nature of Evil* (New York: Macmillan, 1931) both simultaneously and independently presented views very similar to my own has tended to confirm me in my opinion, as has the agreement of many everyday lay Christians and working pastors.

But I have no desire to create the impression that there has been a widespread acceptance of my view. Far from it. Much criticism followed the publication of PG. I have welcomed it, because most of it has been in notably good temper, and much has been helpful. The few exceptions, an occasional peppery correspondent and the almost hysterical George W. Beiswanger (in *The Journal of Philosophy*, July 30, 1931), have helped me see myself in perspective. The classification of my extremely personalistic ideas with those of the impersonalist, H. N. Wieman, made by Dr. J. M. Versteeg and Professor Edwin Lewis, and repeated in a recent review in *Zion's Herald*, is, however, utterly unenlightening and unintelligible to me. The aim of the present essay is to consider some of the chief objections that have been raised in order to discover whether a better solution has been suggested. The objections mentioned will be drawn from reviews, books, correspondence, and conversations. All are bona fide criticisms, although the source will not always be mentioned.

First of all, there have been criticisms of the terminology employed. For instance, it has been said that The Given implies a Giver. This is, of course, merely verbal. By definition, The Given was not given by anyone or anything; it is eternal, uncreated, immediate fact in the divine nature. Similarly, the analogy of The Given with sensation has been criticized; since sensation comes from an external stimulus, Professor G. A. Wilson supposes that The Given must arise in like manner. But this is to miss the point of the analogy. Man's "Given" presupposes an external world. But if God is to be God, his Given controlled by his will explains the world. The content of The Given is analogous to sensation without its having an analogous cause.

A more fundamental objection is raised by those who, like R. T. Flewelling, J. S. Moore, and E. E. Aubrey, hold that the proposed theory is really no solution at all. Two grounds for this statement are alleged.

On the one hand, it is said that it merely transfers the problem to God; and on the other, that, if God controls The Given, he is just as responsible for evil as he is on the traditional view. Let us consider these in order. Does my theory merely transfer the problem to God? It finds struggle in experience and asserts struggle in God, truly; but the struggle in experience is not understood until it is seen in the light of the eternal unity of the Divine Personality. The struggle within that Personality has a control and a meaning that the random struggles of experience do not have. It is an interpreted struggle for universal good. The divine life must include all that we see, but it must mean more than we see; often The Given as we see it seems raging and uncontrolled, but my view asks us to believe that the control never fails. This leads to the second item. If God really controls then surely he is responsible, and my theory has not saved his character, as it hoped to do. I freely grant that God is always responsible, in the sense of being obligated by his own moral nature to find a solution for every problem; but it is not all clear to me that such responsibility means that he created the terms of the problem. If I am able to capture and control a bull in a china shop, it does not follow that I created the bull and broke the china. The control of The Given, does make God responsible for conserving values amidst the evils of life; but it does not in the least imply that he produced the evils. "If the control is a foregone conclusion," writes Professor Aubrey, "the struggle is artificial." But the control is not predestined or fated; it is conditioned on God's treating the struggle as real. And the outcome after struggle is not what it would have been had there been no struggle.

Dr. Douglas Horton, in *The Congregationalist*, raised the objection that my solution was not Christian. My theory, he said, makes the divine suffering necessary; Christianity makes God take it on himself freely. Yet a deeper view of Christianity, I believe, makes the cross both necessary and free. The Divine Nature is eternally such that without shedding of blood there is no remission of sins; this is a given fact. But the fact that God has to suffer (and that, whether man is redeemed or not) is not at all incompatible with his accepting suffering willingly out of his love for humanity. God was not free to escape suffering entirely; but he is free in his attitude of forgiving love.

Several critics are troubled because they fear that with a finite God the outcome of the universe is not guaranteed. Yet it seems pretty clear to me that we are all in the same boat here, whatever our theory may be. The outcome of the universe will be what it will be and no theory and

no faith can change it. I have as good right to believe that the Finite Controller will control as another has to believe that an unlimited God will control. The victory of value over disvalue is possible on either view; and no view can have the impossible guarantee of absolute proof about the eternal future. Here we are in the domain of rational faith, not of possible observation.

An objection arising from the heart of religion itself, and not from mere theory, is stated by Principal A. E. Garvie, in his review in *The Journal of Philosophical Studies*, and in substance by others. He says (and others agree with him) that "religious consciousness seems to me to demand a God perfect in power as well as in goodness." It is, I reply, possible that religious consciousness may, in some of its moods, want more than it can get; yet if religious experience unmistakably asserted omnipotence, that fact would give me pause. Surely, if religious experience is not a finding of God, we can hardly hope to find him at all. But is it really certain that experience testifies to omnipotence? For many Christians, the God of theology is an unknown quantity; their God is Christ, in Galilee and on Calvary. It is not far-fetched to ascribe perfect omnipotence to Jesus? Shall we say that those Christians who think of God in terms of Christ without supposing him to be omnipotent are religiously defective? More generally, can I not have a religious experience without being compelled to accept as part of that experience the proposition that God's power is the source as well as the overcomer of all natural evils? To me, at least, religious experience speaks no such voice. In fact, the more vividly I am conscious of the presence of a holy God who is adequate to meet all my needs, the more certain am I that his will does not voluntarily and freely originate all the evils of life. "Thy will be done" does not mean an endorsement of the *status quo* in the universe. If it does, then those are right who have urged that theism paralyzes endeavor.

Having thus stated the drift of most other criticisms, I should like to discuss in the remainder of this essay the positions taken by the two most significant thinkers who have taken the pains to treat my hypothesis in some detail. I refer, of course, to Dean Albert C. Knudson and Professor Edwin Lewis, whose scholarship and careful study of my thought entitle their criticisms to a most respectful hearing.

Dean Knudson discusses my view in *The Doctrine of God* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1930), chiefly in Chapter VII on "The Absoluteness of God." In that chapter he uses the word "absolute" to mean "the in-

dependent and self-existent cause or ground of a dependent world" (p. 245). While I hesitate to use the word "absolute," on account of the historical ambiguities attaching to it, still it is evident that the Finite Controller of The Given is a self-existent ground of the world, and so is absolute in Dean Knudson's sense. This he sees and admits (p. 263). He admits another point which is vital to my theory, namely, that God has a nature, without which his will "would have no content or direction." The Dean well adds: "Only as it is linked up with the divine nature can the divine will escape being a vague and empty abstraction" (p. 269). He even grants that "in thus giving direction to the divine will the divine nature may be said to limit it. . . Limitation in the sense of definiteness of nature is of the very essence of being" (p. 270). Thus far we are at one. He grants that there is an uncreated limit to the divine will. We differ only about the nature and function of this limit. I find in it, in addition to reason, a content aspect which occasions a real problem and a real struggle in God. The Dean objects, yet concedes that the struggle with The Given offers "a specific reason for the divine activity" and accounts "for the unideal aspects of the world without compromising the divine character" (p. 273). But these concessions do not imply agreement.

Dean Knudson holds that, for four main reasons, my view is inadequate. First, he says that The Given thwarts permanently "the full realization of the divine purpose" (pp. 272-273). Secondly, he asserts that "to deny omnipotence is to deny moral perfection" (p. 274); although he points out that it is objective goodness (p. 366), not subjective goodness of intention, which is compromised. Thirdly, my view is supposed to establish "too sharp a distinction between the nature and will of God" (p. 274). And, fourthly, my view is met by a reference to "human ignorance" (p. 366).

First, then, does The Given permanently thwart the full realization of the divine purpose? The answer depends on how we conceive the divine purpose (see p. 273, n. 31). Is that purpose the attainment of a state of affairs so utterly final and perfect that no conceivable improvement is possible? Then the aim of all action would be ultimate Nirvana, an ideal which the Dean rejects as wholeheartedly as I do. He tacitly admits that we must view the divine purpose as "increase of value" (same note); but he holds that my view does not allow "an ideal increase of value." Now, I believe that experience warrants faith in an inexhaustible increase of value, an eternal "perfectibility" of the universe (PG, pp. 130, 183), but I see no

ground for the faith that the problematic Given will ever be annihilated. This implies that the will of a good and rational God in an ultimately temporal world of struggle is not what the will of such a God would be in an ultimately timeless world of a wholly self-determining absoluteness. The existence of a Given does not, then, thwart the divine will; for that will is one of eternal striving. The divine will would be thwarted only if the increase of value were to cease, that is, if God gave up the struggle. Despite The Given, no suffering or disaster is final; beyond any Alps there always lies an Italy. This ongoing process can never be completed, but never can it be permanently thwarted. Its goal is not the end of struggle; its goal is eternal life which lifts the struggle to ever higher planes. Does this not allow "an ideal increase of values"? It is at least a possible conception of the ideal; and any conception of an increase of value implies that the universe can be improved.

Secondly, the Dean says that to deny omnipotence is to deny "objective" moral perfection. By objective goodness I take him to mean perfection of achievement in accordance with will. I have already shown why we cannot speak of the divine will as being thwarted. Yet any view which grants that at any stage of the universe, even temporarily, there is any factor of which God does not wholly approve, thereby grants that there is some limitation on divine achievement. The demand for perfect objective goodness is refuted if there is anything whatever that is not as it ought to be. To assert that now God is objectively perfectly good is a serious compromise of the ideal of goodness. There is enough objective goodness in God to control and eternally improve a universe not wholly a product of his will. Is not that as much as the facts allow? And is it not enough for religious faith?

The third objection, namely, that I establish too sharp a distinction between nature and will, is refuted in principle by the Dean's admission that the divine nature does limit the will (p. 270). However, on my view there is a portion of the divine nature which is not only "not ratified by the divine will" (p. 275), but even is unwilled and disapproved of as it stands. For example, in so far as God's struggle with The Given in his nature is the ground of human insanity, I cannot say that God approves of such an aspect of his nature. Nevertheless, God may be said to "ratify" his personality as a whole, without approving certain uncreated parts of it; for his nature as a whole is the progressive control of The Given, not ratification of it.

The fourth objection is the appeal to human ignorance. To quote the

Dean again: "If the existence of evil requires us to affirm either the divine omnipotence or human ignorance, and if one theory is logically as tenable as the other, faith will have no hesitation in making its choice in favor of the latter" (p. 366). Surely no sane mind will deny human ignorance. But from human ignorance no particular truth about God can be inferred, nor does the Dean intend to do so. The impotence and ignorance refer solely to the evil surd in the universe. But, remembering that the ugly word "impotence" means merely a limit to divine power, I must protest that that word alone does not state my view. The choice is not between divine impotence and human ignorance, but rather between two faiths for us ignorant mortals. We must choose between the faith that God's will does not produce the evil in question, yet can make all things work together for an increasing good, and the faith that God produces both the evil and also a perfectly ideal outcome from it. As far as the abstract idea of God is concerned, both faiths are self-consistent; one theory, as the Dean says, is logically as tenable as the other. But the facts of experience as a whole, and faith in a suffering and redeeming God, make the former much more probable than the latter. God may be called impotent, then, in that he cannot choose not to suffer. But he is free to choose for what end he will suffer and strive.

Knowing that my answers do not close the question either for Dean Knudson or for myself, I turn now to the more polemic, but always courteous and intelligent, criticisms of Professor Edwin Lewis as presented in his new book, *God and Ourselves* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1931). In treating Professor Lewis' ideas, I shall be guided by the more complicated nature of the material and discuss each point when I first mention it.

The first objection that Professor Lewis raises is that my view is a compromise which will satisfy no one. "The wild beast who is waiting to devour you will simply sniff contemptuously at the nice bone you throw him" (p. 13). The prophesied sniffing has occurred, I freely admit, in *The Journal of Philosophy*. But I am so antiquated as not to regard sniffs as arguments; and even the word "compromise" does not distress me. Of course, if we know that we are in possession of the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, then we can well afford to be high and mighty and refuse to compromise; but if we are seeking for more truth and actually believe that our present knowledge is capable of improvement, then a process of learning from all comers, which may be called compromise if you wish, commends itself to me as more open-minded and

progressive than a view which simply stands pat on attained insights and believes that "neither theism nor atheism can expect to be original" (p. 12). To say that I compromise is to say that I believe that something may be learned from every honest mind that faces the facts of life, and that God has something about himself to teach us which has not yet been threshed over by the theologians. "We must grant that the idea of God is capable of change" (PG, p. 15).

But since I claim only probability, not intellectual finality or demonstrative certainty, for my view (as well as for all possible human thinking), Professor Lewis feels that I have deprived the soul of the certainty of faith (Chapter I, *The Right to Be Certain*). But here he has simply misunderstood my point. While I emphasize the hypothetical character of all knowledge, and teach (FG, Chapter III) that faith is, intellectually considered, hypothesis, yet I have for years dwelt on the paradoxical fact that we must combine intellectual open-mindedness with practical loyalty to attained truth. Hence I accept the formula of Karl Groos, "theoretical relativism, practical absolutism," which, I take it, is essentially what Professor Lewis means. I am conscious of no basic difference here, despite my critic's assertion of difference.

Approaching my thought more closely, he calls it a modern Manichæism (p. 55). Yet my view is a denial of dualism, and an assertion that the unity of divine personality contains complex experience which is controlled, although not originated, by God's creative will. Why describe a view as Manichæan merely because it asserts that God did not actually create his own being, but finds within himself elements which call for action? Yet I will grant that if I had to choose between a dualism of God and Satan and a monism which ascribes everything that is, without exception, to the will of God, I should prefer the dualism. Fortunately I do not have to make the choice.

Professor Lewis describes my God as one "who is growing in wisdom, power, and goodness" (p. 80), and regards this as meaning that God will some day attain completeness. Perhaps he will see my meaning better if he rereads PG, pp. 130-131, and considers also the formula of old Heraclitus, who taught that all things change except the "Logos" of change. In God, as I understand him, there is always perfect good will, perfect love, and perfect knowledge of all that is knowable; yet there is also creative activity and real struggle with The Given. As I have said before, the divine perfection means a divine perfectibility; but this perfectibility, to use Dean Knudson's language, is in the objective, not in the subjective,

aspects of goodness. My view is a plea for a dynamic instead of a static universe, a suffering and creative, instead of an impassive and impassible God.

A criticism based on a misunderstanding of my use of terms is made by Professor Lewis in his assertion that I forgot the New Testament when I said that in the "traditional view" God "stands apart from the [human] struggle in spotless white." He quotes, in answer, what is actually one of my own favorite passages about The Given, namely, the reference to the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" (p. 102). Far from forgetting such New Testament ideas, I regard them as indications that an eternal Cross, eternal suffering, as well as eternal Easter, reveal the complex and mysterious nature of God. Professor Lewis' misunderstanding arose from his failure to notice that when I speak of the "traditional view" I mean traditional theism, with its highly abstract conception of God. Would that the New Testament had become sufficiently traditional in our thinking to save us from such remote abstraction!

A more serious criticism is that I do not have the right idea of omnipotence (p. 102, n. 14). In making this statement Professor Lewis does what I wish all critics would do, namely, refers me to a place where I can find what he regards as the true view. Hence I turn again to Galloway's excellent *Philosophy of Religion* and reread the recommended passage on omnipotence. The heart of Galloway's statement runs: "God is all-powerful, for he is the independent and self-sufficient ground of the being of the world, and therefore not limited by anything which does not proceed from his own will" (p. 485). The last clause is the crux: "not limited by anything which does not proceed from his own will." My view, of course, is that he is limited by his nature, The Given, which does not proceed from his will in the first place, whatever attitude his will may take toward it. Hence I deny omnipotence as authoritatively interpreted. Now, even Dean Knudson, as we saw, admits that the divine nature is a limit to the divine will: How about Professor Lewis? Turning to page 95 I read: "Why the nature of God should be as it is—this is one of those ultimate questions to which we can give no answer. To say that his nature as good is self-determined marks no advance in thought, since God must already be good in order to determine himself to the good." Precisely. This is exactly my view as regards the formal aspect of The Given; and it admits that we cannot regard the divine nature as proceeding wholly from the divine will. Professor Lewis thus implies an internal limitation to divine omnipotence, although he is not willing to draw from this limi-

tation the inferences which I draw. Omnipotence as traditionally defined is defective; the attribute must be modified. The only question is as to the extent of the modification.

I have treated, I think, all of the points in Professor Lewis' book which bear directly on my view and have not been previously covered, save for two positive statements of his with which I must take issue. On page 14 he says: "What the nature of things necessarily puts asunder—God and Evil—let not man join together." This statement is either a truism or a manifest error. If Evil means moral evil, it is a truism, and an irrelevant one; for no one has proposed to ascribe any degree of moral evil to God. If, on the other hand, Evil means natural evil, suffering, pain, and the like, the statement is manifest error, contradicted by Christianity and by the entire spirit of Professor Lewis' book. God and Evil must be put together in any rational view of the whole, and Professor Lewis does put them together, as do I. Only he ascribes natural evil to the will of the omnipotent God, while I ascribe it to the nature of the finite One. Any view which refused to put them together would indeed be dualism and incoherence. The statement is so extraordinary that I vacillate between suspecting that I am misunderstanding its intent and believing that it was a lapse on Professor Lewis' part.

The other statement which I reject is much more fundamental and crucial. It is the assertion that God "knows no change" (p. 32). Hocking, Professor Lewis thinks, is right when he speaks of a "Changeless Absolute" (p. 56). If the idea of The Given raises difficulties, the idea of a Changeless Absolute raises far more. True enough, there must be respects in which a God will not change; in his principles, his purposes, his goodness there is no deviation from eternity to eternity. But is not a personality always a concrete synthesis of change and identity? How could God be a person if change were utterly foreign to him? How could his bloodless categories ever get into action as a ballet? How could he explain a changing world? Why all this time and evolution, all this history and incarnation, all the apparent ongoing of things if change, and so time, are unreal? Even Hegel says that the *Idea* is Process! Professor Lewis approves of Leighton as one who has not "bowed in the house of Rimmon" (p. 15), where, by implication, I am dwelling; let me, then, refer to Leighton's admirable defense of temporalism which I cite in PG (p. 10). If God knows no change, and nothing can happen in him, then God is wholly Given, and creative will has nothing to do; for creative will certainly means change. I heartily agree with Professor D. F. Swenson, of the University of Minnesota, who

once remarked at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association that Christianity is essentially a belief in the reality of change; in the incarnation and in salvation something happens in God as well as in man. And when Professor Lewis is thinking of religion and not of abstract concepts he too shares this belief; for he says that "the world's travail is also his travail" and that he is a God "who cares" (p. 149). "God suffers to be God" (p. 164). How can he care and suffer and never experience change?

After so much expression of disagreement, I wish to voice my high appreciation of Professor Lewis's book (I have spoken of Dean Knudson's in FG, p. 15). It is a stimulating and valuable contribution, which has made me think hard. Irrespective of agreement or disagreement I like especially the Chapters on "The Universal Sovereign," "The Inevabilities of Life," and "The Universal Servant." May I select for emphatic agreement three ideas in particular? "The rationality of the universe and the fact of God stand or fall together" (p. 32). This is essentially what I said in PG (p. 105) and FG (p. 56). A second point is the reference to the nature of God on page 95 (already quoted). A third is the distinction between God's *sancioning* every free act without necessarily *approving* it (p. 99). But I hope that no reader will take my word either for or against any idea either of Professor Lewis or of anyone else. Let each seeker for truth read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest all that he can find on every side of the great questions of human life and destiny. My critics and I are at one in this; we appeal to no authority other than the authority of reason and experience. May all our discussion lead to an enrichment and a more reasonable understanding of experience!

Book Reviews

The Significance of Jesus Christ in the Modern World. The Report of the Delaware Conference. Edited by FRANK KINGDON. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.

No one can read the reports of the Conference at Delaware, Ohio, last June on *The Significance of Jesus Christ in the Modern World* without realizing that the members of the Conference were busy about something important.

These reports were prepared originally by fourteen special commissions which met from time to time over a period of two years in various parts of the country. All of them were then exposed to public criticism at the Conference at Delaware. I attended that Conference for a brief period and am willing to testify to the high level of the discussion. There were both a searching spirit of intellectual inquiry and a passion to achieve results which might give spiritual power and direction to the church at large. It is my belief that in both content and method these reports set a standard for all similar ventures on the part of Protestant Christian bodies. Each report contains questions and bibliography and the entire series can be used most advantageously by study groups.

Two questions came to me in reading these documents. First, Has not this Conference blazed a new trail toward Christian unity? Our ecclesiastical attempts at Christian unity move forward at a snail's pace. Our ecclesiastical administrators fear thought. They are afraid that discussion will interfere with the raising of budgets. Why cannot Christians get together as individuals and work toward a larger fellowship by thinking our way into larger and more dynamic conceptions of the gospel?

Second, can we expect the Christian religion to direct the life of our time unless it is also able to direct the thought

of our time? There is a fine utterance by Dr. John Mackay, published in one of the reports: "Christianity is a way of thought as well as a way of life." That utterance is in line with what one of the most distinguished philosophers of America said to me not long ago. He expressed the conviction that our civilization will not fulfill its promise until the pulpit reassumes the responsibility it has abdicated, of the leadership of our civilization in philosophic thought. The Delaware Reports are a sign of the resumption of that responsibility.

JUSTIN WROE NIXON.

Present Day Summons to the World Mission of Christianity. By JOHN R. MOTT. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. \$2.

DOCTOR JOHN R. MOTT, in *The Present Day Summons to the World Mission of Christianity*, has given the Christian world a volume in keeping with his high and unequalled service in world Christian leadership. Only Doctor Mott could have written such a book, for it is the fruit of his unique and altogether unmatched travel and study in the interest of Kingdom development across a period of forty years. It is a very serious and statesmanlike book on what is to the active Christian the paramount issue in any period of human history; namely, the dissemination, penetration, and promise of the Christian enterprise in all lands. While the volume naturally grows out of the significant meeting in Jerusalem in 1928 of the International Missionary Council, of which meeting Doctor Mott was chairman, its range is much wider than that and it deals comprehensively and trenchantly with the modern missionary enterprise "in its field of concern, its complexity, its pace, and its governing motives and objectives."

Doctor Mott did not write hastily, directly following the history-making conference in Jerusalem in 1928, but waited until he had made other extensive tours throughout strategic centers of the world and had checked over against the findings and declarations of that meeting his own further personal observations in this time of great change and complexity. The book has ten chapters and deals with such outstanding issues in the present-day challenge to Christianity as world trends, rural life, industry, and race, besides the summons which comes to Christianity to share and to co-operate. Then he goes on to deal with the summons of the living message, the call to the home-base to back the enterprise of the world mission of Christianity, and the leadership necessary for the task.

A characteristic statement in this intellectually and spiritually arresting volume is found in one of the last sentences of the book, in which he speaks of the high challenge of this great enterprise for the uplift and redemption of humanity. He says: "It takes a program such as world-wide missions, properly conceived and presented in all their massive greatness, wholeness, oneness, and revolutionary transforming power, to arrest the attention and command the co-operation of men and women of large affairs and of the greatest power and influence."

Doctor Mott's book is the latest, the most cogent, and the most comprehensive statement of what Christianity confronts in its mission to humanity.

STEPHEN J. COREY.

John Calvin: The Man and His Ethics. By GEORGIA HARKNESS.
New York: Henry Holt and Co.
\$3.

THE chief emphasis and value of this book rest more on the moral standards and social teachings of Calvin and their effect on subsequent history than on the man himself, his theology, and religious

influence. His ethics and their implications in his own time and since are far more interesting than some of the rather repelling aspects of Calvinism.

This man of conflicting virtues and faults is one of the root characters of Protestantism. His life and work have made a direct and far-reaching contribution to the religious, social, and political development of over three centuries.

The author is a member and minister of a church not in the lineal descent of Calvinism, but her position and treatment are most fair and judicial and the tracing of ethical and moral principles to their social, economic, and religious conclusions is faithfully and intelligently performed. All Christian people, regardless of denominational families, will be greatly edified by this book.

One comes from a reading of the volume with a better understanding of even the unattractive and austere features of Calvinism and certainly with a keener appreciation of the foundation laid by Calvin for much of the good in democracy, as well as for some of the evils which inhere in a too literal interpretation of the Scriptures and of some of the wrongs from which we are now suffering under an imperialistic capitalism.

The book points out a number of paradoxes in the teachings of Calvin, particularly in reference to the relation of church and state. Growing out of the form of theocratic government he set up in Geneva, he first stood for the complete union of church and state, then the dominant influence of the Church in the state, and then the right of just rulers to the loyal support of Christians, but when Kings and Bishops failed to follow the standards of religion and the rights of the people, Calvin and his followers stood for controversy, opposition, and rebellion.

The author most clearly establishes the sequence historically between Calvin and Puritanism, political liberty, and the

rise of certain major Christian denominations, some of which have greatly modified his dogmas and beliefs.

The book is comprehensive in showing the enduring influence of this great personality and evaluates the molding forces which were released, but which have been ruled and overruled by Providence and by the processes of time for the general good of mankind.

FRANK A. HORNE.

Social Progress and Christian Ideals. Edited by WILLIAM P. KING. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. \$2.25.

THIS book is a careful, critical analysis of Western civilization leading to the conclusion that progress toward a social order, which shall be based upon the principles and ideals of Jesus, is possible providing we can effectively utilize science, ethics, and religion: science for developing the necessary instruments and techniques, ethics in the selection of goals, religion for the creation of dynamic social convictions.

The authors, while contending vigorously for the possibility of achieving human progress, do not lead us into a belief in an evolutionary process which will inevitably bring about a more perfect social organization. They "warrant neither complacent optimism nor enervating despair."

They propose that the Christian ideals of bread, brotherhood and freedom be taken out of the realm of abstraction and made specific through the abolition of war, poverty and unemployment.

We are challenged to social action, action "engineered by understanding, promoted by an educational method and propelled by social passion." If we respond and make their ideals and concrete program a reality within the very near future, social progress is probable. If we shirk the task, social change will

come not by orderly evolution, but by revolution.

The record of the church in dealing with social issues in the ancient, medieval, and modern worlds is set forth in detail. Certain parts will cause the churchman to hang his head in shame, while others will make him proud of his connection with the institution. He will find that the religion of Jesus, instead of being a narcotic which makes him content with the status quo, is a stimulant motivating him to cooperate with God in the building of his Kingdom here on earth.

This book is very opportune, coming as it does at a time of world depression and despair. It offers a ray of hope—a constructive way out.

CHARLES C. WEBBER.

The Philosophy of Religion.—By RUDOLPH OTTO. Translated by E. B. DICKER. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. \$2.50.

DR. Rudolph Otto's book, *The Idea of the Holy*, made such an indelible impression upon all who read it that his *Philosophy of Religion* has been eagerly awaited. It deals chiefly with the philosophy of Fries and his contribution to the philosophy of religion in general; especially his relation to Kant, but also to Jacobi, Schleiermacher and De Wette.

Fries carried forward the method of criticism made central by Kant. Fries was searching for a "religious *a priori*," but rejected the subjective "*a priori*" of Kant. Fries regarded the task of philosophy as that of discovering "the real nature of belief, the ideal sphere of conviction, and to make their truth secure." He held that knowledge of God comes through simple religious feeling which is the central portion of the intellect.

The book is planned in three main divisions: (a) the theory of ideas, (b) practical philosophy, (c) the philosophy of Fries in its relation to theology.

In the first two divisions special attention is given to the relation of Fries to Kant, and emphasis is laid upon the fact that Fries followed out the work of Kant. The third division deals with De Wette.

Doctor Otto says that Fries has shown "the place of religion in the soul, the sources from which it proceeds, the different kinds of real knowledge, its relations to the other intellectual activities, its general basic ideas."

Fries lacked, he says, an explanation of religion as a phenomenon in history, its historical phases and development.

Doctor Otto concludes that modern theology is a science of religion, whereas the old was a metaphysics. The search is for the validity of religion, which will require that preliminary work be done in the realm of philosophy proper. Fries laid the basis of this modern theology. The solution of the problem of religion is to be found in Fries' theory of feeling.

GEOFFREY WARDLE STAFFORD.

The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought.—By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. \$3.00.

In this book, the substance of which was delivered as the Ghosh Lectures before the University of Calcutta, India, in 1928, the professor of theology at Yale University seeks to expound the universal basis of all religion. And he has been singularly successful in his task. He brings to bear upon the problem a deep personal experience and a ripe scholarship, and moves with the sure step of certitude through the mazes of philosophy.

He commences his task with the evident conviction that religion has its basis in the psychical nature of man; that, as Tylor stated in his *Primitive Culture*, "Ethnography knows of no race devoid of religion, but only differences in the

degree in which religious ideas are developed"; that there is in all religions, beneath their external trappings, a common denominator; and that this common denominator may well serve as a rapprochement between the various religions of the world.

He first of all surveys traditionalism, empiricism, critical agnosticism, absolute idealism, pragmatism, realism, critical monism, and duly appraises the weakness and the strength of each; and casting aside the bad, he seeks to weld the good into a whole for the great purpose he has in view.

He indicates that there are four valid methods of arriving at religious conclusions—the historical, the pragmatic, the scientific and the metaphysical; and adds, "From the point of view of metaphysics" we find that it is "most reasonable to interpret reality in activistic, teleological and essentially theistic terms."

The peoples of the East and of the West are seekers after the Universal and the Eternal, he says, and then proceeds to lay down what seem to him to be the characteristic features of universally valid religion: (a) Universal religion must appreciate and be instrumental to universally valid values; (b) Universal religion must be scientific, and must pay due attention to the acknowledged results of science; (c) Universal religion must and eventually will find place for certain assurances which are the natural and logical expression of normal, spiritual living; and normal, spiritual living, he defines as "moral" and "optimistic"; (d) Universal religion, he says, must develop a rational and universally valid religious philosophy.

One lays down this book with the feeling of regret that it is not twice the length. The author's clarity of thought and lucidity of style make it a joy to read. And it is very refreshing in these days when nationalism is rampant, when men are dividing themselves into sections and sub-sections, to be brought face

to face once more with the great truth that in the religions of the world there is a common denominator which may serve as a basis for binding together this sundered world of ours that, despite the surface appearances to the contrary, we are still "members one of another"; and that "God hath made of one . . . all nations of men."

GEOFFREY WARDLE STAFFORD

Gandhi at Work. More of His Own Story. Edited by CHARLES F. ANDREWS. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.50.

As the sub-title, *More of His Own Story*, indicates, this volume is autobiographical and supplementary to the one entitled *Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story*, which was also edited by Mr. Andrews. The same editor for both volumes gives a unity to the narrative and insures a symmetrical portrait of the unique and distinguished Indian Leader.

The world knows Gandhi as the champion of Indian independence and the uncompromising advocate of the method of "passive resistance" as the means of attaining a political goal. But few are aware of his long and bitter experience of twenty years in South Africa in which he learned and tested his method of redressing a wrong or attaining political ends without resort to physical force. The present volume gives a detailed account of the struggle of the East Indians in the different sections of the South African Union for their rights as men and as citizens of a British Colony. As the leader of the Indian community, Gandhi devised the method of "passive resistance," for which he prefers the Sanscrit word *Satyagraha* (truth-force or soul-force), as he regards passive resistance a weapon only of the weak. The present volume was written, according to Gandhi, "to show clearly how *Satyagraha*, for which

I believe I am equally prepared to die, originated and how it was practiced in a large scale." In brief, *Satyagraha* is the key word of the book.

To understand how the struggle came about, it is necessary to account for the presence of the East Indians in South Africa. Many years earlier they were taken there as "indentured laborers" to work in mines and on large estates. Such an arrangement is not far removed from slavery and is sure to poison race relations. Quite naturally Indian merchants followed in the train of the laborers and in the course of time attained not only wealth, but also a clientèle among the British and Dutch population. The success of the merchant and banker soon aroused the jealousy and the fears of their European competitors. In consequence of this, a systematic campaign of repression was organized with the enactment of oppressive laws requiring registration and imposing burdensome taxation. All this takes us back to the days prior to the Boer War (1899-1902) when South Africa was divided into four political units: Cape Colony and Natal (British), Orange Free State and the Transvaal (Dutch). In general, both the Boer and Briton had the same attitude to the East Indian; to both alike he was a hewer of wood and a drawer of water.

At this juncture Gandhi appears in South Africa, not as a deliverer, but as a young lawyer with a prominent and wealthy Indian merchant as his client. Almost at once he becomes a marked man because of his ability, his integrity, and his courage in the conduct of his client's suits, and in the defense of his fellow countrymen against oppressive laws.

In the wake of the Boer War, after the territories in South Africa ceased to be crown colonies, the condition of the Indians speedily passed from bad to worse. The London Cabinet no longer had any authority to set aside the laws

of a Dominion. Color prejudice and race hatred carried the Transvaal government beyond the bounds of reason and decency in the Ordinance of August 22, 1906, known popularly as the Black Ordinance. The purpose of the law was legitimate enough, but its methods were an outrage. Every Indian man, woman, or child was required to register by a certain date, and for the purpose of identification the finger and thumb impressions were to be taken. It was this last requirement, which is imposed only on criminals in civilized lands, that fired the train and caused an explosion. It started Gandhi to develop the idea of "passive resistance," *Satyagraha*, truth-force or soul-force. At a mass meeting the Indians took an oath to refuse to register and to be ready to go to prison. Soon the struggle was on: imprisonment with hard labor for Gandhi and hundreds of his followers was the rigorous penalty. It was in this harsh experience that he forged the weapon which has finally forced the Indian question on the attention of the Imperial Cabinet. For every thorny question in the Indian field which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has to face to-day he has to thank Mr. Louis Botha and General Smuts, who do not appear in an enviable light in this connection. The Indian problem, if not directly caused by the South African treatment of Indians, was certainly aggravated by such laws as the Black Ordinance and by the treatment meted out to Gandhi's countrymen.

It is not possible to follow the struggle step by step as it developed with successes and reverses until the Indian leader finally, in 1914, induced the South African Government to grant his chief demands. The main points in which relief had been sought were the repeal of the £3 tax, the legalization of the marriages celebrated according to Hindu and Moslem rites, the entry of educated Indians, and reasonable laws justly ad-

ministrated. The book has a vital message for the world, for it shows how justice may be attained and legislation secured without resorting to the methods of violence and anarchy.

JAMES A. KELSO.

The Doctrines of the Christian Faith. By SYDNEY CAVE. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 8/6d.

THIS is a course of lectures delivered at Hartford Seminary in 1929. The author has had a wide experience as a pastor and missionary in India, and is now the Principal of Cheshunt College in Cambridge, England. Such a background is reflected in the comprehension, sympathy, and substantiality of the book. It is written with a lucidity and brevity that makes it readable to an average layman. The genuineness of the author's scholarship appears in his resort for authority to primary sources in various languages. The positions taken are much the same as those set forth in the *Basic Beliefs*, of Maldwyn Hughes, which book the author greatly admires. I esteem this book of Sydney Cave's to be one of the best statements of introductory systematic theology available to-day.

JOHN W. LANGDALE.

Karl Barth. Prophet of a New Christianity? By WILHELM PAUCK. New York and London: Harper and Brothers. \$2.

OF the growing influence of Karl Barth and his followers in Germany there can be no doubt. What is it that gives to him his unique position? He is difficult to understand. He has no clear-cut system. He does not want to found a "school." Yet his following steadily increases. He evidently has a message to the theological students and thinkers in Germany. Has he a message also to the English-speaking theologians? Is he the prophet of a new Christianity?

Karl Barth cannot be understood except against the background of German post-war mentality, disillusionment, despair of the old, and quest for something new. Barth is the prophet of this unrest. His strength, like the strength of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, is in the critical analysis of present thought and organized activity. He is looking for reality in the mass of illusions, for an objective foundation in the place of subjective theories. This he finds in the absolute existentiality of God as opposed to historical relativism and psychological sublimations, which, according to him, have vitiated theology as well as practical living. He is thoroughly opposed to modernistic humanism, yet he is far from being a traditionalist or a fundamentalist. In fact he cannot be classified. Neither can he be followed in all his conclusions. In fact his conclusions are by no means fixed. Yet the questions he raises are fundamental. They are disturbing to the snug self-complacency of both modernist and fundamentalist. Barth has not found the final answer, but he is compelling us again to face and ponder the transcendence of God and the reality of his self-revelation over against every kind of self-deification of man.

Dr. Wilhelm Pauck, Professor of Historical Theology at the Chicago Theological Seminary, is eminently qualified to introduce Karl Barth to American readers. He was educated in Germany and is thoroughly conversant with the German background of Barth's viewpoint. He has lived long enough in America to understand the American mind. He aims to be an interpreter, not an advocate. On the whole, this is as lucid and penetrating an introduction to the Barthian theology as I have seen.

JOHN L. NUELSEN.

God and Ourselves. By EDWIN LEWIS. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.50.

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DOCTOR LEWIS directs his attention to the very core of the theistic problem. The subtitle of his book, "*A Plea for the Reality, Adequacy and Availability of God*," will suggest both its purpose and its tenor. In one view it is a comprehensive critique of the most important theistic literature of the past two decades; direct reference is made to over two hundred books, most of them of contemporary date, and hardly a page fails to indicate its indebtedness to the best thought of our day. In another view, the book is a solid, comprehensive and convincing development of the author's own position—a rich and full theism.

The order of topics is unusual and adds freshness to the argument. Two introductory chapters survey the present temper of religious thought, the need for certainty in religion, and the major issues. The author then plunges directly into an unusually exhaustive consideration of various aspects of the problem of evil—death, suffering, natural evil, hunger, error, and finally sin. The way is thus opened for a study of suffering in the Divine Experience. Only after a disposal of the questions of evil and redemption are we confronted with the usual prolegomena of theistic discussion—the nature of mind, the problem of knowledge, and the positive evidence for God. Here the heart of the argument is that "what life deeply needs is actually provided for it." Religion completes life and vindicates its essential goodness. The final emphasis falls upon the adventure of faith, without which we can never achieve assurance of that which our souls most deeply need.

To the present reviewer, the strength of the book is in its extensive use of the contributions of others, its *rappor* with dominant currents in contemporary thought, and its determination to deal with all the difficulties which harass the modern mind. But its strength also suggests certain limitations. Its refutations are sometimes dogmatic and over-vigorous,

ous, rather than persuasive. And continual reference to the thought of others, both critical and appreciative, somewhat blurs the coherence and clarity of the author's own constructive argument. The book is not calculated to overpersuade many who approach it with skeptical presuppositions; probably that was not its purpose. It will certainly confirm and strengthen the convictions of those who already share its position. And not the least of its services is the splendid introduction it furnishes to the literature of the field.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN.

Christian Faith and Life. By WILLIAM TEMPLE. New York: Macmillan. \$1.50.

SCHOLARLY, spiritual, practical—these three. Reasonably conservative in theology but perfectly fearless. Constructive and evangelical. Anything from the pen of Doctor Temple will be scholarly; not because he is an archbishop, but because he is William Temple. The author of *Christus Veritas* always speaks with authority.

This, however, is not frigid scholarship, but warm and vital. The spiritual grip of parts of this book is very great—for example, Chapter V, "The Meaning of the Crucifixion," and Chapter VII, "Prayer and Sacraments."

Each lecture is broken by a hymn and is concluded with a Scripture reading and prayer, imparting to it the impulse of a scholarly evangelism!

The book is a result of a preaching mission at Oxford. English students must be more serious in mind and purpose than the American. The appeal is addressed to the whole man, not ignoring his intellect.

"What do we mean by God?" and "Is there a Moral Standard?" are most thorough-going and constructive aids to faith, without evasion of hard problems. "Sin and Repentance" speaks with

moral enthusiasm and does not ignore modern psychology.

The final appeal to join the Christian Society is moving; is earnest and sincere. And likely, the practical interest is the one most dominant. Here are some examples of the clear, practical, fearless sentences in which the book abounds:

"It is, no doubt, true that we have repeatedly substituted compromise for warfare and prudence for the spirit of adventure" (p. 128). "It is good to be sensible; it is better to be heroic; but it is best of all to be both, although very few of us are" (p. 11).

"The mind grows always by intercourse with a mind more mature than itself" (p. 27). "You say the Creed; the words 'I believe in God' . . . you mean 'I mean to live as if these things were so.' If you do not mean that you ought not to say the Creed" (p. 35). "As soon as we have done something that is nasty, we have blunted our own capacity to be disgusted; we have tarnished the mirror in which we are to look at our own reflection" (p. 55).

A good book to be put in the hands of seriously minded individuals or study groups of college age. Better still is it suited to refresh the mind of some busy minister who needs a statement of Christian doctrine and ethics in a small compass.

JESSE HALSEY.

Jesus Came Preaching.—By GEORGE A. BUTTRICK. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50.

IF there is one task more difficult than to resurrect a city church which has fallen on evil days, it is perhaps the task of taking up a distinguished ministry at the peak of its usefulness, and of carrying it on with undiminished power. It used to be said frequently that the unique serviceableness of the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church in New York City could not survive the pastorate of Dr.

Henry Sloane Coffin. A young man in his thirties has belied the pessimists, and under the leadership of Dr. George A. Buttrick, the church continues to be a center of ever-increasing spiritual vitality, which means, of course, that it is sought out by the great numbers who want first-hand contact with the grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ. In the spring of this year Doctor Buttrick was invited to stand in the succession of Beecher, Brooks, Dale, Jowett, Fosdick, and others in the most famous lectureship in America, as Lyman Beecher Lecturer on Preaching at Yale University.

Possibly the secret of Doctor Buttrick's power as a preacher is revealed in this little book. Here is simplicity of thought, the simplicity of genius or mature wisdom which goes straight to the heart of every question, undismayed by the incidental and the trivial. Here is a mind which ranges widely over the field of thought and experience, always pointing true to certain great convictions to which assent has been given. Here is a gift for the right word, an unerring taste for the illuminating phrase which makes the reading of the chapters an undiluted pleasure. Above all, here is a plea for preaching which takes Jesus of Nazareth as its model, makes Him the burden of its message, and finds in Him the sources of inspiration and energy.

Doctor Buttrick is not unaware of the common criticisms of the preaching function which are current to-day. In fact, his opening lecture, like the title of the book, is a defense of the perennial place of the pulpit in religion. He is convinced that the preacher can still speak with authority, so long as he relies upon his genuine authority in Christ without self-betraying attempts to bolster that authority with artificial supports. He must know the mind of the day to which he preaches, and the social needs of the generation to which he addresses himself. Not the least significant chapter is a plea that the

preacher, however engrossed in social problems, should always preach to the individual rather than to the mob. Doctor Buttrick renders his readers the greatest service one minister can perform for another by opening the door of his study for revelations not only of his methods of work but also for glimpses of the spiritual life out of which good work springs. Having done that he has earned the right to conclude with a chapter on "The Preaching of the Cross."

These lectures will give many a preacher a new faith in his calling, and a new insight into the privileges and opportunities of the ministry. They are a worthy addition to the long line of Beecher Lectures which have heartened and guided previous generations of the ambassadors of Christ.

MORGAN PHELPS NOYES.

The Finding of God.—By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.

THE Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy in Boston University develops the theme of a previous volume, *The Problem of God* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1930). In that book, Doctor Brightman, functioning primarily as a teacher, offers a finite God, who is the Creator of the world of persons, but who is limited by his own self-will, by reason, by the free-will of man and by an uncreated "Given" in his own nature. God is conceived as The Controller of the Given.

Can one find intellectual satisfaction and spiritual inspiration in the finite God? In the volume under review, the teaching philosopher becomes also a preacher. *The Finding of God* makes this Controller of the Given walk the common roads of life. There are many paths to God. One does not have to try them all, but the religious life of the seeker is enriched if he tries as many

as possible of these paths. Four main roads are charted and the preacher pauses to interpret the points of interest along the way. The Way of Revelation is grounded in experience and it presupposes communication. In spite of psychological handicaps the liberal rather than the authoritarian reaches a more satisfactory solution, but both find God in experience. The brief critique of Barth and Brunner from this point of view is timely and convincing. The Way of Reason depends on experience for its data and offers a synopsis of experience. Intellectual certainty is impossible, but science commits us to the essential reasonableness of an hypothesis which may be tested in life. The Way of Moral Loyalty clears up the traditional conflict between morals and religion and presents a God who can cure the evils which he did not create. The Way of Religious Experience "points beyond the self to an Other in whom or in which the self finds its fulfillment, its purpose and its joy."

No matter which way one takes in the finding of God at the end if the path is a "spiritual satisfaction of being able to worship God with the same mind that faces the facts of experience, to accept the tragic aspects of life without denying its reality, and to trust the goodness and the power of God as eternally sufficient."

Doctor Brightman devotes the last four chapters of this most stimulating book to concrete illustrations of what the finite God, this Controller of the Given, means in practical terms. He discusses the patience of God, the mystery of God, the goodness of God, and the power of God. There is rich homiletic material on every page. Ministers who find any difficulty in comforting the bereaved or the unfortunate will find help in the calm, practical reasoning of this philosopher.

Any man who offers a new terminology will meet with severe criticism.

Doctor Brightman will not escape. He is in very good company, however, for whether one accepts The Controller of the Given as the best phrase which interprets God, the trend of present-day thinking is certainly in that direction. The Terry Lecturer at Yale, Doctor Montague, in *Belief Unbound* reaches the same goal by a different path. Religion to-day has a definite Promethean quality. It is creative intelligence defying the real in the interest of the ideal, and the acceptance of a possibility that the real and the ideal may be one and the same.

M. H. LICHLITER.

The Christ of the Mount.—By E. STANLEY JONES. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.50.

It is a sign of the times that amid our economic and social confusions new books are constantly appearing on the interior life and the way of Jesus. The book abounds in flashes of insight. If in some parts the exegesis appears a little forced, that is forgotten in the suggestiveness of the thought, its challenging relevance to our need, and, above all, in that glowing atmosphere of devotion in which new things start within the soul. The thesis of the book is that the Sermon on the Mount describes the nature of a Christian, both in his root and his fruit, and that kind of life is the acid test of the reality of the experience of Christ, out of which, of course, it is born.

The Church has never really taken the teaching of Christ seriously. Sometimes it escapes from Him by worshiping Him. Its tremendous affirmations about Him have been too often used to set Him so far above us as to relieve us of the need to be like Him. Doctor Jones's story of the soldiers who locked their commander in a tower in order that they might get on with the battle in their own way is a parable of what we have done with Christ. Mr. Bernard Shaw says

the same thing. He throws it at us that we have never taken Christ as a real person, who means what He says, "a force like electricity" which can be set to work with revolutionary effect. He has been but a picture in a frame, a statue on a pedestal. If only we would let Him come down!

Why should we blind our eyes to the fact that the big majority of people in our congregations are missing something vital, and are conscious of missing it? Religion does not contribute anything to the vitality of their lives. Their faith they would not give up, for it is precious. But it is too often like the buttresses to a building which gives no evidence of needing their support or of being supported by them. Religion fits into our scheme of life. But it does not control or shape our plans, and the result is a second best.

There is a best and God means us to have it. The finest chapter in Doctor Jones's book is that on the dynamic. One comes back to that. Without the assurance of a power which can start the pulse of a new life and keep it going, the Sermon on the Mount is so much bleak beauty, like ice-clad mountains, dazzling but unscaleable—a torment, a moral impasse. How much of the revolt against the principles of Jesus is the consciousness of mental conflict which He creates, but which, as it seems, He cannot solve. Yet that is just His power. Only there can be no half-way road. It is all or nothing. It means fullness of life, a salvation to the uttermost, or a life which is doomed to littleness and futility. He asks all, but He gives all. Is it not for a challenge and an offer like this that countless people are waiting?

JAMES REID (Eastbourne).

Bookish Brevities

I have observed that a reader seldom peruses a book with pleasure until he knows whether the writer of it be a black or fair man, of a mild or choleric disposition, married or a bachelor, with other particulars of a like nature that conduce very much to the right understanding of an author.—JOSEPH ADDISON.

Books of composite authorship can never reach first grade. Symposiums are supposed to be an ingenious device for obtaining the diversified approach of different people to a common subject. They are usually notable for the scope of their content and the eminence of their contributors. Symposiums have obvious weaknesses. The content may manifest a compliance with an invitation rather than the urge of a message. In their lack of unity and inequality of value symposiums betray the absence of orchestration. The consequence is a diffusion of effect in the reading of such a book as though consciously or unconsciously each contributor had acted and counteracted upon the others.

President John Timothy Stone, LL.D., of the Presbyterian Seminary in Chicago, presented to each member of the class of 1931 a copy of William Arthur's *Tongue of Fire*. The choice of so old a book signifies the motivating place that classic has had in Doctor Stone's ministry. It also signifies that despite the many recent books upon the Holy Spirit, a few of which are highly commendable, the book of the Holy Spirit, conceived in the light of present-day knowledge and need, is not yet born.

The city of Buenos Aires recently celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the literary career of Ricardo Rojas.

In the presence of the President of the Argentine Republic and other leaders who were part of a vast audience that filled the Colon Theater, the Minister of Education said to the distinguished author: "Keep on singing of the victory of man and of the Eternal Spirit of Christ, fertilizing the generation of the present and the future with goodness, truth and beauty." Since the publication of his *The Invisible Christ*, Señor Rojas has been much persecuted, in which he has felt not a little encouragement in the cordial reception given to his book in the United States.

The monumental size and extensive influence of the pulpit of Dr. Ernest F. Tittle in Evanston, Illinois, is insufficiently known in the eastern portion of the United States. It is equalled only by that of Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick. Beyond the Mississippi the preacher's name to conjure by is that of Doctor Tittle. In the leading eastern universities no minister is more eagerly welcomed. In one of the aristocratic residential cities of the United States, the dominating appeal and demand of his pulpit are for social justice. His devotion to truth, charity of spirit, and breadth of view allure the allegiance of a host of young people. His is the accumulating force of a strong man who, from youth, has maintained a determination at whatever cost to have something to say that is worth saying Sunday after Sunday. Doctor Tittle is to give the Yale Lectures on Preaching next April.

The two outstanding missionaries of the day are Dr. E. Stanley Jones and Dr. Albert Schweitzer. Both are filling an enlarging place in current religious literature.

The values of Stanley Jones are too well known to be recounted.

Few men have had the versatile abilities of Schweitzer. He is a doctor of medicine, philosophy, theology. He is a renowned organist, a gifted writer, and a social worker to whom is given the unstinted praise of General Smuts, who is not enthusiastic about the effectiveness of Christian missions in Africa. In that the General differs from Julian Huxley, who thinks that the door is wider open to Christianity in Africa than anywhere else.

Schweitzer says it was from Goethe he learned that to maintain a spiritual existence homely practical work should always accompany intellectual activity. Higher than Goethe, however, is the inspiration that keeps a genius serving ebony-skinned folks on the banks of a Central African river, overshadowed by a gloomy forest and saturated with the furnace heat of the tropics.

The radio is the most important medium of mass communication ever invented. It is being more rapidly developed in the direction of advertising and entertainment than in education and religion. The frequent report that five millions listen to the religious messages of each Sunday is obviously based upon a computation little more accurate than a guess. A surer test is the multitude of letters which come in response to the addresses. Interesting enough, the preachers who excel over the radio are also well-known writers.

In their amazing understanding of human nature and wisdom of judgment, Doctor Cadman's questions and answers are the most popular feature of religious radio ministry. Doctor Goodell has an audience all his own in a heart ministry to people who are discouraged under the burdens of life and who respond to his message by abandoning suicide, sin, and despair. A newer voice is that of Doctor Stamm, who has been receiving high commendation as one who can speak

to the average person illuminatingly and helpfully.

The two overseas preachers who are chiefly read in the United States are Arthur John Gossip and Leslie D. Weatherhead.

Doctor Gossip's *The Hero in Thy Soul*, which was written after a deep personal sorrow, is a widely circulated call to courage and confidence. "But When Life Tumbles In, What Then?" is the most talked of sermon of recent times.

Weatherhead is more typical of the younger preachers. Gossip is mature; Weatherhead continues to unfold. Gossip is a profounder thinker; Weatherhead has a sprightlier and more penetrating knowledge of human nature. Both are essentially preachers in that all they write discloses that they are out to win a verdict from the minds and hearts of their readers for the God who is like Jesus.

The authorities of the British Museum are interesting themselves in establishing a standard of beautiful English. Henry James contended that speech, both in correctness of pronunciation and quality of tone, is more slovenly in the United States than in Great Britain. Americans who seek to be careful about their speech expose themselves to the charge of being affected. We have the Yankee twang, the Southern drawl, and the mid-Western flat. Where to find a standard amid these sectional peculiarities is a problem. A Harvard accent is not welcomed and the diction of South Carolina is enjoyed, but not accepted. Mr. John Powell, the noted singer, in commenting on Helen Stockdell's *Speech Made Beautiful*, quotes Arthur James Balfour as saying, "The most perfect English is that spoken by cultivated Virginians."

Much work in archaeology is proceeding in the Near East. Notable discov-

eries are being made which throw light upon biblical characters and places. At Mugharet el Wad, a little west of Mount Carmel, Miss Dorothy Garrod and members of the American School of Prehistoric Research have unearthed evidence that Palestine was inhabited by a hardy agricultural race using only stone and bone implements thousands of years before the traditional time of Abraham. Since much of the work is being done by Americans and is being supported by American capital, valuable books on archaeology, by American writers, may be expected in the near future.

One of the leaders most instrumental in keeping the Peace Movement from degrading into a futile prevention of war is Dr. Frederick W. Norwood, minister of the City Temple, London, and a frequent and influential visitor to the United States.

Valiantly he has sought to convince people that it is not enough to hold meetings, sing hymns, offer prayers, orate about the dread of war, pass resolutions, and feel complacent. Steadfastly he has called for the setting up of a positive and constructive peace program by hard thinking and joint action.

It is one of the strange ways of Providence that this Melbourne boy, who was for twenty years a business man before he entered the ministry and who has been, in succession, a Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian and Congregationalist, would never have been known beyond his remote island home, had not the war brought him to France with the Anzacs.

Johnson's debt to Boswell is proverbial. The much discussed Gandhi owes a similar obligation to Mr. C. F. Andrews. Through successive books he has presented him not as a politician, but as a saint of perpetual love and service to the poor.

Mr. Andrews has spent nearly all his active life in India. For ten years he was a missionary under the auspices of Cambridge University. Anticipating and pioneering the development of modern missionary motivations, he came to the conviction that as imperialism blights the development of native peoples, so may missionary effort retard an indigenous Christianity. Ecclesiastical authorities who, if remembered at all, will be as shadows cast by his sunlight, undertook to rebuke him. Severing himself from any official connection, to an unprecedented extent he has identified himself in social practice with the Hindu people.

Pellucid as is his personality, his selfless devotion conveys a sense of reserve and distance. Many of his friends have wished that an autobiography might disclose more of what goes on within the Christlike man whose initials have given to him the cognomen, Christ's Friendly Apostle.

The Spectator, in a recent issue, stated that England is now as truly interested in Wesley as in Shakespeare and it may well be doubted whether in the long course of her history any one person has ever influenced life in so direct, palpable, and powerful a way as John Wesley.

The assembly of his followers at Atlanta last October brought from Great Britain several interesting literary personalities. The Rev. F. Luke Wiseman was the most conspicuous. He has a magnetic personality, musical genius, commanding preaching ability, and leadership in social progress.

Another fascinating visitor was the Rev. William H. Lax. His services to the underprivileged in the East End of London, through thirty years, are reputed to be unrivaled. He was one of several who astounded, not to say shamed, the American delegates by an unquestioned confidence in the readiness of God to recover every sort of lost personality.

His books, which throb with reality, courage, humor, hope, and faith, have quickly run to thirteen editions. Lax, of Poplar, is to-day's illustration of Matthew Arnold's sonnet:

'Twas August, and the fierce sun overhead
Smote on the squalid streets of Bethnal Green;
And the pale weaver, through his windows
seen
In Spitalfields, looked thrice dispirited.
I met a preacher there I knew, and said:
"Ill, and o'er worked, how fare you in this
scene?"
"Bravely," said he, "for I of late have been
Much cheered with thought of Christ the Living
Bread."
O human soul, as long as thou canst so
Set up a mark of everlasting light
Above the howling senses' ebb and flow,
To cheer thee, and to right thee if thou roam,
Not with lone toil thou laborest through the night,
Thou mak'st the heaven thou hop'st indeed
thy home.

Dr. Georgia Harkness is Professor of Philosophy at Elmira College. She is the author of two books which have received much acclaim especially in the

educational and philosophical world. After reading the recent books of her former teacher, Professor Edgar Sheffield Brightman, she wrote the following poem:

THE DIVINE PATIENCE

God strives.

Before the firmament was formed, the Eternal One
Envisaged all, and saw a battle to be won.
Through countless zones of creative pain and toil
A struggling God has labored with untiring moil.
God strives.

God feels.

The God who hears the gun-fire of eternal war,
And smells the stench of sin, must suffer with and
for
Humanity. The God who heals with conquering
power
Must know himself the pangs of grief when shad-
ows lower.
God feels.

God waits.

Man lights a torch: in feverish haste he goes about
His task. He sees the light burn low: it flickers out.
The ever-striving, ever-suffering God relights
The torch, and labors on through age-long nights.
God waits.

—GEORGIA HARKNESS.